

THE LIVING AGE



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THE LIVING AGE. Published monthly. Publication office, 10 FERRY STREET, CONCORD, N. H. Editorial and General offices, 253 Broadway, New York City. 50c a copy. \$6.00 a year. Canada, \$6.50. Foreign, \$7.00. Entered as second-class matter at the Post Office at Concord, N. H., under the Act of Congress, March 3, 1879. Copyright, 1933, by The Living Age Corporation, New York, New York.

THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May, 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, succeeding *Littell's Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: "The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world; so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries."

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THE GUIDE POST

J. L. GARVIN is one of the few prophets of hope who still command intelligent attention. As editor of the London *Observer*, he preaches Anglo-American friendship year in and year out, and it is perfectly evident that when the British Cabinet decided to pay the December 15 installment on the American debt it took a course of which he approves. 'Yaffle,' humorous contributor to the weekly organ of the Independent Labor Party, shares few of Mr. Garvin's opinions, and he compares the note in which the British Government pointed out the difficulties and dangers of war-debt payments with a Communist manifesto.

F. A. Weitzel is a German engineer who has been working on the Energy Survey of North America under the supervision of Howard Scott, director of Technocracy. Mr. Weitzel explains some of the social implications of Technocracy to the German public, for his article is scheduled to appear in his native country simultaneously with its publication here. Our translation was made in this office and then was checked over by the author. Some of the words and phrases are not those that Technocracy itself uses, and the point of view is that of the author alone.

As we go to press the armies of Japan are occupying Jehol, and the outlook for peace in the Orient was never so dark. It is therefore timely to consider the Russian point of view toward China and Japan, for it was probably more than a coincidence that the renewal of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Nanking was followed by more Japanese aggression in China. N. Terentyev, writing in an official Communist organ in Moscow, opens up the usual attack on the imperialist foreign powers and challenges Japan to sign a nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union. In spite of the belligerent

tone of many passages it is quite evident that the author realizes that war in the Far East represents a menace to his country. Since a Far Eastern war also represents a menace to the United States, resumption of diplomatic relations with Russia would seem to be the order of the day.

Two new premiers assumed office in Europe during the month of December. General von Schleicher, who succeeds Von Papen as Chancellor of the German Reich, is said to have expressed the intention of remaining in power for twenty years. In any case, he is a stronger man than his predecessor and his rise to power continues the strong-man tradition in Germany that began with Bismarck and came to life again in the form of Stresemann. Paul-Boncour, Herriot's successor in France, is not likely to remain in office for long—French premiers seldom do—but it is significant that a former Socialist and ardent pacifist should stand as a fair representative of the French people today.

Two of Europe's greatest living philosophers are presented in a pair of double-header articles. Oswald Spengler, author of *The Decline of the West* and *Man and Technics*, has just brought out a new book consisting of political essays, all of which but one were read before groups of industrialists between the years 1919 and 1926. This book is reviewed at length and then we offer a new essay by Spengler himself, prophesying an era of Fascism in Europe.

José Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses* has been ranked on a par with *The Decline of the West* as one of the chief contributions to European thought since the War. But Ortega has turned from

(Continued on page 563)

THE LIVING AGE

Founded by E. Littell

In 1844



February, 1933

Volume 343, Number 4397

The World Over

MOST OF THE FIGHTING now going on in the world can be traced back to the decline in the prices of raw materials. Even before the Wall Street crash colonial countries were feeling the pinch of depression and in our own farm states land values had been dropping steadily since 1920. The result has been ruin for the nations and districts that make their livelihood from some form of agriculture. South American bonds have suspended payments, the whole Commonwealth of Australia seemed at one point on the verge of default, several Chinese provinces have gone Communist, martial law has been enforced in India, and a wave of bank failures and farm strikes spread over the American Middle West. In South America, Australia, and the United States too much credit was extended and the borrowers could not meet their interest payments when the prices of their crops began to decline. The Chinese and Indian peasants, on the other hand, did not go into debt in order to purchase automobiles, tractors, and modern equipment but they too have suffered from declining prices because they lived on a bare subsistence level even in good times. As for Japan, which is still predominantly an agricultural nation, the peasants have gone so deeply into debt that many are living on roots and grass.

The depressed condition of agriculture therefore explains two striking features of our time. Not only did Japan's invasion of Manchuria occur as a direct consequence of domestic distress, but the revolu-

tionary movements that have made such startling progress in lands that produce raw materials arose from the same cause. The Third International has been able to take advantage of distress in China more successfully than anywhere else. Not only is China near at hand, but its predominantly agricultural civilization bears a certain resemblance to that of Russia. During the past fifteen years the ablest Communist agitators in Russia have had to concern themselves with peasants rather than with industrial workers, and they have therefore been more successful in making converts among the Chinese coolies than among the proletariat of Western Europe. Nor has their success in China been lost on the present rulers of India—both British and native—which explains why the Indian Communist movement, though still small, has met more stubborn opposition there than in Europe.

But the immediate outcome of the world depression in agriculture is more likely to be war than revolution; in fact that outcome has already materialized in China. As for South America, we should like to recall to our readers that in our November 1932 issue Georges Hoog, writing on 'Steel against Peace,' quoted from the *Journal du Crédit Public* to the effect that Brazil ordered 500 million francs' worth of Hotchkiss machine guns at a time when Japan was ordering only 200 million francs' worth.

BRIGADIER GENERAL E. L. SPEARS, who has launched several semiofficial campaigns for the British Government in the *Daily Telegraph*, has made still another attempt to remind the British public that several of our southern states repudiated bonds sold in England whose total value plus interest charges amount to at least one hundred million pounds. He recalls among other things the following parody of 'Yankee Doodle' that appeared in November 1843:—

Yankee Doodle borrows cash,
Yankee Doodle spends it,
And then he snaps his fingers at
The jolly flat who lends it.
Ask him when he means to pay,
He shows no hesitation,
But says he'll take the shortest way,
And that's Repudiation!

Yankee vows that every state
Is free and independent:
And if they paid each other's debts,
There'd never be an end on't.
They keep distinct till 'settling' comes,
And then throughout the nation
They all become 'United States'
To preach Repudiation!

General Spears also quotes the following statement of Daniel Webster made at the instance of Baring's, the London banking house that issued some of those bonds:—

The States cannot rid themselves of their obligations otherwise than by the honest payment of their debts . . . They possess all adequate powers of providing for the case by taxes and internal means of revenue. They cannot get round the duty nor evade its force. Any failure to fulfill its obligations would be an open violation of public faith, to be followed by the penalty of dishonor and disgrace; a penalty, it may be presumed, which no state of the American Union would be likely to incur.

This disgraceful record has about as much to do with the present war-debt settlement as England's disgraceful record in China has to do with Japan's invasion of Manchuria. But the items that General Spears has exhumed possess historical interest and indicate that the present British Government does not entertain the friendliest kind of feeling toward the U. S. A.

THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT'S attempt to cancel the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession has provoked a situation that is likely to become more tense by the time this copy of the magazine has reached our readers. But whatever happens after January 23, when the issue was supposed to come up before the League of Nations, there are two points that should be borne in mind. The immediate cause of the dispute is analyzed as follows by the *Week-end Review* of London:—

The fall in royalties this year from £1,300,000 to £300,000 is serious for the Persian budget, and the Shah is no doubt influenced by the fact that he pays for the modern armaments he is acquiring in Europe from these royalties. It is not generally known that Italian-built Persian gunboats, manned by Italian-trained Persian crews, are about to appear in the Persian Gulf to protect Persian interests. The fact that most of the new sailors are landsmen, and unlikely to become efficient seamen overnight, is the least important factor in an interesting development, full of possibilities for us.

Whereas the Persian Government is chiefly concerned with the immediate problem of paying for armaments, the British Government takes a longer view. William Martin, writing in the *Journal de Genève*, says:—

If England is interested in Persian petroleum it is chiefly in order to have a formidable reserve in time of war rather than to exploit this petroleum immediately. And it is here that England's interests find themselves in direct opposition to those of Persia. What does England want? As little exploitation as possible in order to save large reserves. What does Persia want? As much income as possible in order to strengthen a budget that is burdened with increasing charges by reason of national modernization.

To England, the stakes are the route to India and a fuel supply for its fleet in time of war. These are formidable strategic interests. What is at stake for Persia is the unity of the country, national sovereignty over the southern districts, and the future of the reforms to which Shah Riza Pahlevi wants his name to be attached. In the last analysis, the question is whether Persia has the right to become an independent country or whether it will have to remain a feudal state, tractable and submissive as it was before the War, a state of affairs that was very convenient for England.

THE GERMAN COUNTER-REVOLUTION that was completed last July when the Socialist officials in Prussia were kicked out of their offices enters a new and more acute stage with the disappearance of Von Papen and the emergence of Von Schleicher. The new Cabinet at once received the indorsement of the Reichstag in the form of a resolution to dissolve over the holidays, but this merely forebodes a more intelligent régime—not a more liberal one. Von Papen came into power when the feudal landowners of East Prussia convinced Hindenburg that Brüning intended to break up their estates. For six months Von Papen favored the interests of the landed aristocracy and won the confidence of Hindenburg, but his only positive accomplishment was to check the Hitler movement. By December the Rhineland industrialists demanded a new deal, and, since their power in the land is far greater than that of the antiquated Junkers, Von Papen had to go. Indeed, the miracle is that he lasted so long, for he never enjoyed widespread popular support and his tactless personality made him the most hated chancellor in German history. There is an article on Von Schleicher elsewhere in this issue; here we need only add that his arrival in power has given the middle class new hope, for he at least represents the strongest defenders of the *status quo*.

HITLER'S FAILURE to seize power last summer is likely to stand in history as a shining example of how individual character can interfere with the natural operation of political and economic forces. Not only is Hitler himself an emotionally unstable person, but most of the other leaders of his movement are men of the same stripe. Gregor Strasser, the most notable exception, has recently broken loose from the movement and his brother, Otto Strasser, published in his paper, the *Black Front*, a description of the scene in Hitler's headquarters when Strasser announced his resignation. Hitler's voice 'choked with emotion' and he appealed to the loyalty of the party, exclaiming, 'To think that he could have done this to me! And now of all times! I could never have believed it to be possible!' At the end of the speech Hitler fell back in his chair, 'completely broken' and 'burst into sobs.' The report continues as follows:—

In front of him stood Captain Goering, Nazi President of the Reichstag, clasping with both his hands those of his leader and with tears pouring down his cheeks. Beside him sobbed Herr Bruckner and Herr Goebbels, two of Hitler's trusted lieutenants. In the second row, Herr Bernhard Kuss was shaken by a paroxysm of weeping and Herr Heines blurted out fierce threats against Strasser. From the background was heard Streicher's sonorous voice bellowing: 'The faithless dog, Strasser, to cause our leader such grief.' And between them surged a crowd of astounded, enraged, stupefied, and bewildered men.

Naturally suspecting its account will be questioned, the *Black Front* offers to produce thirty-five members of the Reichstag who will swear to the truth of the story.

SURPRISE is Senator Borah's stock in trade and he never dealt in it more effectively than when he became unofficial spokesman for France on the floor of the American Senate. For, in accusing President Hoover of having treated debts and reparations as a single problem, he was merely echoing a conviction that almost every Frenchman cherishes and that caused the Chamber of Deputies to refuse to meet the December 15 war-debt installment. Moreover, in launching a personal attack on Mr. Hoover's attitude toward France, Mr. Borah put his finger on one of the most serious points of recent international friction. Because the French were not consulted before the Hoover Moratorium was announced and were suddenly called upon to make a greater financial sacrifice per capita in renouncing German reparations than the United States made in renouncing inter-Allied debts, a great opportunity for international recovery failed to achieve its object, and, again, when Laval visited the White House he went home with the definite impression that Mr. Hoover had agreed to support readjustment of American war debts if the former Allied Powers would first agree to readjust reparations payments. Here is the way *Le Temps*, semiofficial organ of the French Foreign Office, feels on the subject:—

No one can seriously deny that the personal initiative of Mr. Hoover effectively linked these two questions [debts and reparations]. Whether Mr. Hoover exceeded the rights that the Constitution confers on him in taking this initiative is an affair between himself and the American people. But it remains no less true that his action engaged the responsibility of the United States and created a situation of fact that angry arguments cannot dislodge.

In respect to the Moratorium *Le Temps* comments as follows:—

The Hoover Moratorium in no way remedied the financial difficulties of the nations concerned. At the most, it prevented the complete loss of American and English credits that were frozen in Germany and it did so by imposing a sacrifice on countries that had a right to reparations. By linking reparations and inter-governmental debts in law and in fact, the Hoover Moratorium, which was com-

plemented by the recommendation that European countries proceed to regulate matters between themselves as a preface to a regulation of debts, led to our being finally dispossessed of our title to the reparations owed to us. Such is the reality that Mr. Hoover's arguments cannot conceal in spite of their deceptive aspect.

And here is the way *Le Temps* feels about the December 15 payments:—

The arguments that Mr. Hoover used to justify his refusal to prolong the Moratorium by suspending the December 15 payments contain nothing new. He maintains that such a suspension would have integrally destroyed the existing accords because the debts owed to the United States would have constituted a counterpart to the reparations owed by Germany. The occupant of the White House simply forgets that he himself suspended all existing agreements, both debts and reparations, when he imposed the Moratorium of 1931 and that the revelation publicly announced by Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons definitively established that the Lausanne agreements in respect to reparations were entered into through the inspiration and with the approbation of the American Government as an indispensable preparation for a regulation of debts.

In the interests of international comity, which THE LIVING AGE seeks to promote, we quote only a semiofficial publication. Compared to what the more chauvinist French papers say, the above excerpts sound like passages from a Republican campaign speech.

THE FACT that Herriot's successor as Prime Minister to France belonged to the Socialist Party until a year ago indicates that repudiation of the American war debts was not followed by a swing to the right. To the sketch of M. Paul-Boncour that appears in the body of the magazine we need only add here that there seems to be a general impression that Herriot will soon return to office. The new Cabinet almost exactly duplicates Herriot's, the most important novelty being the Finance Minister, Henry Chéron, who served under Poincaré and accumulated a nineteen-billion-franc surplus that earned him the title of 'Minister of Budget Surpluses.' But the surpluses were spent long ago, to the intense disgust of their creator, and he is now called upon to eliminate the eight-billion-franc deficit that threatens to accumulate in 1933. Chéron himself is a quaint character, notable for his good humor, Norman sagacity, and imperturbability. His connection with Poincaré does not endear him to the left-wing parties that are now in the saddle, and he was only offered his post after three other men had refused it. But the chief problem of the French Government is financial and it finally summoned the services of the ablest statesman in that field.

'THE COUNTRIES that have made the League of Nations the foundation of their foreign policy and the basis of their security need to know

whether it exists.' Eduard Beneš, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, uttered this warning before the extraordinary December session of the League and forthwith departed from Geneva to attend a Little Entente conference at Belgrade with the representatives of Rumania and Yugoslavia. What he tried to convey was that the small nations of Europe have become seriously alarmed by the League's failure to act more effectively in Manchuria and by the refusal of the five chief nations of the League to allow the smaller powers to participate in disarmament discussions. Although the Little Entente was formed to prevent Austria or Hungary from reestablishing the old Dual Monarchy in any form, its members hoped that the League would eventually become so strong that they could count on it to support them in maintaining the peace—and, of course, the *status quo*. But the Great Powers have chosen to ignore the smaller ones at a time when the continued existence of several Balkan governments is doubtful, and when Italy, Hungary, and Germany are known to be planning to take advantage of domestic unrest to alter the present Balkan frontiers. Last month we quoted from an article by Wickham Steed to the effect that a Fascist International was being projected in southeastern Europe, and William Martin, shortly before he retired as foreign editor of the *Journal de Genève*, indorsed Mr. Steed's thesis with some reservations. In any case it seems clear that the League's high-handed attitude toward the smaller powers may weaken several existing governments to such an extent that they will fall victim to revolution from within or aggression from without.

THE BOURGEOIS, democratic revolution that overthrew the Spanish monarchy nearly two years ago and placed in power liberal leaders of the middle class and conservative leaders of labor has had a proletarian uprising on its hands. The same elements are now ruling Spain that ruled Russia under Kerenski, but they are more powerful numerically and economically and they have also instituted agrarian reforms that have kept some of the peasants on their side. We are inclined, however, to believe that the situation is more serious than it appears to be in the press. The twelfth plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International issued a completely realistic statement last October analyzing the condition of every country, and it is of the utmost significance that the Communist Party of Spain was the only one urged to form soviets, a step that is not recommended until the tension has become acute. This statement is not a propaganda sheet but a recommendation of policy to the Communist Parties of every country, and the Third International recommends such drastic action in Spain only because it has analyzed conditions on the spot. Here is the text of its instructions:—

Communist Party of Spain: Steering a course for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants in the form of soviets, the party must create basic organizational strongholds for the mass movement of the toilers in the form of factory committees, unemployed committees, peasant committees, elected committees of soldiers; it must overcome sectarian aloofness and anarchist habits of work.

In Germany, where revolution is supposed to be much closer, the Communists merely recommend defensive measures against Fascism.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE that occurred in Manchuria when Japanese officials took over the jobs that Chinese had held is causing a shift in world trade and the Mukden correspondent of the *London Times* reports that 'the outlook for foreign trading interests is still left very much in doubt.' Mr. Nagai, Japanese Minister of Oversea Affairs, outlined at an informal conference in his office what he called the 'policy of Japan-Manchukuo industrial control' whereby Manchukuo would be prevented from building factories to make goods already produced by Japan. Dr. Oka, vice president of a large newspaper organization, pointed out that, since the independence of Manchukuo was based on the spirit of the Open Door and equal opportunity, Japan might have some difficulty in monopolizing the market, but Teijo Eguchi, former vice president of the South Manchuria Railway, replied that Japanese investments in Manchuria have nothing to do with the Open Door and remarked with engaging frankness that it was strange to consider Manchukuo a foreign country anyway. Since the Manchukuo Foreign Minister had already assured Mr. Roosevelt in a telegram of congratulation that foreign participation would be welcomed in the development of the country, some difference of opinion seems to exist within the group that is now in the saddle. But the presence of so many Japanese officials—military, naval, and civil—gives Japanese exporters an insuperable advantage over those of other countries.

TECHNOCRACY'S assertion that unemployment will increase still further in a highly mechanized society operated under a price system has caused some advocates of that system to question the benefits of a machine civilization. One hundred years ago English workers tried to wreck the factories that were ruining their home industries, but to-day the very investors who have profited from the operation of those factories are beginning to fear that the foundations of their fortunes are insecure. It is too late now to set back the hands of the clock in Great Britain, but the consequences of a century and a half of British industrial expansion are causing the rulers of India to think twice before continuing further in a direction that seems to have led the rulers of Britain to disaster. For

the Indian State of Kashmir, renowned for its carpets and shawls, has not got a single power spinning spindle or mechanical loom, and its Maharajah is conducting an investigation as to whether such machinery should be installed. Alfred F. Barker, Clothworkers' Professor of Textile Industries in the University of Leeds, was summoned to make an investigation on the spot and when he returned to England he devoted two months to visiting the seats of British hand industries that still survive. Here are some of his conclusions:—

Much as it may grieve some idealistic friends, there is but one story to tell—of hardships under the old handicraft conditions and of improvement in social and economic life following the introduction of the industrialized system. Even the special industries of the Shetland Islands have to-day an industrial or mechanized basis, and beyond question the old handicrafts, as an economic proposition, have passed away.

It is not an unreasonable supposition that a better system, in the full sense of the term, has taken their place. And it is obvious that if the economic position of the Kashmiri is to be maintained or improved the way is not through the handicrafts as at present practised. In the report that I have presented to His Highness's Government, I have shown:

(1) that the spinning wheel will produce from four to eight times as much as the *katwa* or distaff spindle;

(2) that the machine will produce from 400 to 600 times as much per worker as the spinning wheel.

Modern industry already exists in other parts of India and came into existence because native labor and modern machinery were more efficient than British labor and antiquated machinery four thousand miles away. The hand workers of Kashmir must therefore continue to compete against the machine workers of neighboring provinces or else set up machines of their own. It is Professor Barker's conclusion that those who continue to spin by hand will be forced down to a lower standard of living than the factory workers, and he therefore urges the construction of as many factories as the trade will bear. He suggests that Kashmir can profit by some of the mistakes that England has made and admits that a few hand workers can continue to flourish.

The editor of the London *Observer* has hopes that a debt settlement can be made between now and June and that England and America can lead the world to recovery. The more impertinent 'Yaffle' takes a different view.

England *to* America

TWO BRITISH
EDITORIALS

I. THE CASE FOR HOPE

By J. L. GARVIN

From *The Observer*, London Independent Conservative Sunday Paper

A MERE million has become a vulgar commonplace, though it played so large a part in former drama and fiction. Since the vast war expenditure the world has got into the bad habit of thinking in billions. It might as well imagine the oceans transmuted into liquid gold. Mediæval alchemists, when they dreamed of creating a little of that stuff, dreamed only of fortunes in phials. Most people have ceased to remember that, apart from the substantial elements of human life, money is a phantom.

Had some bad magician revealed to Victorian statesmen like Peel or Gladstone what would happen to Britain and the world between 1914 and the end of 1932, those severe guardians of

national finance might well have dropped down dead. To them the single operation on gold performed by this country on December 15 would have seemed a thing of staggering dimensions and horrifying suggestion. We must remember the habit of that age, when upon the question of improving an official residence the following colloquy occurred:—

GLADSTONE: 'What would it cost?'

SECRETARY: 'Seventy pounds, Sir.'

GLADSTONE: 'Who would pay for it?'

SECRETARY: 'The Public Treasury, Sir.'

GLADSTONE: 'And do you think, Sir, that the Public Treasury has seventy pounds to spend on such a purpose?'

Other times, other manners, but this little anecdote may help us to realize

the all-threatening size and all-involving complications of the nation's and world's economic problems to-day.

Britain's great action on pay day had the invaluable effect of relieving tension and averting challenges. We are convinced that from now forward feeling will improve more and more by degrees, and that after Christmas American common sense will begin to move toward the recognition of dominating and inexorable necessities for which no separate country is culpably to blame.

By comparison with its masterly predecessor the third British note was a mistake that was soon remedied. President Hoover and Mr. Stimson, legally powerless in such a matter, were bound to protest, as they did with startling promptitude, though with scrupulous courtesy also. Repelled for a moment were some of the best among the crowd of friends this country has had right through in the United States. Then the British Government, reserving its right to express its views in the future, paid in effect without conditions, as in present circumstances it was bound to do if it paid at all. All over America the result of this big and frank procedure was excellent in the shape of restored and enhanced friendliness to Britain.

Across the Channel by contrast, M. Herriot was overthrown in a passionate all-night sitting. His magnificent effort, momentarily in vain, made him a bigger man in his own country, increased his influence in Europe, and won all sympathies both in Britain and America. We may take it that he will return to power with enhanced authority before long, and that we may regard him as the Briand of the future, with this great difference, that,

belonging to a later generation, he may well achieve what Briand might have attempted had he been younger.

M. Herriot, staking his political life, as he well knew, pleaded for one more good-will payment in line with Britain. The Chamber, partly overcome by memories of sacrifice and suffering in the War, partly in utter revolt against the thought that France should continue paying when Germany has ceased, voted by well over two to one for default. This disposed of the mischievous suggestion that London and Paris were forming a common front against the United States.

The majority of the French deputies were vehemently sincere. The Socialists were as strong as the right against further payment to anyone, now that Germany—like Russia—is relieved. On this subject, French psychology is fixed and unchangeable. For the French, with their memories of invasion, devastation, slaughter, mutilation,—all symbolized by the ordeal of Verdun,—the relative outpourings of life and money by the ex-Allies and their ex-associate are intermingled elements of one mighty complex such as the earth has not known.

They think that, but for the French effort, the Americans would either have had to accept defeat or to pay for the victory achieved in common at last three times more in treasure and ten times more in blood. This is the idea of the French in their heart of hearts, and they always return to it. This is how they see it, how they will continue to see it, whatever else happens, beyond this generation, and at least to the end of the next.

For practical purposes France, all the same, has made an emotional and

imaginative blunder by prejudicing her position in American eyes before consultation can take place. For the moment there is intense irritation and resentment across the Atlantic. There is talk of reprisals that would hit our neighbors hard if Americans were in earnest about boycotting France and abjuring Paris. But what good would it do? None. It would only make bad worse. It would be a deathblow to disarmament on this side of the Atlantic, and beyond Europe it would have political repercussions that no thoughtful American can desire.

North and South in the United States did not and could not forget their own Civil War so soon. Presently there will be some consideration for the passionate war memories of the French people—for the insuperable feeling of wrong raised in their minds when it is suggested that they should pay as usual whether Germany pays or no. We do not think that much more will be heard in the United States of reprisals if the French politicians and writers of all the responsible parties rigidly abstain from further provocation or recrimination.

II

Consultation ought to begin as soon as possible at Washington between foremost representatives of the chief powers concerned—America, Britain, France, Germany, Italy. The more quiet and frank the proceedings, the better. They should leave little chance for sensational publicity, though the power of good humor in intercourse with the American people ought to be remembered by every delegate from Europe. The discussions ought to begin in the first week of the New

Year. After that there will not be a day to lose. It must be understood that if these talks are not fruitful the World Economic Conference will be a fiasco if it ever assembles at all.

President Hoover and his Administration in their constitutional circumstances cannot implement decisions. But they can raise their repute in defeat and stand better in the eye of history if they can secure and leave on record the clearest possible record of respective positions and of the alternatives for the future. And if, above all, they keep in touch with Mr. Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats. This is the only way of mitigating the legal rigidity of the American Constitution. Woodrow Wilson's exclusionist attitude toward the Republican leaders in the world's most critical hour, when all the other countries in the War had national governments, was one of the tragic errors of all history. Immeasurable evils have flowed from it since. But for that, the Treaty of Versailles would have been different and America never would have left the League.

The great object is to draw up from the respective standpoints the final statement of facts and propositions. This material ought to be complete and ready before March 4, when Mr. Franklin Roosevelt assumes the Presidency. There will not be too much time available between March 4 and June 15, when, unless a settlement is reached in the interval, the second crisis of 'To pay or not to pay' will arise in a much more serious form than on December 15. For in such a case 'finis' would be the word universally pronounced on this side of the Atlantic.

In certain situations human nature, the mildest by disposition,—the most

replenished to begin with by mother's milk of good will,—can bear no more. You cannot get blood from a stone. Every nation must bear the penalties of a disastrous predicament that was not the fault of any single nation. This, if we are just interpreters, is the psychology of Europe.

On the other side of the Atlantic, severance of reparations from debts has been a vigorous theory. On this side, the inextricable connection between those two financial processes is an overpowering reality. No reparations, no debts. There's the truth. No power on earth can change it. Talk about connecting the question with disarmament only makes human feeling worse. Armaments do not exist in Europe because an extensive proportion of mankind, diverse in language and imagination, are mere fools or ruffians. Armaments exist for reasons of a kind unknown to America—for reasons of different national idealisms, right or wrong, about history and the future.

This situation can be improved only by practical readjustment of the territorial arrangements drawn in the height of feeling by the supremacy of the conquerors, and by spiritual reconciliation patiently pursued by those unthanked spirits, both chivalrous and rational, who respect the valor of a foe as much as the heroism of a comrade, and who, after the ravage and the slaughter,—brought about by conflicting dreams, more than by their materialistic intermixture,—strive to mend the mischief and the terror that have been lamentably wrought, and to unite former antagonists for a common humanity in peace.

If this is not the truth, then all kinds of Christianity are tissues of

pretense false to their Founder. On both sides of the Atlantic they should shut up their churches for a month of Sundays unless their orators with the whole of their hearts can preach understanding and sympathy toward all nations. Golden patience is required for this; immense intelligence applied equally to opposite views.

Not yet quite simply faced or stated anywhere is the core of the thing. Britain and France cannot pay if they are not paid. Then can any American seriously desire that the Lausanne agreement to remove the curse of reparations shall be destroyed and the curse restored? That the ex-Allies shall again try to drag money out of Germany? That Britain shall try in the same way to drag money out of France and others?

Any such attempt would be a thing too terrible to contemplate. If reparations could in fact be brought into force again on this side of the Atlantic, they would cause a chaos of difficulties, distractions, bitternesses, and hatreds. As in the great parable, the evil spirit temporarily cast out would return with seven other spirits more wicked than himself to the swept and garnished house. The last state would be so much worse than the first that reasonable men might well despair at last of the future of civilization.

If these would be the moral results of any determined combination by Britain and France to force renewed payment to themselves in order that they might endeavor for a few more years to pay America, what of the other consequences? Needless to say the hope of disarmament would perish. Passion would be so exasperated, and cynicism so much encouraged, that the League might as well shut up shop.

The slump would, of course, be prolonged, and every hope of revival thrown back. There is already an unmistakable tendency of maritime trade to transfer itself by degrees from the United States sphere to the sterling area. That tendency would be strongly increased. Quite possibly the United States never would recover its former relative position as an international factor, and certainly never would attain the position to which it otherwise might have risen.

We beg all concerned on both sides of the ocean to cease wrangling about the past and to look to the real alternatives of the future. From that standpoint let the entire case be restated so as to be grasped by ordinary minds. We have now shown what would be the disastrous effects in all directions of annulling the Lausanne agreement in order that the European debtors, tearing at each other, might remit to the United States in the old way.

If these considerations are put in a spirit of truth and soberness yet humanly and vividly brought home—if it is shown just how and why the world-wide indirect workings of resumed pressure all round would be even worse for the United States than for any other country—if at the same

time the moral arguments are made to take a higher place than hitherto in the whole appeal—we say that the American people in the New Year will understand and respond as they have never done yet. They are in the lump, like ourselves, a decent people through and through and do the right when they see it plainly. When they see truly that the war heritage of debts and reparations has brought civilization to the crossroads, we say that they will not try to force the world to take the wrong turning. This is the case for hope as regards a great and saving settlement by consent as a result of early consultations in Washington.

Behind all this is yet another consideration. It was the real cause in the French Chamber of the size of the vote, swelled by the Socialists, which precipitated M. Herriot from office. It is a fact that the ex-Allies have not the vestige of a prospect of being themselves repaid again in any manner that would make it possible for them to continue paying their former associate on anything like the old scale or in the old way. The pre-Lausanne situation is irrevocably eliminated. The old system has collapsed. No power on earth can raise it and repair it so as to make it work again.

II. ENGLAND PAYS

By 'YAFFLE'

From the *New Leader*, London Weekly Organ of the Independent Labor Party

THE workers will rejoice that England has decided to repay to American financiers the money they did n't earn and we don't owe them.

We have made our decision with

what Mr. Garvin calls 'unswerving judgment and good will . . . with dauntless quietude and courage.' And incidentally with boots that let water.

It is a debt of honor. All the papers

tell us that. England gave her sacred word—to the financiers, just as she gave it to the workers during the War (while these debts were being contracted), that if they fought they should have homes fit to live in. So at that time she gave two words at once; but she can't keep both, so she will keep the sacred one—the financiers' one.

If we were to default we should never hold up our heads again. We may default on doles and pensions, but not on bankers' loans. For an Englishman's word is his bondholder. When faced with the choice between workers' health and bondholders' money, Gentlemen Prefer Bonds.

Nevertheless, as a patriot and a Conservative, I protest against the language of the note sent by the British to the American Government. Some of it is all right. I don't mind that part which hints that war debts are the cause of the present economic crisis. It contradicts that later on, but the contradiction won't be noticed.

It says, 'The War produced a profound disorder in the course of international trade.' On the contrary, the natural course of international trade produced a war; but why bring that up?

But what I object to, as a patriot and member of the Primrose League, is the note's detailed description of the breakdown of capitalism. I make all excuses for involuntary confessions in times of panic or mental stress. But I did think that our rulers, who for so many years have displayed such 'dauntless quietude and courage' in the face of other people's poverty, would have had more presence of mind than to give away facts that hitherto they have so vigorously and

successfully denied. It is un-English; and as a patriot and a scout master I protest against this pusillanimity.

The note makes one tactless admission after another. After we have been telling the people for years that capitalism is based on freedom of enterprise and a just reward for labor, the note now carefully explains that the whole system is based on the haphazard investment of a fluctuating amount of privately owned money.

It says that the system 'depends entirely' for its functioning upon 'public confidence' (that is, hope of a return for money invested) and then proceeds to show that this confidence is more or less permanently broken.

One of its worst admissions is: 'Everywhere taxation has been ruthlessly increased and expenditure drastically curtailed, and yet . . . the control restrictions intended to remedy the trouble have merely aggravated it.' In other words, the only remedies that capitalist governments have been able to suggest (economies, wage cuts, and taxation) have proved a failure. Need this have been said?

Worst of all, the note goes out of its way to expose the financial system. It proves that the repayment of the debt will damage the trade of both countries. This is nothing but an admission that financiers' interests are essentially opposed to those of the rest of the community. No Socialist could put it more plainly; and as a patriot and member of the Cobden Club I protest.

It tries to weaken this admission by saying that the debt is different from other debts because the money did not go to 'productive purposes or additions to real wealth' but was 'expenditure on destruction.'

As a matter of fact that ought to

have made it better for the capitalists. The difficulty about other loans, for productive purposes, is that when the produce appears there is never enough money to buy it, so it goes to rot, and producers say they can't borrow any more until it has been sold—hence the present 'blizzard.'

If only the goods we make in peace time could be got rid of as quickly as explosive shells, the financial system might last a bit longer, and my income from Industrials would n't keep falling. Besides, this talk of producing for destruction only reminds people of the continual destruction of food that goes on because the people have n't money to buy it.

As a patriot and shareholder of the Bank of England, I always get a shiver down my back when people start talking about 'real wealth.' But this wretched note rubs it in. It goes on to say: 'This loss and suffering is not due to the niggardliness of nature. The triumphs of physical science are growing and the vast potentialities of the production of real wealth remain unimpaired.'

This is the most dangerous admission of all. It might have been written in Moscow. It is an incitement to the British and American masses to demand that their financial systems be based on their respective productive and consumptive capacities. It reminds the common people of both nations that they lack nothing but the little bits of metal and paper called money, and will set them asking why the 'vast potentialities of production' cannot also produce enough of these.

To make matters worse still, the note goes on to say, 'In the long run, international debts can be paid only in goods or services.' Never has capitalism committed such a *faux pas* as this admission that real wealth consists of goods and services, not money, just after it has made it clear that our power for producing these goods and services remains unimpaired!

It leaves vulgar minds to conclude that the financial system which controls and directs our governments bears no relation whatsoever to economic realities, and that its main function is to prevent the distribution of real wealth.

In short, the note carefully explains what real wealth is, and then admits that only the financial system prevents us from enjoying it.

It presents the great bankers of the world to the public as nothing but a mob of parasites who are deceiving us into starving in the midst of plenty, and it incites the common herd, as clearly as any Socialist pamphlet, to rise up and demand their blood.

The note is a dangerous and revolutionary document. Communists have been imprisoned for less.

After all our complaints of subversive propaganda among the unemployed who are going without food in the midst of gluts, it has been left to a capitalist government to tell the people frankly that but for financiers they could all be living in comfort.

As a patriot and a churchwarden I protest. The press has called the note 'a manifesto.' It is; but it sounds like a Communist manifesto to me.

A German worker with Howard Scott's Technocracy group discusses some implications of an outstanding topic of the hour. Written for German consumption, the article is appearing here simultaneously with its publication abroad.

A German on Technocracy

By F. A. WEITZEL

Authorized Translation by THE LIVING AGE

AN ABANDONED child who has suffered many vicissitudes has at last been given a name. A group of Americans, most of them engineers, has affiliated the spirit of a new era and christened it 'Technocracy.' An important step has therefore been made, for now we can call the child something. And the technologists to whom we have referred are bending all their efforts to show us that further steps must be taken.

About ten years ago a group of American engineers began to excavate the economic foundations of technology and to bring their combined influence to bear on the construction of human society. Among the founders of this movement there were such men as Charles P. Steinmetz, Bassett Jones, Thorstein Veblen, Frederick Lee Ackerman, Dr. Richard Tolman,

and Howard Scott, who is now directing the research work. For years they worked in silence, because the public remained indifferent to them during the period of prosperity. But now the course of events has aroused wide interest in their work.

Everyone has heard by now that the spirit of the present social order is weak with old age and on the point of collapse. Nor has there been any dearth of diagnoses or of proposed and attempted cures, most of which were nothing but hypodermic injections. We are, likewise, all too familiar with the advice of those who would have us eliminate what is outworn, harmful, and corrupt. But ultimately all such attempts at improvement turned into struggles of small groups for their own advantage, and therefore were doomed in advance not to

bring salvation to humanity as a whole. The representatives of Technocracy, on the other hand, attach importance to physical reality alone. All personal attitudes and emotions are laid to one side. On the basis of existing facts they are trying to find the path that leads to the highest possible standard of living for everybody without exception.

The old-school economists are still making painful efforts to control the economic situation. But the supporters of Technocracy do not think these men are properly equipped to undertake salvage operations, because they are victims of false theories and because the social apparatus in all nations that have attained a modern cultural level has assumed a purely technical form. Capital clearly recognizes the value of technology and therefore has made technology its chief slave, for it is technology that supplies almost all the essentials of our social apparatus. But technology, being no respecter of persons, is denied leadership and power. Thus technology has acquired an unfortunate reputation and is too easily blamed for all the shortcomings of our economic system. If it is to escape this ill repute it must take over the care of its children and not turn them loose in a world of capitalistic exploiters who are interested exclusively in their own advantage. Only then will it be clear what benefits the achievements of technology can bring to the human race.

II

The champions of the idea of technocracy are in the middle of their work, hence a final conclusion cannot yet be announced. But their work has

gone far enough for it to be worth while to call attention to what has been accomplished up to now. The time is at hand when an analysis can be made of the whole social mechanism of the North American continent more basic, more complete, and more impartial than any that has ever yet been undertaken. The total industrial activity, involving about three thousand branches of industry, will be summed up statistically. Three hundred such studies have already been completed and enable us to draw some significant conclusions.

This industrial analysis is being made along entirely new lines and it is to lay the necessary groundwork for further industrial development. In order that the economic activity of every historical period can be expressed in terms of a fixed measure, all estimates are made in units of physical energy or work, that is in calories or in ergs or joules. This method leads to amazing results. All the vast, important distinctions that economic history has drawn in the past dwindle to trivial variations of one and the same social condition. Investigation from the point of view of physics reveals only two fundamental types of social state, one in which the energy consumed and the work performed per capita of the population is approximately constant and one in which these two elements vary with the passage of time.

Humanity, as far back as we can trace its social history at all, lived in a practically social steady state until about a hundred years ago. But in the early nineteenth century completely new physical factors began to operate and they were so powerful that they destroyed the stability that

had previously existed. Of course, the economic system did not at once accommodate itself to this change but used every means at its disposal to control the new situation. Here lies the origin of a contradiction from which our present economic system is suffering.

Life presupposes energy and the conversion of energy. Energy means the capacity to perform work and may occur as heat, potential energy, radiant energy, electrical energy, or kinetic energy, the energy possessed by a moving body. All of these forms of energy may be reduced to heat, measurable in calories, or work, measurable in ergs or joules, and these, in turn, may be converted from one to the other. Wherever apt and convenient, this commutation is made throughout the analysis mentioned for the sake of uniformity and perspicuity.

Living creatures depend on their capacity to assimilate energy from available sources and, by a process of conversion, to make this energy maintain life. Going back to life in its primitive, natural form, where no technical implements are at hand, we find that the number of a species is dependent on two factors, of which one is the rate of reproduction and the other the available energy. And only that species will multiply according to its reproductive rate that never runs short of a sufficient energy supply. Growth would continue to infinity if space did not set a limit to the density of population and to energy output. But under such circumstances, regardless of whether the population increases or whether the area limits the population and affords only a certain maximum amount of energy, there is no important variation in the

quantity of energy that an individual can convert into motion or work.

Applied to a human society, this means a constant standard of living, and such a society can rightly be described as being in a social steady state. The opposite of this is a society in which the energy consumption per capita of population does not remain constant and the standard of living varies. Such a social system is said to undergo social change. This latter can occur only by virtue of rendering available new sources of energy by means of new engines of energy conversion.

III

Physics measures all activity in terms of work performed or energy consumed. By work it means the application of energy to mass, which thereby undergoes a change of state.

This elementary physical law can be applied to any social system. In a primitive society the energy consumed consisted chiefly of the food eaten by men and the fuel burned. This amounted to about 2,000 kilocalories per capita per day. Man was the chief engine of energy conversion. With the introduction of work animals the total energy consumed included the feed for these animals and resulted accordingly in a slight increase. Thus extraneous energy consumption—that is, energy consumption other than by man himself—rose from zero, in the case of the aboriginal man, to about 2,000 kilocalories per capita per day and remained approximately at that level during all the time prior to the inception of the extensive use of the steam engine about 150 years ago.

This meant a constant standard of

living, and therefore this whole period can correctly be described as a social steady state. The vast difference between the old social steady state with its extraneous energy consumption of about two thousand kilogramme calories per day per individual and the present social system at once becomes clear when we remember that in the United States in 1929 the daily consumption of extraneous energy was 154,000 kilogramme calories per capita per day.

The characteristic feature of a social steady state is the comparative weakness of its engine for doing work, 'man,' for man is almost the only engine used. Weighing between 60 and 90 kilogrammes and working eight hours a day, he has an average output of about 210,000 kilogramme metres. In the nineteenth century, when technology began to develop, new sources of energy were opened up to humanity with the result that there was, on the one hand, a growth of population and, on the other, a greater output of energy per individual, which raised the standard of living.

At first technology developed very slowly. The first engines were rather weak and were less efficient than man, with his one-tenth of a horse power. The first Newcomen steam engine had seventy-six and a half h.p., or 765 times as much power as man. But its efficiency was only a tenth of the efficiency of the human engine because it consumed 7.3 kilogrammes of coal per horse-power hour, or 40,000 kilogramme calories. The Watt steam engine with the double-acting cylinder, which was perfected in the 1790's, in an eight-hour period surpassed the human engine seventy-eight thousand times

over. The introduction and development of the turbines increased the proportion much further. To-day there are 300,000-horse-power turbines that can do the work of three million human engines. This comparison becomes even more impressive when we consider that men cannot work twenty-four hours on end like a turbine so that, during a twenty-four-hour period, the work of such an engine is nine million times greater than the work of the human mechanism.

The efficiency of engines has also improved considerably in recent years. In 1913 1.3 kilogrammes of coal were consumed per kilowatt hour. To-day an engine can be run on as little as .38 kilogramme of coal per kilowatt hour.

IV

These few results show how rapidly technique has developed, almost like a geometric progression. The tremendous increase in the capacity to do work has altered the whole social structure. We can make things to-day and undertake tasks that would have been impossible with the forces that a social steady state possessed.

A man can spade one-eighth of an acre of land in twelve hours. But one man with a tractor and the largest plows can plow 136 acres in that time. Whereas a shoemaker in Roman times needed five and a half days to make a pair of shoes, the production per worker per week in a modern shoe factory is sixty pairs. Brickmakers working ten hours a day could make only about 450 bricks per worker per day by hand, but now, with an eight-hour day, the output of an almost automatic brick factory amounts to 300,000 bricks a day. A hundred

years ago one man could mine eight hundred tons of iron ore a year, and the annual output of pig iron was twenty-five tons per worker. In 1929 the best mining and blast furnace practices yielded 20,000 tons and 10,000 tons respectively per man per annum, while the average for the industry was about 12,000 tons in open-pit mining and 1,700 tons in blast furnaces.

In the year 1830, the United States had about twelve million inhabitants, and the first beginnings of technology were already discernible. During that year less than 19 trillion kilogramme calories of fuel were consumed in this country. In 1929 the United States had a population of about one hundred and twenty millions, ten times as much as in 1830. But the annual output and consumption of energy had increased to 6,800 trillion kilogramme calories, in other words, an increase of 358 times since 1830. The greater part of this increase has occurred since 1900, for in that year the total output of energy amounted to only two thousand trillion kilogramme calories.

Graphs representing the development of the chief industries of the North American continent show a gradual growth up to 1870. Between 1870 and 1890 a rapid increase occurred, with time acting as an accelerating factor in this increase. Finally a point was reached at which the acceleration began to decline. That point is called the point of inflection. On the North American railways it came in the year 1900, but for the graph combining all the chief industries the inflection point was reached in the year 1921. All the industries have the following characteristic in

common. During the last hundred years they show first a steady growth in the number of establishments and then an equally steady decline. The maximum occurs when mass production begins, for after that machinery became obsolete so fast that many factories had to close down completely. The clay-products industry offers a good example of this. In the year 1849 the United States had 2,121 factories. In the year 1889 the number of factories reached its peak figure of 6,535. In 1929 there were only 1,749 factories, or less than the number of the year 1849. But production had increased steadily.

Industrial history shows that the number of man-hours necessary to manufacture a given object was at its height a hundred years ago. Since then man-hours per unit have steadily declined and are approaching zero in all branches of industry. At first the number of workers increased as the industry grew. Then, in consequence of technical improvements and mechanized mass production, the number of workers began to decline while production continued to advance. A time arrived when machines began to replace human labor more rapidly than the industry grew. While mass production is one reason for the decline of man-hours per unit of output, there is another cause that came into effect soon after mass production was introduced. By means of more economic production methods the amount of energy going into the manufacture of the commodity in question was cut down.

For instance, in 1929 the steel industry employed 1.75 times as many man-hours of labor as it did in 1890, but production was 13 times as great in 1929 as it was in 1890. The auto-

mobile industry attained its highest production in the year 1929, when 5,600,000 cars were produced, but the maximum number of man-hours of employment in this industry occurred in 1919, and the peak in numbers employed occurred in 1923.

These are not special cases. They are quite normal. A more striking example might also be quoted. The firm of A. O. Smith in Milwaukee can produce ten thousand automobile chassis frames daily with 208 workers.

V

For a long time after 1850, which might be called the beginning of the technological revolution, laborers who became superfluous in one branch of industry could find employment in new industries. The main reason was that for many years factories and machinery could be built only by hand. But as soon as machine tools were made the reemployment in new industries of workers who had lost their jobs almost completely ceased, because the building and equipment of new factories had only a temporary, unimportant effect on industry as a whole. All these changes occurred because the development of new sources of energy and the development of technology went hand in hand.

The only way to raise the standard of living in an agricultural community is to lengthen the working hours so that the individual can do more work. In an industrial society energy output per capita of population can be increased by technical exploitation of the sources of energy. In industry human labor plays a subordinate rôle. For instance, the loss of labor through illness makes almost no difference in

an industrial enterprise but is of the greatest importance on a primitive farm, where it may lead to a hundred per cent loss in the daily output of labor. The standard of living therefore rises in an industrial community without lengthening of working hours, in fact a higher standard of living can be attained even while working hours diminish.

The long-cherished belief that sustenance alone determines the population has been severely jolted by the impact of hard facts. Only 7 per cent of the total energy consumption of the United States goes directly into providing the necessities of life. The remaining portion goes into the social mechanism. It follows that a dependent relationship exists between the energy consumption per individual, or the standard of living, and the population density, and from this relationship we can compute either one of these factors if the other is known or ascertainable. The importance of the amount of energy consumed by our social apparatus becomes evident when we consider the results of a stoppage of energy output in any city. The water supply, the sewer system, communications, light, and heat are only a few of the many necessities without which a metropolis would fall into complete collapse.

Technocracy describes the present economic form as the price system. The exchange of goods, or the flow of the social stream of energy, depends on the valuation of commodities. The value of a commodity, from this point of view, is determined by the strength of the desire to possess it. The strength of the desire is expressed in the willingness of a man to exchange one form

and quantity of goods for another form and quantity. When an economic system develops to such a point that one commodity is used to measure all exchanges, then that economic form is called a price system.

All economists who have tried to penetrate the kernel of our economic existence have missed their aim. All confine themselves more or less to descriptive representation and criticisms of quality. They go into hair-splitting definitions of desire, demand, and ownership, conceptions that can not be measured with any rule.

Almost all economic theories are based on the assumption that the desire of the individual determines the dimensions of an economic structure. But, since demand and desire are said to be infinite, it follows that economic development has no limit. A further result is that it ought to be possible, if this is true, to develop similar economic systems anywhere on the earth's surface and thus give to everybody in the world the same standard of living. Another assumption that appears in economic theory is that wealth depends on the expenditure of human labor. The conclusion is that the wealth of any economic community should be proportional to the number of hours its inhabitants work. A third assumption that occurs in all economic doctrines is that tangible possessions represent wealth and that man desires what is useful. Hence the degree of usefulness would determine the value.

VI

All these conceptions are based on the assumption that unlimited possibilities of economic development exist

side by side with the maintenance of a constant output of energy, although actually these two conditions are mutually exclusive. No theory has ever allowed for the increasing energy output of modern industry because such an economic factor at once upsets all classical economic doctrine.

In order that economic activity may function successfully under the price system it must yield a profit in terms of money. Secondly, under the price system all invested capital must yield interest, which is regarded as part of the running expenses. The first requirement with respect to profits—other minor factors being regarded as constant for the moment—means that profits stand in direct proportion to the quantity of goods sold. The ideal business situation from the point of view of the individual manufacturer would therefore be an infinite supply of cheap raw materials and cheap labor so that production could follow a constantly rising curve.

As far as the inside of any business is concerned, it can be said in general that the profit of any undertaking stands as an inverse function of the costs of production. Mass production has been developed as the most satisfactory method of lowering production costs and thus increasing profits. This method of mass production fits in beautifully with the above-mentioned manufacturing ideal of constantly increasing production.

The absolute necessity that invested capital should yield interest has been mentioned. Capital investments in industry are now undertaken by an extremely small percentage of the population. Hence by far the greater part of the interest is reinvested in

industrial enterprises. But, in order for industry to be able to meet the increasing interest charges on its constantly increasing capital investments, the growth of industry must follow a rigidly fixed rate that is identical with the rate of compound interest. But such an expansion of industry is impossible, for then the limits of production would be infinite.

Another method of increasing production under the price system is to produce goods of inferior quality. For one thing, this means buying cheaper raw materials and saving on labor costs, but it also means creating a larger market because goods of inferior quality wear out more rapidly and must be replaced.

To escape from our present industrial blind alley, the price system can offer only two solutions, neither of them complete. Production can be leveled off to correspond to the standard of living, which is what has happened to-day. But since the prime essential of the price system is constantly to reduce production costs, unemployment persistently increases if production is forced to remain constant.

The other possibility is to keep the number of people employed in industry constant. But the result of that would be, in accordance with the principles of the price system, overproduction into infinity. If we are to keep production at a constant level, capital investments will ultimately become impossible. Interest rates will fall to zero, and this will automatically ruin the price system.

The present economic order, known as the price system of enterprise, is a mechanism that releases tremendous powers over which there is no controlling hand. The present calamity is

the logical result of playing the game according to the rules of the price system, allowing the tremendous forces of the economic machine to run wild. It is like an express train traveling without an engineer. Hence it is becoming important that technology should emerge from its subordinate position and put its skilled hand on the controls of the enormous mechanism.

VII

The above description gives a brief account of the development of a modern high-energy social system. The existing system stands as proof of the continually increasing consumption of energy and mineral products, of the increasingly ingenious development of methods of work and the elimination of human toil.

But the accumulation of debt has paralleled the growth of industry. Our daily experience teaches us that every physical thing diminishes with use. With debt it is just the opposite. The more of it you use the more you have. I might observe in passing that economic indebtedness is increasing while at the same time opportunities for work and income are decreasing. The result is a constant decline in the standard of living for the vast majority of the people.

The total domestic debt of the United States to-day amounts to more than two hundred billion dollars. The national income in 1929 was eighty-three billions. To-day it is about forty billions. If this decline continues at approximately the same rate of speed the present system will be bankrupt in about eighteen months. Of course, measures will be taken to forestall such a catastrophe and they

can take either of two forms—shorter working hours or inflation. But even these measures will only create temporary improvement and will merely postpone the end a little further, unless the whole social system is reorganized in accordance with technological requirements. The existing economic system does not contain even a single feature that would help to set such reorganization in motion.

Material that has been assembled up to now indicates that the design of a new social system could be drawn along the following lines. The geographic boundaries of the economic community must be as advantageous as possible from the point of view of natural sources of energy. An estimate of the total population and the available sources of energy enables us to reckon the available quantity of energy per capita, whereby the standard of living is determined. Then the social order must see to it that every member of the community receives his full share of the existing energy. In this way a community comes into existence which is just to every individual and in which hardships are done away with.

VIII

That is the social point of view in accordance with which Technocracy is conducting its survey. The method of approaching this problem is difficult because history offers no precedent in any way comparable to the present economic situation of the United States. Developments in this country have led to entirely new problems for which equally new solutions must be found. In the United States there is a wider gulf between the present social

management and the existing facts than in any other country, because its wealth of natural sources of energy on the North American continent has caused a more rapid tempo of development.

Europe, on the other hand, has almost come to a halt as far as new sources of energy are concerned. With the exception of petroleum, no major mineral sources have been discovered in Europe since 1850. Other countries are facing calamity as a result of the exploitation of their energy sources as, for instance, England with her coal-mining industry. Developments in America, aided by the country's natural wealth, have brought conditions to such a point that a quick solution is more urgent than in any other country. The answer to this burning question will be found only when American society takes a form of its own that is not a strait-jacket but is completely suited to the country's individual needs.

It is perfectly clear that the present system encourages tremendous waste. More reasonable economic processes could make a large amount of energy useful to the whole community. The canning industry is a significant example of this wastefulness. The United States produces twenty-two billion tin cans a year, which use up a large percentage of the annual steel production, all of which the country loses when we remember that these cans are dumped as garbage. The use of petroleum has brought about similar results. In 1900 the oil wells of the North American continent yielded about 100 million hectolitres of oil and in 1929 1.6 billions. Since 1859 a million oil wells have been drilled, of which 323,000 are still producing, but

six thousand wells, or two per cent, provide half of the oil consumed within the year.

Much greater economy is also required in building, as even a hasty computation shows. Anyone to-day who sketched in rough outline a standard dwelling which, without being at all luxurious, would meet the requirements of modern hygienic housing, and who then attempted to build the thirty-five million units of this type that are needed in the United States would discover that such an undertaking could not be accomplished. Not only would the supply of materials be inadequate and construction impossible because of lack of sufficient energy, but maintenance would also be impossible for the same reason. The plan could be carried out only if a break were made with

ordinary building methods and if completely new building materials and types of construction were adopted, if heating, light, and other housing equipment were introduced that have not up to now been possible under a price system. Science and technology have already shown how to make construction more reasonable and economical, but the nature of the price system does not allow the introduction of any such innovations.

In the light of what the work of the technocrats has revealed up to now, the study of modern society encounters many new ideas and lines of development if it is undertaken sensibly from the point of view of physics; and, proceeding in this way, there is hope that the brisk process of fermentation society is undergoing may now be brought to a satisfactory end.

Kurt von Schleicher became chancellor of Germany in the same month that Joseph Paul-Boncour became premier of France. Here are sketches of two men destined to play important parts in Europe.

Europe's Two New Premiers

By TWO BRITISH
CORRESPONDENTS

I. SCHLEICHER, CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY

By ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

From the New Statesman and Nation, London Independent Weekly of the Left

GERMANY to-day is the journalists' paradise; there is nearly always a political crisis, and things are seldom what they seem. For Schleicher, who six months ago was decried as the betrayer of Brüning and the evil genius of Papen,—the very embodiment of black reaction,—turns out to be a man whose conciliatory powers justify his appointment as chancellor; he is probably the least hated man in faction-ridden Germany to-day.

The most important thing about Kurt von Schleicher is, moreover, something which not one of his enemies can deny. They may mock at him as 'so up-to-date,' they may suspect his 'damned charm,' they

may belittle his quick intellectual grasp as merely facile, they may deny his ability to handle a terrible economic situation, but all agree that he is a realist. While Papen was astonishingly insensitive to post-war circumstances and public opinion, Schleicher perceives things as they are. He knows that the post-war German state rests upon the balance of two forces, the one organized labor, which defeated the Kapp Putsch by a general strike, the other the present Reichswehr, which saved the Republic from its Communist enemies.

If the president of the German Trade Union Congress and the head of the Reichswehr can effectively work together, the existing social structure

is fairly secure. Papen brought the unions and the army into almost open conflict, for the possibility of his reappointment after Hitler's refusal on November 25 aroused the threat of a general strike. So ministers like Bracht and Krosigk forced the issue, and Hindenburg reluctantly accepted Schleicher as chancellor.

Schleicher is probably the most representative public figure in Germany. He is certainly a soldier, an authoritarian, and a nationalist, but even the left is not to-day fundamentally opposed to such notions. His aim is to construct what has been labeled '*Die Dritte Front*,' a working coalition from trade unions on the left to Nazis on the right. The Centre Party, always important strategically, while it abhorred Papen, has welcomed Schleicher to office.

The Nazis present a far greater difficulty. Recent elections, both parliamentary and municipal, have brought the party serious losses. Yet, if the movement is reduced in quantity, it may have been purged in quality, now that its young men must rattle money boxes at all the street corners, instead of thriving upon the subsidies that once flowed in from the Ruhr industrialists. Whatever one's political taste, it is clear that this movement cannot yet be neglected, that it is infinitely tiresome in opposition, but would probably be helpless in office. Of all Papen's colleagues, Schleicher is the one who has always remained on good terms with the Nazis, and the most capable and sensible of Hitler's lieutenants, Gregor Strasser and Frick, have shown their desire to work with him. But the intransigent Goebbels, editor of the scurrilous *Angriff*, appears to

have defeated them. Strasser has just resigned all his party offices, saying that he can, as a German, no longer coöperate in Hitler's recent *Katastrophenpolitik*; Frick has surrendered to Goebbels, and the rest of the party has renewed its oath of allegiance to Hitler. Since Hitler and Goebbels prefer agitation to administration, they are denouncing the tyranny of Schleicher as warmly as that of Papen or Brüning. This, so far, is Schleicher's only failure.

A new ministerial post has already been created and Dr. Gereke has become minister for *Arbeitsbeschaffung* (stimulation of employment). Hugo Schäffer, who was associated with a Krupp tradition, has been succeeded, at the Ministry of Labor, by Dr. Syrup; this in itself implies the abandonment of the hated Papen plan, and the acceptance of the demand that the money destined by Papen for employers who took on more hands at lower wages shall be spent on public works.

Dr. Syrup, incidentally, has been organizing 'labor service' since July. The identification of chancellor and acting premier of Prussia is temporarily to continue in Schleicher's person, and a more permanent arrangement has been again—in the interest of peace and quiet—postponed. It has been made very clear that the present relation between the Reich and Prussia is not to be disturbed, but the General has had a friendly interview with Otto Braun, the Socialist, who is still titular premier of Prussia. All talk of constitutional reform is to be given up for the time; the southern states need not fear the destruction of their cherished defenses against northern rude-

ness. It is important that Baron von Gayl, the most complete Prussian aristocrat in the Papen cabinet, who was detested on the left as an admitted monarchist and the enemy of democracy, has been dropped. Schleicher's appointment means in itself that the disastrous quota policy is abandoned, and Baron von Braun has remained minister of agriculture only on this condition.

The reactionary press is already scolding the Chancellor because parliamentary government seemed again to function last week with the Cabinet's acquiescence. The *Kreuz-Zeitung*, organ of the monarchist Stahlhelm, expresses its bitter disappointment that Schleicher appears to have abandoned authoritarian government in favor of a return to Brüning's methods. There were a few rowdy incidents in the Reichstag, it is true, but a number of significant measures were approved. That part of the Papen programme which arranged for the depression of wages was condemned. A pretty generous amnesty for political prisoners was approved. It was agreed that if the President dies or becomes incapable his authority, pending an election, shall be exercised not by the Chancellor but by the head of the Supreme Court of Justice in the Reich.

II

Some think the General's appointment was provocative abroad. The idea is automatically distasteful in England, but the French are inclined to prefer Schleicher to come out into the open; it may actually be easier for a soldier not to play to his own gallery, though the East Prussian declaration in September was disgusting.

The acceptance at Geneva of Germany's claim to equality gives Schleicher a fortunate début. In the future much will depend upon what form the equality is to take, for, if it brought rearmament and a return to any form of conscription, the balance between Reichswehr and trade unions would be destroyed. For the army would cease to be carefully selected, easily controlled, and potentially anti-popular—it would, on the contrary, like the old imperial army, be something like the trade unions in arms.

It seems clear, then, that Schleicher must be cautiously welcomed by all but those who wish to provoke violent revolution in Germany. For a great man the opportunity would be tremendous, but he does not seem to be constructed upon an heroic scale. His economic grasp is probably superficial, and it is possible that he tries to be 'in' with too many people. The success of his advances to labor is still obscure, since labor is itself so divided. The trade unions and the Reichsbanner do not seem unfriendly; the Socialist politicians at first proclaimed their hostility, but one has the impression that proceedings in the Reichstag did something to soothe their susceptibilities. The allegiance of the rank and file is in any case extremely uncertain, and the leaders fear a continuing secession to the implacable Communist Party now thriving upon Papen's persecution.

When all is said and done, it remains true that Schleicher's appointment is really democratic; he well represents the German nation in its present mood, and he is prepared to give the Reichstag a chance because it is more practical not to quarrel with it. There is a feeling now that

Weimar is not ended and can be mended. After the last general election one began to see that the only alternative to more violent dictatorship was a step in the constitutional direction.

If Schleicher succeeds, the military strength of a Germany no longer divided against itself (and in which military and social organization are as perfectly identified, within the modern industrial framework, as Schleicher contemplates) may indeed be alarming to Germany's most anxious neighbors. But those who know Schleicher best consider him far too

cautious to contemplate military adventures. If he only succeeds in employing and feeding an increasing number of people the internal future of Germany will be extraordinarily interesting. The General has accepted his dependence upon organized labor at a time when poverty and politics appear to have sapped the strength of its organization. With food and work the strength of the labor movement must grow greater again. Will the workers of the coming generation remain Socialists and lead up-to-date generals, or will they desert to Communism and destroy them?

II. PAUL-BONCOUR, PREMIER OF FRANCE

By A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

From *The Spectator*, London Conservative Weekly

IT WAS inevitable that sooner or later Joseph Paul-Boncour would be prime minister of France, and certainly he has every qualification that French politics require. He is handsome—'picturesque' is the word the journalists have overworked about him in the last ten days—handsome, not with the strange, almost mystical beauty of Aristide Briand, but with the harder, bolder good looks that befit a revolutionary leader. His unruly mane of silver hair is just the setting needed for his combative, musical voice. He is industrious, with the industry of the advocate who without wealth, assistance, or position has made his own career at the bar. He is courageous; as commandant of a battalion in the line he won the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre for valor against the Germans, and fourteen years later, as minister of

war, he fought and beat the great French general staff. He is a lawyer, and not only a master in the Courts of Paris, but preëminent also, as counsel for his country, at the bar of the Permanent Court for International Justice at The Hague. Above all, he is an orator. With less than Briand's genius for debating, and less than Viviani's genius for the literary masterpiece to which long weeks of preparation are devoted, he must nevertheless be counted in the first flight of the orators of France.

With all these assets it may, indeed, be wondered why he did not become prime minister before he was fifty-nine. Why has it taken him so long to reach that eminence for which the critics freely cast him long ago? The reason is, perhaps, that he is sincerely, deeply, even passionately, a man of the left. As private secretary to

Waldeck-Rousseau, when Waldeck-Rousseau was prime minister of France, from 1899 till 1902, in an atmosphere still charged with the emotion roused by the Dreyfus case, Paul-Boncour was blooded in the fight against militarism, nationalism, clericalism, and reaction in all its forms. In that fight he has continued to this day. He was thirty-six when, as a Republican Socialist, he was first elected to the Chamber. His success in that turbulent assembly was instantaneous, and only two years later he entered the cabinet as minister for labor. Thus the curtain was rung up on what must surely, so it seemed, be an astonishingly brilliant and even a dramatic career.

But the drama was interrupted by the tocsin of war. In 1919 Paul-Boncour came back from the front even more ardently, even more vehemently an enemy of militarism and war than he had been before he had seen the carnage of modern battle. Throwing his chances of ministerial promotion to the winds, he joined the Socialist Party, for no other reason than that he believed the doctrines they preached. For twelve long years—till he was fifty-eight—he fought with them through thick and thin. Not few were the counselors who told him that he would be prime minister as soon as he left them. At last, a year ago, he did so. The Socialists were bitter at the time, but even they admit to-day that Paul-Boncour broke with them chiefly because his comrades were so obstinately opposed to taking office, to 'participation,' for which he had striven patiently but in vain; they admit that their rigid party discipline was particularly irksome to one who suffered no leadership very gladly;

and they count it for grace that when he went he did not join another party, but remained an independent of the left, a 'Republican' and a man of peace.

That fact is of significance, not to France only but to the world. For since he first went there with Herriot and Briand in 1924 Paul-Boncour has spent almost as much time in Geneva as he has in Paris. He has never missed an Assembly. He has been French representative in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and in all the other important League committees. On the strength of his war record and his Geneva experience, he was made president of the Supreme Council of National Defense. He has led the French delegation to the Disarmament Conference. As minister of war under M. Herriot, he drew up, and against bitter military opposition secured acceptance for, the new French 'constructive plan.' He is the first prime minister of a Great Power to rise to the top by an almost exclusively League of Nations career.

In considering M. Paul-Boncour's prospects as prime minister, the last steps in this career should, in particular, be remembered. It is only a few weeks since he was staking his whole future on his 'constructive plan.' He is not likely to forget it now that his power is greater. So long as he is in office 'Arbitration, Security, Disarmament,' the slogan of 1924, will stand more than ever in the forefront of the policy of France. There is no part that Paul-Boncour would sooner play than that of prime minister of his country, leading the first World Disarmament Conference to a great result. Less likely things have happened in the history of the world.

Here is a Communist editorial on the subject of Manchuria, urging the Japanese to sign a nonaggression treaty.

Russia to JAPAN

By N. TEREITYEV

Translated from the *Moskauer Rundschau*
Moscow German-Language Communist Weekly

THE exchange of notes between People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov and Dr. Yen, Chinese delegate to the League of Nations, has reestablished normal diplomatic and consular relations between the U. S. S. R. and China, and thus brings to an end the five-and-a-half-year period during which relations were more or less broken off. I say 'more or less' because the break between the U. S. S. R. and China was forced by the imperialists. Although the Nanking Government was a willing tool in the hands of the imperialist powers, it did not dare to carry through their policy to its ultimate conclusion because of the pressure of the Chinese working masses, who wanted to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Russian workers. The result was that even after Nanking had officially severed relations with the Soviet Union the Chinese embassy and consular offices, which first represented Peking and then Nanking, remained on Soviet

territory until the conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway broke out in the year 1929. After this conflict had been liquidated in conformity with the protocol of Khabarovsk, Chinese consulates reopened in the Far East and the Soviet consulate in Manchuria reopened, although Nanking denied that any such thing had happened.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that over five years ago the Nanking Government declared that relations with the Soviet Union had been suspended. Wide masses of the Chinese people opposed this break, which was dictated by the imperialists. What happened was that in the year 1927 world imperialism, headed by the English Conservatives, made its first attempt since the intervention and the famous Curzon ultimatum to feel out the power of Soviet Russia with bayonets. Chang Tso-lin's attack on the Soviet embassy in Peking, instigated by the imperialists and carried out with their formal permission, coincided

almost exactly with the raid on the Arcos offices in London and was rightly referred to by the Soviet Government in its note of April 9, 1927, as an act provocative of war executed by 'irresponsible groups of foreign imperialists.' At that time the Kuomintang, in the person of Chiang Kai-shek, stood shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union and expressed its indignation at the attack.

But during the following months the Kuomintang made a sharp change of policy. It ceased to be an anti-imperialist weapon and became the tool of imperialism in China. Anti-Soviet intrigues conducted by imperialists spread all over south and central China, where the Kuomintang was in power. As an excuse for breaking off relations with Russia it was claimed that Chinese Communists had used the Soviet consulate and the offices of the Soviet commercial attaché as bases of activity. The Soviet Government denied this accusation in these words: 'For some years now imperialists of all countries who are enemies of the Chinese people have regarded the great revolutionary movement of the Chinese people as the result of intrigues conducted by foreign powers. The fact that the National Government at Nanking is now repeating these counter-revolutionary legends of the oppressors of the Chinese people proves in the most definite way whose desires they are carrying out.'

II

The false legend that Soviet representatives were responsible for the confusion in China is best refuted by history itself. 'For a long time past there have been no Russian represent-

atives in southern or central China,' said Stalin in his speech before the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 'But there are German, English, and Japanese military advisers working with the Chinese generals who are now fighting. Russian emissaries vanished from the scene long ago. Yet there are English, American, German, Czechoslovakian, and other foreign rifles, airplanes, tanks, cannon, and poison gas. What is the result? Instead of peace and quiet we now have, in southern and central China, the wildest and most destructive warfare among generals who are financed and trained by the "civilized" states of Europe and America.'

These words were spoken in 1930 and since that time the Kuomintang has fallen still further into disrepute. The revolutionary movement in China, on the other hand, has grown stronger and has become completely native, as even such a thoroughgoing imperialist as the White Guard American journalist, Sokolsky, admits in the December number of *Asia*.

The terrific crisis in the imperialist world has now lasted for four years and the Soviet Union has alone remained immune to it. This fact must have been enough to convince the Chinese public of the futility of isolating Russia, a policy dictated to it from abroad. Still more instructive is the fact, proved by the loss of Manchuria, that this isolation has not strengthened the position of China in relation to the imperialist powers but, on the contrary, has weakened it dangerously. Never in modern history has China found itself in such a catastrophic situation. Never was the prospect of a partition of the country among the imperialists so real, either

in the form of individual attacks by separate states or in the form of international intervention such as the Lytton Report proposes. The present situation in the Far East confirms the analysis embodied in the Soviet reply of five years ago to the Nanking declaration breaking off relations 'that the position taken by the Chinese officials in Shanghai damages the Chinese people and the national interests of China, and that all those who so readily adopt an anti-Soviet policy will be the first to recognize its disastrous consequences.'

It is no longer surprising, therefore, that the Nanking Government has finally been compelled to abandon its bankrupt policy of suspended diplomatic relations. Nor is it surprising that this act has aroused more enthusiasm among the Chinese people than any measure that the leaders of the Kuomintang have taken for a long time. The Soviet Union, which was in no way responsible for the break of five years ago, can only greet this renewal of relations with China as a great new success.

Even in the most difficult situations and under pressure of the most serious provocation, Soviet policy has remained unaltered. Russia has adhered firmly to the principle of respecting Chinese independence, sovereignty, and national interests and China's efforts to attain internationalequality. This principle was laid down on May 31, 1924, when normal Soviet-Chinese relations were resumed for the first time. It has been repeated on later occasions and has been revealed in the actions of the Soviet Government itself, not excepting those undertaken during the Soviet-Chinese conflict of 1929. The Soviet Union is not pur-

suing any imperialist aim in China. It is building its relationships with China on the foundations of equality and mutual esteem. The Soviet Union is the only country that has voluntarily surrendered all the privileges embodied in one-sided treaties—the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction, concessions on Chinese territory, and the Boxer indemnity. The Soviet Union has transformed the Chinese Eastern Railway from an implement of Tsarist imperialism into an ordinary commercial undertaking that is now being run by Soviet and Chinese authorities side by side.

III

Is it also necessary to add, in the light of the 1929 conflict, that the Soviet Union is not seeking any territorial conquest, is not endeavoring to oppress the Chinese population, and, of course, has nothing to do with the imperialist brawls over China? Nor should we forget that this policy is not exceptional, that it is, on the other hand, part and parcel of the whole system of Russia's foreign policy, which is above all else a policy of peace, a policy of creating and strengthening friendly relations with all countries. Hence the renewal and reestablishment of relations with China does not mean that relations with any other country will suffer.

Soviet-Chinese relations have unfortunately always been a sphere in which the influences of imperialist powers hostile to both China and Russia have made themselves felt. Up to 1924 the imperialists prevented China from renewing normal relations with Russia. The imperialists caused the first treaty with Russia, signed in

March of that year, to be broken, and surrounded later negotiations with such a hostile atmosphere that the Chinese Government was compelled to request that these negotiations be concealed from the diplomatic corps. The imperialists systematically provoked a conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway that led to open conflict in 1929. The imperialists forced China to take an aggressive attitude and break off relations with Russia and prevented the Soviet-Chinese Conference of 1930 from coming to a successful conclusion.

This systematic interference between Russia and China reveals the semi-colonial position that China occupies. Even those powers that were forced to maintain normal relations with the Soviet Union considered it possible and normal to continue anti-Soviet intrigues with the aid of Chinese officials and at the expense of China. On the other hand, an attempt is now being made to represent the completely normal and natural act of resumption of relations between two great neighboring powers as a threat to universal peace. In an extremely heated interview with an American journalist, a representative of the Japanese Foreign Office declared that 'the forces that are the chief threat to universal peace have now joined hands. Japan opposes these forces uncompromisingly. The Powers are faced with the question: to whom shall leadership in the East be entrusted? To the powers of destruction or of consolidation?' This same ministerial official in the same interview spoke of Litvinov's 'veiled threat against Japan.' Is it necessary to add that this sensational interpretation of the simple act of resumption of rela-

tions is completely meaningless and that the accusation that 'China is throwing herself into the arms of the Soviet Union' has no significance? Further, is it necessary to repeat that this act, which simply involves the restoration of normal relations between the Soviet Union and China, such relations as have existed all along between China and Japan, holds no dangers for any third power?

China might just as well protest against the normal relations that exist between Russia and Japan, which the Soviet Union not only maintains but even endeavors to strengthen by offering to sign a nonaggression pact. The representative of the Japanese Foreign Office clearly means that the resumption of Soviet-Chinese relations will make it difficult for Japan to sign a nonaggression pact with Russia, as if the purpose of that pact were not to maintain peace but to make both parties return to the system of complete self-sufficiency that existed at the time of the Japanese shogunate. No one can take such an idea seriously. We are simply witnessing an attempt to postpone or eliminate the conclusion of the pact that Russia has proposed, which would also affect the neighboring territory of Manchuria. But all actions of the Soviet Union's policy of peace are harmoniously bound up together, and the resumption of normal relations with China merely adds strength to the efforts that the Soviet Union is known to be making to strengthen its relations with Japan. The doubts and suspicions that Japan feels in regard to the intentions of the Soviet Union, in so far as they are genuine, can be allayed by the prompt conclusion of the nonaggression pact.

Persons and Personages

INTERVIEWING PREMIER AZAÑA

By JEAN LONGUET

Translated from *Vu*, Paris Illustrated Weekly

EVEN in the opinion of his opponents, Premier Azaña is the 'revelation of the Republic,' a politician of the first order whose authority has grown steadily with the course of events. Even before the revolution, well-informed people recognized his ability.

I picked up from authoritative political sources the following characteristic anecdote. Some years ago, when the Madrid Ateneo was the great centre of republican culture and anti-monarchist agitation, with Azaña as its president, it was closed by Primo de Rivera. Alfonso XIII was discussing the incident with one of his innumerable generals. Speaking familiarly, as was his habit, the King of Spain remarked, 'I have hundreds of generals like you but I do not find a single Azaña among you.'

This striking piece of homage rendered by the last representative of the Habsburg-Bourbon dynasty to one of his adversaries has been fully justified by the dramatic events of last summer, whose repercussions still resound. The conspiracy of Sanjurjo, former commander of the 'Cossacks,' who was financed by a rich business man, whose activities had been stopped by the Republic, and whose arrest had been ordered, was organized with the most powerful financial support and without any scruples whatever. Two royalist conspirators had been assigned the job of blowing the heads off Azaña and his minister of the interior. Let us add that the Premier was not ignorant of the plot to assassinate him, but that he never lost his coolness or tranquil courage. While the royalists were attacking the War Ministry and Central Post Office in Madrid, which the inhabitants had ironically baptized 'Our Lady of Communications' because it looks like a cathedral, while Sanjurjo was operating in Seville, while gun fire was ringing out on every side and bullets were whistling in his ears, the Prime Minister tranquilly smoked cigarettes in the window of the building that was being attacked.

I had just been talking with my friend, Besteiro, President of the Cortes and the Marxian theoretician of the Socialist Party, when I met Premier Azaña in the corridors of the Chamber.

I asked if I could interview him and he kindly consented. But first I wanted to tell him what admiration the republicans of France felt for

the unruffled courage and splendid energy he had shown and what joy the republican victory in Spain has given them at a time when we are witnessing the most lamentable returns to tyrannical government in other parts of Europe.

Azaña replied to me with charming modesty, 'What I did was nothing,' adding, with a smile, 'The fortress was solid.'

I asked him about the condition of the country after this rude attack and the months that had followed.

He replied clearly in perfect French: 'The monarchists attempted a decisive *coup d'état* and were carried away by their own foolish, criminal exploit. The plot was not a morbid symptom of the Republican Government but, on the contrary, a final phase of monarchist illness. Remember that during the fifteen months of the Republic we had had to modify completely the mentality of our soldiers, who had been accustomed for so many years to manipulating governments as they pleased. You see how we succeeded.'

'In short, you cannot help congratulating yourselves on the consequences of that counter-revolutionary plot?'

'The Republic emerged strengthened, with the immense majority of the nation behind it. You have no idea of the republican fervor that now animates the whole Spanish nation.'

'I have not, of course, been able, Mr. Prime Minister, to check up as thoroughly as you have, but I can tell you that I have been impressed by the enthusiasm that I have found all over Spain, from Burgos to Madrid, from Toledo to Córdoba and Seville, as well as at Barcelona, which I have just visited. But how about the Catalonian problem? We have been told all kinds of stories in France about the dissatisfaction in Catalonia and even about its separatist tendencies.'

'It's absurd. The statute that we have just given to the Catalonians satisfies the province. Of course there are some extremists,—in Barcelona, for instance,—but they represent a tiny minority. The immense majority of the Catalonians, whatever their desires for autonomy may be, are profoundly devoted to the Spanish Republic. You must have noticed this yourself, since you have been to Barcelona. The monarchy, the soldiery, and the clergy created separatist sentiment by their oppressive government of that beautiful, rich province. To-day the Republic has reestablished the sentiment of nationalist unity there.'

I may say that the investigations I had made in the magnificent capital of Catalonia fully confirmed what Azaña told me. I witnessed enthusiastic demonstrations in which the whole Barcelonese population acclaimed *el estatuto* and the Republic. And Señor Alavedra, the political secretary and soundest interpreter of the ideas of President Macia of Catalonia, said to me, 'Separatists under the Monarchy, the Catalonians

have become unionists under the Republic.' And he added, 'We are going to coöperate with Madrid in complete solidarity. We pay homage to the noble character of President Zamora and to the generous efforts of Señor Bello, who presided so successfully over the Catalanian Committee in the Cortes.'

BUT LET ME return to my conversation with the Prime Minister.

'Apart from Catalonia, Mr. Prime Minister, you have other problems of local autonomy just as delicate. In the Basque country, where I spent two weeks this summer, in the charming watering place of Zarauz, where Unamuno came from, I saw how violent the nationalist spirit of revenge is.'

'The basic situation there is very different from that in Catalonia. The Catalanian movement is essentially a movement to the left, a republican movement. The Basque nationalist sentiment is much more penetrated with influences of the right, with Catholic fanaticism. The influence of the Jesuits and royalist tradition can still be felt profoundly there. Royalism does not exist in dynastic form, but its reactionary and clerical ideology endures. But in the Basque country, too, the Republic is moving forward. The enthusiastic reception given to President Zamora throughout the province during his September visit is significant.'

'There is also an autonomous movement in Galicia, is n't there?'

'It is much weaker and much less reactionary than that in the Basque country. There, too, by recognizing local liberty we shall maintain the unity of the nation.'

'The coöperation of the Socialists in your government, the important rôle played in the Cabinet by men like Prieto, Minister of Public Works; Fernando de los Ríos, Minister of Public Instruction; and Caballero, Minister of Labor, have provoked lively criticism in certain bourgeois groups. Señor A. Lerroux, leader of the traditional radicals, has combated this criticism violently. Moreover, many Socialists, at least until the monarchists attempted a *coup d'état*, thought that Socialist participation had lasted long enough and that it was time for the Socialist Labor Party of Spain to resume its freedom of action. At the recent congress of the General Union of Workers these tendencies were affirmed.'

'The collaboration of the Socialists is precious to the Republic. At the present time it is the basis of the Government's stability. Without them I should have encountered insurmountable difficulties.'

'How was the question of the constitution of your cabinet settled?'

'When I was summoned by the President of the Republic I told him that I considered the coöperation of the Socialists indispensable, that I would not accept the task of forming a government without them under the circumstances that existed.'

'You know the objections that certain Socialists make against the coöperation of the Socialist Party in a bourgeois government?'

'Yes, I am familiar with them. I suppose it is essentially a question of kind. In certain circumstances I can understand that our Socialist friends would prefer to reserve themselves for the future. But at the present time they must almost all recognize that they cannot do that.'

'Is n't the Spanish Republic,' I continued, 'animated largely by the European and pacifist tendencies expressed with such undeniable authority at Geneva by your eminent representative and ambassador to Paris, Salvador de Madariaga?'

'We have proclaimed in our Constitution that we renounce war as an instrument of international policy. We remain faithfully attached to the League of Nations. We are determined to bend all our efforts to promote world disarmament. Without waiting for any decisions to be made at Geneva, we have cut our permanent military forces fifty per cent by reducing our army from sixteen to eight divisions. We have cut down our officers even more and have retired ten thousand of them. That was one of the reasons for the recent attempt at sedition.'

'French opinion, Mr. Prime Minister, has long been intentionally and perfidiously misinformed on the subject of Alfonso XIII's alleged friendship. That explains in part, though it does not justify, the deplorable demonstrations that took place when the ex-King arrived at the Gare d'Orsay, and similar outbursts in some of our newspapers.'

'Alfonso XIII pro-French? A poor joke. I can tell you, knowing the reasons for it, that throughout the World War he, like all other reactionaries and aristocrats, ardently desired victory for William II. No, it is the Spanish Republic, penetrated with the traditions of the French Revolution, it is the living Republic and not the dead Monarchy that is the friend of republican France.' With these words President Azaña took his leave and returned to the legislative session, where he made an enthusiastic, extensive speech explaining the character of the great agrarian reform that the Spanish parliament was about to vote and eloquently affirming that the Spanish Republic 'is advancing resolutely on the path of the revolution that brought it into the world and that nothing will halt it.'

LUDWIG RENN, GERMANY'S PROLETARIAN NOVELIST

Translated from the *Rote Fabne*, Berlin Communist Daily

SOME weeks ago Comrade Ludwig Renn, author of the world-renowned book entitled *War*, was arrested during a search of the Marxian Workers' School. Papers that he carried relating to his literary

and scientific work gave the government officials an excuse to charge him with preparation for high treason. There is no doubt that the purpose of this scandalous arrest was not merely to brand Renn as a private individual; it was also supposed to damage his reputation as a writer. He is widely unpopular in bourgeois circles—why we shall soon see—and this is reason enough to make the proletariat more aware of the great value of all his literary work. The best way of judging Renn's first book is to compare it with Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, which appeared slightly before.

Remarque dodged the most important question that any serious reader would ask him and refused to say whether he was for or against the War. It was a conscious dodge, for he explained with that haughty air of superiority that scribblers who have no real ideas use as a mask that his book was neither an attack nor a defense. The fact is that it was written so 'objectively' that it indorsed every bourgeois defense of imperialism and at the same time justified both pacifists and militarists. Thus everyone, except us Leninists, could read into it whatever he pleased.

The friends of war generally emphasized the sharp representations of characters and events, especially the erotic passages, whereas the pacifists used its realistic descriptions of many of the horrors of war to support their abstract peace propaganda that Lenin called 'a way of misleading the working class.' No wonder the Ullstein Press by trying to please everyone at once succeeded in making new sales records with Remarque's trash. Here is proof of the high esteem in which Remarque is held by the counter-revolutionary petty bourgeois masses from whom the readers of this book were chiefly recruited.

Renn's *War* has a completely different aim. It is not a proletarian revolutionary novel, but the author comes much closer to representing the proletarian point of view than he does to representing that of the petty bourgeois. On the surface it is not an aggressive work. It does not point to revolution as the way out of the period of imperialist wars, but it leaves one to imagine for one's self that revolution is the way out. Like Remarque, Renn neither attacks nor defends war in so many words, but, in contrast to Remarque, paradoxical as this may seem, he has created a silent, unspoken condemnation of the wire-pullers and beneficiaries of imperialist war and an implicit recognition of the counter-activity of the men they sacrifice, the class-conscious proletarian masses.

The difference between Remarque and Renn is chiefly one of vision. Whereas Remarque succeeded in convincing the reader that even such a butchery as the World War had its good side, Renn, without resorting to trickery, gives anyone who is not smothered by patriotic phrases

complete understanding of the senselessness and viciousness of such butchery. Anyone who does not care for that kind of understanding cannot enjoy Renn's style, for no book achieves a more perfect unity of form and content. Renn's language is not the art form of a poet who possesses the gift of fancy but the natural means of expression of a completely fair-minded chronicler. There is not one word too much or one word too little. There is neither bombast nor artificial smoothness but a simplicity that comprehends the basic qualities of every worker and peasant.

RENN'S inner and outer transformation from an official of the bourgeois state into a member of the revolutionary proletarian party forms the content of his second novel. It is more than a continuation of his first. In spite of its political and artistic value, Renn's initial work did not differ in content from most of the other war novels that sprang up after the bourgeoisie had signified by its attitude toward Remarque that it was willing to remember the World War. But in Renn's next novel, *Post-War*, he entered a province that literature had not yet occupied—the conduct of the Reichswehr, the militia, and the police during the first post-war years, the events in Dresden in 1920, the Kapp Putsch, and, finally, the activities of March 1921.

Still more impressive than the representation of these objective events is his description of the inner struggles, the self-questionings and doubts that he had to stamp out of himself before he could break away from his military *milieu*. When we read how isolated, abandoned, and lonely he felt all that time we get the impression that this man, like so many of his bourgeois colleagues, belongs to the rabidly individualistic school of writers. The judgment that he passes on himself in this book is all the more serious and bitter because it is delivered without the usual psychological trimmings. Renn's method of conveying the emotions of an individual, not by laying bare his soul, but through the cadence of his words, this psychology without the professional lingo is reminiscent of Knut Hamsun's method, but it has a much more natural effect. Naturalness and reality, these are the qualities that give each book of Renn's its profound power.

That he is not really the individualist he appears to be in the pages of *Post-War* is proved by his description of his visit to the Soviet Union. Just as the stuffy atmosphere of his official bourgeois profession sentenced him to isolation, so the free atmosphere of proletarian state power awoke his class consciousness and led him to appreciate the community. His account of his two visits to Russia has the greatest fundamental significance, although he himself modestly describes it in these deprecatory words: 'In these dispatches I shall bring to those readers

who are ready to form their opinions of a new system little things from everyday life. Important theoretical material, the Five-Year Plan, and statistics must be studied in other books.' Certainly, but it is theoretically as well as artistically significant for an individual to show the path that has led him, and millions of petty-bourgeois intellectuals as well, to form a solid class front with the revolutionary proletariat.

This path is no longer blocked. Let the bourgeoisie persecute as they please the Ludwig Renn who used to be a bourgeois and is now a proletarian revolutionist. For the Ludwig Renn who is engaged in the class struggle cannot be separated from the proletariat, nor can the proletariat be separated from him.

PAUL GÉRALDY, DRAMATIST OF LOVE

By BERTA ZUCKERKANDL-SZEPS

Translated from the *Neue Freie Presse*, Vienna Liberal Daily

THE stage entrance of the Comédie Française. Paul Géraldy is expecting me and the first dress rehearsal of his play, *Christine*, is about to occur. We pass through historic rooms, for 'la Maison de Molière' is rich in the great tradition. The greenroom where the actors rest and receive friends between acts is hung with pictures that preserve the memory of long-vanished stage celebrities. It is a distinguished, luxurious room. Marie Marquet and Francen, the stars of Géraldy's play, greet us. Like actors all over the world, wherever plays are rehearsed, they are excited, despairing, happy, uncertain, hopeful, childish. Soon I am standing on the stage with them. The actors think that the scenery and furniture, which has been designed by Géraldy and executed by Ruhlmann, one of the biggest interior decorators, is disproportionately large. Arguments occur, actors refuse to act, scenery is put up and taken down, a monumental divan is brought on, taken away, and brought on again. There are even tears. Then M. Fabre, the director of the Comédie Française, appears, has the footlights turned on, and calls out in a dry, practical tone, 'Begin.'

Four acts pass, or rather fly by, for one is carried away by the tempo of this play that is outwardly so quiet, but inwardly so rich in suspense. Géraldy himself stands on the stage and directs the rehearsal, correcting, explaining, and going over scenes.

A few days later I dined *tête-à-tête* with Géraldy, who was exhausted but unable to talk of anything except *Christine*.

'Yes, I am playing a dangerous game. In these times, when the real theatre has lost its boundaries and stands in danger of losing its true

form and giving up the ghost, I have written four acts that do without external incident and merely mirror inner experiences. In my opinion the film has not injured the theatre but, on the contrary, has made possible its renaissance. For the film has done away with the sham romance and pasteboard fata Morganas of the theatre. To the film belong marvelous diversity and a constant interplay of cities, nature, and men, an endless variety of pictures. But is not all this precisely the reason why the theatre, freed from all these trimmings, is about to find its way back to its essential elements?

'Ever since I have loved the theatre, and that means ever since I was born, I have heard theatrical people preach: "The theatre needs action." Certainly it needs it. What would the actor do, what would he be, without action? But it is necessary that we should agree as to the true meaning of this word. In a play action is generally taken to mean a succession of outward events. But in my opinion the only true action in the theatre is that which takes place in the hearts and minds of the characters. Outer circumstances and complications possess interest only in so far as they serve to reveal another, much deeper activity.

'Classical writers loved above all else to handle well-known legends, myths, and historical events dramatically. They knew that neither the development nor the *dénouement* of such material could stimulate curiosity, but in their wisdom they feared the impatience of the audience that curiosity arouses. It is this same impatience that causes the novel reader to skip pages and jump to the last chapter. The classical writer wanted to awaken interest and not curiosity. He was quite indifferent to that feverish query, "What's going to happen?" For in the last analysis the dramatist has only a single plot, which is always the same. What one does with this plot meant everything to the classical writer. The outcome, the solution, was a matter of no importance. His goal was the method pursued.

'A MAN and a woman face each other. What difference does it make how they came together? None. They meet; that is enough. He is the typical man, and she the perfect expression of woman. True, this is a situation that lacks originality. But what an occurrence! I claim that it gives the dramatic writer all that he needs. The greatest of human adventures can now begin, feeding on itself, and dying of its own accord. No railroad trains are necessary, no ships, no airplane accidents, no big cities, not even trees or sea. All that is needed is a lamp, a table, two armchairs, and actors who are vital and convincing, who can make contact with the audience beyond the footlights.'

'Even in the notices that *Aimée* received a few years ago it was said that you were carrying on the tradition of Racine at its purest.'

"To that I must reply with all due modesty that the exacting form of our great classical writer has indeed determined my dramatic outlook. Charles Méré has already written about me in this connection, saying that, like Racine in his *Bérénice*, I have analyzed and developed the most undying and glorious of themes—the birth, life, and death of love. Méré says that when I am reproached for always trying to simplify things the proper answer is what Racine, the author of *Bérénice*, said to his critics:—

"“There are people who are of the opinion that my simplification is a sign of poverty of invention. They do not reflect that invention, on the contrary, consists chiefly of making something out of nothing. An overburdened plot is always the recourse of those poets and authors who do not feel that they are mentally strong or rich enough to hold their audiences through five acts simply by means of an uncomplicated plot, to which, however, the glow of passion, the noble power of emotion, and elegance of expression have given that vitality of which life itself consists.”

"I admit that this passage from Racine expresses perfectly my own efforts and goal. At least I have tried to let this pair of lovers love, suffer, devote themselves to each other, lose each other, and mourn each other without giving the outcome of this passion too real a basis, as is commonly done on the stage to-day.

"Four acts, the four seasons of love! Act One: meeting. Act Two: passion. Act Three: the marriage and slipping away of the woman. Act Four: solitude. That is the be-all and the end-all of my *Christine*.

"“Nothing but love, always this theme of love!”—that is an objection to which I often have to listen. How I should like to speak to each of these assailants of mine and tell him: “Think back over the most beautiful, the most moving, the most decisive, and the most unforgettable moment of your life. Does not an experience of love press everything else into the background?” And none of those who criticize my world as too narrow and limited could answer with a “No.” The great public has just given such an enthusiastic and unanimous “Yes” to my *Christine* that I shall never forget this echo that confirms the avowal of my own heart.’

A collection of political essays written by Oswald Spengler between 1919 and 1926 has just been published and we are using a review of that book as an introduction to a new essay by Spengler himself on the future of civilization.

Spengler TO-DAY

A REVIEW AND A PROPHECY

Translated from the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*
Munich Conservative Daily

INTRODUCTION TO SPENGLER

By HORST GRUENEBERG

OSWALD SPENGLER has collected in a well-printed, inexpensive, popular edition the political articles that he wrote between 1919 and 1926. Remember those years and then ask yourself what politician would allow what he wrote during that time to be reprinted to-day unaltered. Whose writings, reissued exactly as they first appeared, would still possess the utmost immediate interest in a new edition? Spengler has allowed his work to appear in this way and is more than justified by the result.

Of course, not many critics are congenial to his point of view. The fascinating title of his greatest work has

made it easy for people to rubber-stamp him as a prophet of disaster without any knowledge or consideration of his work. But one of his own sentences crushes all cheap criticism of this kind. 'We Germans,' he wrote in 1919, 'placed as we are in this century, have rich, inexhaustible possibilities within us and tremendous tasks before us.' Even a period of decline, therefore, has its compensations.

It must also be admitted that in all his books, and especially in his latest effort, *Man and Technics*, Spengler has irritated us to distraction with his overbearing method of weighing

historical events and with his brutal efforts to separate events that are factually connected and to connect those that are separated when they do not conform to the lines of his own historical picture. The charm of history, which lies in making us savor what is remote and foreign, vanishes in the light of his arbitrarily sharp perspectives. He interprets different cultures in such a way as to overemphasize either their immeasurable remoteness or the inexorable and disturbing similarity of their rhythms.

Spengler's judgment of the present, from which he feels his way into by-gone eras, can be justly evaluated only by determining the degree in which it succeeds in establishing secret contact with the powers that are now building up contemporary history. And we can apply this method of valuation to his work because twelve dangerous years fraught with political and economic destiny have elapsed since the appearance of his basic essay, 'Prussianism and Socialism,' which is the first of the political essays in the present collection and which contains the meat of Spengler's political beliefs.

Although Oswald Spengler stood almost completely alone in 1919 and for a long time afterward, since then more and more people, disillusioned by the course of events, have become ready to grasp the meaning of this essay. 'Prussianism and Socialism' contains all the ideas, conclusively and authoritatively handled, that the younger members of the National Socialist Party have come to accept as a result of their conflict against a chaotic reality that they must survive and subdue with their own strength.

Here are a few of Spengler's most essential ideas and interpretations.

II

The first question after the German revolution was whether that revolution was a visible token that a new era was about to begin. In 1919 Spengler placed the decisive revolutionary date back in August 1914. 'A real revolution is only one of a whole people, and this German Socialist revolution occurred in 1914. It will gradually overcome the loathsomeness of 1918 and give it its proper place as a factor of progressive development.' To-day these ideas are the first articles of faith of our young nationalists.

During a period in which liberalism has been in the saddle Spengler has steadily and with keen insight demanded that the politician should be given a position of predominant importance, that is to say, the strong politician and not the little puppets that we know to-day. Not only does such a policy serve the political needs of the nation, but a sound economic system requires it. 'The economic leaders must learn to think purely politically, not economico-politically,' said Spengler in 1922.

In connection with the unique quality of the present overwhelming economic crisis, Spengler was quick to recognize that it possessed structural significance and was not a mere stock-market affair. Even to-day only a few of our national economists have come to share this opinion. He insisted that we were facing an economic catastrophe that would last for decades.

As long ago as 1926 he described

the stock market as undergoing 'an insignificant intermezzo of revival,' though even to-day a large and influential group of backward-looking optimists keep asserting at every rise in stock prices that the false golden age is about to dawn again. 'We need not doubt that the standard of living that was considered normal in Germany during the twenty years before the War will never again be attained,' said Spengler in 1926.

To-day more and more people are gradually beginning to recognize that Spengler's analysis of the causes of the crisis was accurate—for instance, his assertion that the unbalanced, overrapid development of the production apparatus of the white nations resulting from the rise of machine industry has occasioned all the dangers of forced retrenchment due to saturation of the market by which we are beset to-day. The conflict between man-nourishing earth and man-breeding coal, between the peasant and the miner, between farm economy and overindustrialization, is the very essence of the present economic struggle.

In spite of his insight into the significance of the world economic structure and his insistence on including it in his political plans, Spengler has uttered a sufficiently clear warning against the tendency that liberals still have to overestimate and oversimplify the connection between politics and economics. 'World economics,' he wrote in 1926, 'is a very shaky structure composed of many economic units. In the future as in the past it will lead us into the most grievous economic-psychological misconceptions if we are so rash as to believe that world economics can

be treated as an individual whole, that it leads a single inner and outer life of its own. We are not only far from that condition but we shall never arrive at it. World economics now consists and always will consist of a number of national economic systems.' His idea of the primacy of the state over economics again appears when he says that coal serves to produce cannon and not the other way around—the disarmament problem in a nutshell.

These brief excerpts must prove how immediately valuable Spengler's ideas are, especially when we consider the time at which they were uttered. His prophecies have also held good. 'I have not made a mistake in any important point,' he says. Now let us consider the prophetic picture that Spengler, the politician, gives of a reanimated Germany.

III

It is not surprising that he believes that national domestic politics can be strengthened by abandoning parliamentarianism. Spengler has in mind a tremendous strengthening of governmental power by investing the government with great responsibility and giving it the assistance of a state council of real political and economic competence which will serve in an advisory capacity.

Spengler's economic system tends in the direction of authoritarian socialism, toward a merging of conservative and socialist ideas against what he calls the 'inner England.' 'The state has the choice between democratization or nothing. Conservatives have the choice between conscious socialism or futility. But we need to

shake ourselves free from the forms of Anglo-French democracy. We have one of our own,' he wrote as long ago as 1919.

Spengler's critics have made most of their mistakes in the way they characterize his economic policy. His high opinion of the entrepreneur applies exclusively to the kind of entrepreneur who assumes personal responsibility, who works in the business himself and differentiates himself with the utmost sharpness from any anonymous economic leadership. Spengler's hostility to corporate control, the separation of owner and property, especially his opposition to the methods of financial capital, arises from his profound respect for labor and professional competence, as well as from his recognition that economics is primarily concerned with goods and not money. Perhaps the most striking passages are those in which he analyzes the economic attitudes of various Western nations and depicts the special attitude of German socialism. Here he makes a complete intellectual break with the idea that Germany depends on the West. He cuts himself completely loose from what we now call Western ideas.

This break leads logically to Spengler's conception of foreign politics, to his anti-French, pro-Russian attitude. The phrase, 'for or against Bolshevism,' he describes as a simplified formula and outlines the path of economic coöperation with Russia and political support through Russia with all its possible complications. We are not enemies of Russia. 'Germany will be able to gain advantages from its propinquity to Russia, chiefly under pressure of the fact that both nations have the same enemy—the high

finance of the Allied Powers,' he wrote in 1922. This is perhaps the line of Spengler's thought that modern National Socialists are least inclined to follow, but the future will justify him here, too.

Spengler says in his proud foreword: 'I feel myself more lonely than ever.' If he is referring to the official Germany that occupies the centre of the political stage, if he is thinking of the confused programmes of different parties, he is certainly right. But more and more leaders are coming forward and elbowing aside the fruitless, barren, political figures of the day, and these new leaders are working, within the framework of Spengler's own political conceptions, though their attitude may be due to other sources than the suggestive power of his own vast historic theory.

From what quarter does Spengler expect that his political desires will be realized? Where is the political leader going to come from, who, as he himself says in his foreword, does not yet exist in Germany? At this point it should be mentioned that Spengler read all his essays but one before groups of industrialists.

Here is his first mistake and the reason for his loneliness. The idea of disciplining economics and evoking a really social code of ethics could hardly arouse any genuine response at the present time. Only once—and that is his second mistake—Spengler spoke in the presence of the younger generation, which he berated for its lack of political capacity and understanding, for its lack of practical knowledge and sound instinct. Is what he said in 1924 still true to-day? Will Spengler repeat his speech to a more mature, more sensible, more

hardened younger generation that shares his knowledge of the danger that Germany faces and his desire to overcome that danger? Can he

establish contact with the historically constructive forces of the nation without establishing contact with the nation that is coming into existence?

LOOKING AHEAD

By OSWALD SPENGLER

ON THE one hand, we face the fact that the present economic structure and with it the maintenance of the increased masses of white people at their present high numerical level are in danger. On the other hand, we face the second, no less important fact that non-European nations have a voice in the settlement of economic and political matters. And there is a third fact that needs to be explained a little more fully. The responsible governments of the nations that are now in danger have changed their form during the last ten years. With the exception of a few dictatorships, no strong, aristocratic governments like those of Bismarck, of Napoleon III, and of the English at the time of Gladstone exist any more. It is now possible in every country for the whole weight of political influence, capital, and armed force to be used to perpetuate the nation in its present form and position or to improve it, regardless of whether its government is receiving support or opposition within the country.

Grotesque as it may seem to some future observer, this is perfectly natural. I do not need to go into details here. It stands to reason that the English people, who have been taught to think in terms of world political realities, should face all decisive national problems in a unified manner

although they are really split into two nations—that of the industrial and that of the nonindustrial population.

What we call a nation to-day is basically nothing but the practical egotism of a certain territory that is compelled by its whole economic and political development to stand or fall as a whole, and which must therefore enlist the support of every individual and every class. If we use the words 'economic egotism' instead of 'nationalism,' we are still speaking of much the same thing. And that portion of an industrial nation whose existence depends on coal would be the first to resort to economic egotism because it would be the first to be affected if the state relaxed or withdrew its protection.

In any event, when we survey the leading nations of the world and attempt to discover to what extent each one could count on the support of its component parts in the event of a disagreement's arising among them concerning some vital question, the prospects in more than one case are dark indeed. As long as we had to do with national forms sanctified by the power of tradition, as long as we had to do with the kind of nation that stood its ground firmly from the time of Napoleon to Bismarck, the power of any individual man, no matter

how great he might be, was limited by the power of the existing forms that had been handed down to him. This was also true, as English industrial history shows, in respect to traditional economic customs and methods. The result was that any leader, whether he was a business man, a demagogue, a diplomat, or a financier, could make his personal abilities effective only within a limited field of activity. The old state, the old economic system, the old concern—all these were powers in themselves.

The new factor, of hopeful import for Germany alone, in the great changes that await us is the unlimited creative opportunities open to men of extraordinary stature. It is quite probable that in the fields of economics, technique, and finance, as well as in politics, diplomacy, and war, the individual will be able by the strength of his personality and the importance of his position to outweigh all those factors that I have described as being unfavorable to him up to now. For instance,—and I must mention the name of Mussolini at this point,—a man arising in a country that can never be a world power may yet be able to make that country look like a world power within ten years, and enable it to play a dominating rôle in the Mediterranean as long as he lives. In like manner, it may be possible for the leading personalities of an economically self-sufficient country that has emerged from the War under the most disadvantageous circumstances to avert the injury aimed at by the deliberately destructive tactics of new political methods. I foresee during the twentieth century an economic and political epoch during which states and constitutions will

amount to little and proclamations and treaties to less, but during which great names will play a more and more decisive rôle and the sound of these names will stir up nations and win spiritual conflicts. The country that has the strongest individuals and that is least bound to tradition will be the ultimate victor.

II

As I have said, what has happened is that Europe has lost its preëminence and that European nations whose form and population developed in a certain way during the course of industrialization must be given a new kind of relationship to the rest of the world in order to go on living, that, therefore, a new kind of connection must be established between each European country as a centre of gravity and the other continents as its subordinates. The efforts of the British Empire in this direction and Russia's attempts to attract a circle of Asiatic nations give a faint indication of what may be expected. Any nation that does not succeed in basing a ramified economic system of its own on this foundation and—let me be quite clear on this point—does not maintain a favorable position in relation to other nations that want the same thing will have to do what is now being seriously considered in England, to wit, set in motion a mass migration of the permanently unemployed to certain continents, in this case to the Dominions. The success of such a method would not, of course, ease the condition of the original country or solve the problem, but, on the contrary, would make conditions more precarious, for, as the events of

the past hundred years prove, a million men who are able to work and defend themselves not only represent productive power, but also national wealth, economic power, political and military power, and ultimately, therefore, something of incalculable value if we are trying to make favorable economic agreements and maintain them in the face of opposition. For, now as always, treaties of any kind, even economic ones, can be enforced only by political methods.

No matter how much international politics may have been determined by the pressure of economic leaders during the past century, and no matter to what degree they may have become dependent on economics and dominated by economic aims, to-day an economic success of great magnitude, that is, economic security of life for a great people, is possible only if politi-

cal power can be thrown into the scales, power of the kind that exists in quality, not quantity. The way to improvement is not confined to technical processes and methods. The whole of culture is included. Let me therefore repeat: political power, without which there can be no extended economic success, no longer resides in money, cannon, and treaties, but, to an increasing degree, in individuals who through their superiority represent real power and can therefore replace the anonymous power of greater quantity. My hope for Germany arises from the fact that during the last century we have been the nation that has developed the strongest individuals in technology, science, economic organization, military force, and governmental administration, and that this power of production is obviously far from being exhausted.

A distinguished Spanish philosopher and essayist analyzes the emotion of love with the same understanding and perspicacity that he displayed in another connection in *The Revolt of the Masses*. His essay is preceded by an English exposition of his philosophy.

The Nature of LOVE

By JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET

INTRODUCTION TO ORTEGA

By GEORGE PENDLE

From *The Adelphi*, London Literary Monthly

EVERYTHING suggests that human nature is to-day on the verge of a new, 'significant' 'variation.' We can not describe the form that this variation will take (it will be a dynamic event); we cannot even be sure that it will occur—mankind may fail to renew itself, as other species have failed. But the necessary elements are present.

Through the medium of a few outstanding men, the race is feeling toward the new thing that it is to be. These exceptional men are gathering the material; concentrating on the features that are vital, alive; rejecting the forms that are dead. The work of José Ortega y Gasset is one magnificent manifestation of the process.

The 'idealist' philosophers of the past confined their gaze to the eternal—"the eternal," from which all time and all movement were excluded, as belonging merely to the less-real world of the senses, the world of 'appearances.' Ortega, never forgetting his relation to eternity, works in the world of *time*, the world where drains and poetry, love and turbines, exist, and change, and are important.

Like his master, Unamuno, Ortega is in no way concerned with abstractions. He does not contemplate the *Homo sapiens* of the text-books 'who is neither here nor there, belongs to neither this nor that epoch, who has neither sex nor country.' His subject is *you*, reader, and *me*. And you and I

—we are of flesh and bones; we 'eat and drink and play and sleep and think and will, we see and are heard'; and we belong to *this* epoch. Ortega takes us as we are; situated *here*, in this moment that gives significance to our lives; he compels us to recognize and accept our destiny. He imparts to us his passion for 'authenticity.'

Again (for I must clear the ground of all objections), he is no 'modernity' fan. He has little patience for those who go scampering from fashion to fashion. In one of his most dramatic lectures he explained how, to be *truly* modern, we must be conscious of our place in the historic sequence; we must have explored the past, and must carry it within us, 'for new ideas, daughter-ideas, bear their mothers in their wombs.'

For Ortega, life is essentially problematic, and man must be continually evolving to deal with new problems, conquer new worlds. There are innumerable ways of evading the problems that arise, of denying the conditions of one's existence. But 'destiny—that which we must vitally be or not be—is not open to dispute; it is only accepted or not accepted. If we accept it, we are authentic; if we do not accept it, we are the negation, the falsification of ourselves.' Thus it is man's duty 'to become fully that which he is.' Every man has 'a mission for truth,' and has to decide at every moment what he is to become.

The effort, therefore, is always toward precision—to lay the finger upon that which is essential, that which is vital. Not to point with the finger at 'abstract truth,' but to lay it upon the truth that is here, now, entangled in the circumstances that give it significance; the truth of which to-

morrow will be born. This is the philosophic adventure.

II

To appreciate the throbbing vitality of Ortega's thought (which loses much of its substance in translation), you must have attended his lectures—those lectures, during the dictatorship, when Spain suddenly realized that this little *catedrático*, who had lectured on philosophy to an enthusiastic audience of 6,000 people in Santiago de Chile, was the expression of her own most intimate longings. You must have observed (as Gómez de la Serna said at the time) 'the gaiety of his triumphant spirit, and the voluptuousness of his thought as it accommodates itself to his word.' And you must have heard him drop, casually, one of his piercing, autobiographical sentences: 'I, who was born upon a printing press'; or 'Señor Prieto accuses me of affecting to be an intellectual; but—*diablo!*—I *am* it, to the root. He speaks as though this were a flashy necktie that I had assumed; whereas, in reality, it is my spinal column showing through!'

He is a small man, with a broad forehead that protrudes over bright, gimlet eyes. He has a complete and inborn mastery of language; a faculty for discerning the subtle changes in the 'vital sensibility' of mankind; a relentless honesty.

To bring Ortega's thought closer to the English mentality, I wish to suggest a few points of contact. For instance, I suggest that his passion for the authentic, the necessary, becomes more understandable if we recall Chaucer's 'law of kind.' Years ago, in an unwontedly 'human' moment,

Aldous Huxley wrote of Chaucer: 'It is characteristic of his conception of the world that the highest praise he can bestow on anything is to assert of it that it possesses in the highest degree the qualities of its own particular kind. Thus of Cressida he says:—

'She was not with the least of her stature,
But all her limbs so well answering
Weren to womanhood, that creature
Was never lesse mannish in seeming.

'The horse of brass in *The Squire's Tale* is

'So well proportioned to be strong,
Right as it were a steed of Lombardy,
Thereto so *borsely* and so quick of eye.'

Ortega judges the modern world in *La Rebelión de las Masas*; notices where it falls short of its destiny; and condemns the falsification. Let me quote, as an example, his analysis of the European nationalist movements:—

'Everyone perceives the urgency for a new principle of life. But—as always happens in such crises—some are trying to save the moment by means of an intensification both extreme and artificial of precisely that principle which is worn out. This is the meaning of the current "nationalist" eruption. And always—I repeat—it has happened thus. The final flame is the largest. The last breath the deepest. On the eve of disappearing, the frontiers are accentuated—the military and economic frontiers.

'But all these nationalisms are blind alleys. Try to project them into the future, and you will hit the end. There can be no way out in that direction. Nationalism is always an impulse directly opposed to the nationalizing principle. It is exclusive, whereas *nationalization* is inclusive.

In times of consolidation it can, however, be of positive value and be a high principle. But in Europe everything is excessively consolidated already, and nationalism is no more than a fad, a pretext offered for evading the duty of invention and enterprise. The simplicity of the methods by which it works, and the quality of the men whom it exalts, are sufficient evidence that it is the contrary of an historic creation.'

Then there are many points at which Murry's writings bring us close to Ortega. For example: his explanation that there are two 'Gods'—one 'who looks upon all creation at any timeless moment, and declares that all is good,' and another 'who looks at any part of creation at any moment of time, and declares that a great deal of it is bad'; and the resultant synthesis, which implies (so to say) an acceptance of predestination *and* free will, a 'conscious submission to the historic process.' This idea is of the essence of Ortega's philosophy.

How does the method work on the practical plane? That, of course, is the final test; and recent events in Spain have given Ortega an opportunity to apply himself to politics. First, in his celebrated article, 'El Error Berenguer,' published in November 1930, he dissected the monarchy—with precision, a devastating precision. Reading this article (and all Spain did read it), the Spanish people suddenly realized that their monarchy, which had seemed to them to be firmly rooted in the heart and soil of the nation, was after all but a corpse, waiting to be removed. A few months later they gave Alfonso a gentle push—and he disappeared; for the system in which he moved and had his being was (as Or-

tega had surprisingly shown) already divorced from the authentic life of Spain. It had remained afoot so long that people had failed to notice that it was a corpse.

III

The Republic came on April the 14th, 1931. By April the 23rd, Ortega had already observed that the revolution was being falsified. On that day he published in *Crisol* an article in which was set, in large type, the injunction: 'NO IMITAR'—'Do not imitate.' He was the first man to point out that the removal of Don Alfonso was not in itself sufficient; that Spain must not drop back into the old habits, but construct her life utterly afresh. 'Originality is a thing that cannot be sought, it can only be found. From the first, it eludes any methodical attempt at capture. There is no recipe for being original, save a very simple one: do not imitate; be faithful to circumstance. If the Spanish Republic will withdraw its gaze from what other nations have done—France in 1789, Russia in 1917—and, instead of counterfeiting circumstances that are not those of this country to-day, inclose itself in our peninsula's present reality, then the Republic will be a glorious and illustrious creation in the history of the world. Let no one doubt it. So we must now live, not amid exotic images, but well submerged in our own circumstances, squeezing them to nourish ourselves with their juice. A life of imitation is a false life.'

As usual, Ortega's analysis was unerring. It was even hailed as momentous. Spain applauded—then began to wander from the direct line, disintegrated once more, and the revo-

lution became what it is to-day: incomplete, *embourgeoisée*, anarchic. Again, Ortega was the first man to diagnose the malady, to point out the need for constructive enthusiasm. 'Do you think a state can be forged simply by shouting the word "revolution"?' he asked. 'No. We have to accomplish a *material* revolution: a revolution in economics—which is, in the human world, the purest thing that exists.'

But Spain continued to shout 'Revolution!'; to change the colors of her flags, the names of her streets and warships, and to hamper with her nihilism the men of constructive genius who were working on the lines laid down by Ortega. 'J'aime l'Espagne,' says Jean Cassou, 'j'aime l'Espagne parce qu'elle produit des maniaques.'

The experiment is profoundly interesting. Here you have a philosopher of revolution, demanding authenticity, showing the people that they are betraying their destiny, day by day. And they agree. They say: 'It is so.' Yet they do nothing to rectify their course. Partly is this due to the national temperament. Partly, also, to the fact that Ortega *does* belong to his own times—though he feels beyond those times, forward to a new principle of life, a change of heart, a new 'vital sensibility.' 'All' (he says) 'all that is done to-day in public and in private, with the exception of a few parts of a few sciences, is provisional.' But, having said this, he proceeds on his way, 'advancing, without haste and without pause, like the star.'

The method is purely personal—to abandon the personal point of view would be to work in vain, for reality is revealed to man only in individual perspectives. We must be faithful to

the position that we occupy, fatally, in the world—knowing that every individual and every epoch has its own system of preferences and postu-

lates, insight and blindness. And knowing, too, that if man is sufficiently *true* to himself, sufficiently *personal*, he transcends his personality.

THE NATURE OF LOVE

By JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET

Translated from the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zürich German-Language Daily

WE ARE going to discuss love, not these or those 'loves.' Such 'loves' are rather tempestuous episodes between men and women. Innumerable elements enter into them, causing them to develop and change in such a way that almost everything happens except the one thing that can be called love in the real sense of the word. A psychological analysis of love with every crisp detail would reveal a great deal, but we might misunderstand each other if we did not first try to discover what love is in the strictest, purest sense. Moreover, we should be restricting our field unduly if we confined the meaning of love to what men and women feel for each other. The theme is much more ample, and Dante believed that it was love that made the sun and stars revolve.

Without extending the phenomenon of love to astronomical proportions, we must nevertheless regard the erotic in its full completeness. Man does not love only woman, nor does woman love only man. We also love art and science, the mother loves her child, and the pious man loves God. The great variety and wide extent of the diverse circumstances under which love arises will make us careful not to ascribe to love the peculiarities and qualities

pertaining to the various objects that might be loved.

For the last two centuries people have talked a great deal about loves and very little about love. All periods, beginning with the classical period in Greece, have possessed some great emotional theory. Only the past two centuries have lacked one. In ancient times the teachings of Plato were all-important; next came the Stoics. The Middle Ages lived under the influence of Thomas Aquinas and the Arabs. The seventeenth century studied Descartes's and Spinoza's theories of passion with enthusiasm. For there was no great philosopher in the past who did not feel obliged to expound his own emotional theory. The present age, however, has witnessed no attempt to evolve a systematic philosophy of emotion. Only recently have the labors of Pfänder and Scheler reverted to the problem. Meanwhile our souls have become more complicated and our perceptions more acute.

Hence the old emotional theories no longer suffice. The idea of love that Thomas Aquinas took over from the Greeks is obviously false. To him love and hatred were two forms of desire, of appetite. Love is the desire for something good in so

far as it is good—*concupiscibile circa bonum*. Hatred is a resistance, an attitude of revulsion toward evil as such—*concupiscibile circa malum*. This confusion between desire and appetite on the one hand and emotion on the other afflicted the whole psychology of the past until the eighteenth century.

And yet this is one of the most important distinctions we must make in order to prevent what is unique and essential in love from escaping our grasp. Love is the most fertile of our personal experiences; so much so, indeed that it has become the symbol of all fertility. From love many disturbances of the soul arise—desires, thoughts, decisions, actions. But all these things grow out of love as the harvest grows out of the seed; they are not love itself but they presuppose love. What we love we of course strive for in a certain sense and in a certain way. We also strive, as everyone knows, for a great deal that we do not love, things that leave our emotions cold. To want a good wine does not mean loving it. The morphine addict desires his drug, yet at the same time hates it.

II

But there is a still deeper, more convincing, and more immediate ground for the distinction between love and desire. Desire for any object is ultimately a desire to possess it, and possession means that, in one way or another, the object enters into our circle of life and thus becomes part of ourselves. Hence the desire dies of its own accord when it is fulfilled. It disappears with its accomplishment. Love, on the other

hand, is an eternal dissatisfaction. Desire has a passive character, and in this sense, when I desire something, I want it to come to me. I am the centre of gravity and expect things to fall in my direction. Love, on the other hand, as we shall see, is all activity. The lover goes out of himself to the object and lives in it. Love is perhaps the highest attempt nature makes to lift the individual out of himself and to lead him to another. When I desire I try to attract the object to me. When I love I am attracted to it.

Saint Augustine, one of the most profound thinkers on the subject of love and the possessor of one of the most powerful erotic temperaments that ever existed, was often able to escape that interpretation of love which considers it as a kind of desire or appetite. With poetic fervor, he said: 'Amor meus, pondus meum; illo feror, quocumque feror. (My love is my burden; it is my weight. It draws me wherever I am drawn.)'

By avoiding appetite Spinoza tried to discover a common foundation for love and hatred in the emotions. In his opinion, both love and hate, both 'rejoicing and sorrow, were bound up with the idea of their objective cause.' To love something or somebody simply means to be happy and to recognize that one's happiness arises from this something or somebody. Here again we see love confused with its possible consequences. Who doubts that pleasure can come to the lover from the beloved? But it is no less certain that love is often tragic, tragic as death, an overpowering, mortal pain. Nay, more, real love feels itself, measures and weighs itself better through the pain and suffering of

which it is capable. A woman in love prefers the pain that her beloved causes her to painless indifference.

In the letters of Mariana Alcaforado, the Portuguese nun, to her false lover, sentences like this occur: 'I thank you from the bottom of my heart for the despair that you have aroused in me and I abhor the peace in which I lived before I knew you.' 'I know what will heal all my sorrows and I could rid myself of them if I left you, but what a course to pursue! No, better suffer than forget you. Ah, does it depend on me anyway? I cannot reproach myself with ever wishing for a moment not to love you and yet you are more deserving of pity than I, for it is better to suffer as I suffer than to enjoy the shallow pleasure that your French sweethearts give you.'

The first letter closes: 'Farewell. Love me ever and let me suffer still greater pain.' And two centuries later Mlle. de Lespinasse wrote: 'I love you as one must love—in despair.'

Spinoza was wrong. Love is not pleasure. The man who loves his fatherland will perhaps die for it, just as the martyr endures death for what he loves. On the other hand, hate can take pleasure in itself and enjoy the misfortune that comes to the person hated.

Since these illustrious definitions do not go far enough let us try to define for ourselves the act of love by examining it as an entomologist examines an insect he has caught in a thicket. I hope that my readers love or have loved something or somebody and can now take hold of their emotion by its transparent wings and regard it with their inner eye. I shall describe the most universal and abstract characteristics of this buzzing

bee that lives on honey and knows how to sting, and my readers can judge whether my formulæ fit their own individual experiences or not.

In its first stage love resembles desire because it is aroused by some person or thing outside one's self. The soul feels disturbed and gently wounded by a sting inflicted by the object. Such a stimulus has a centripetal direction: it comes to us from the object. But the act of love does not begin until after this experience, or rather stimulation, first begins to work. From the wound that the provocative sting of the object opened up, love flows and turns itself actively toward the object. The direction in which it proceeds is the direct opposite of that in which a stimulus or desire moves. It goes from the lover to the beloved, from me to another in a centrifugal direction. This characteristic of finding one's self in spiritual motion toward an object, this ceaseless inner impulse of one's own self toward another is fundamental to both hatred and love. How I distinguish between these two emotions we shall presently see, but the point is not that we are physically moved toward the beloved, that we seek physical proximity and physical presence, that we seek to be near and close to her physically. All these exterior acts arise entirely from love and from what causes love, but they have nothing to do with the essence of love and they must be left entirely out of the study we are now undertaking. Everything that I say has to do with the act of love as an inner experience, as something that happens in the soul.

Man cannot go to the God he loves in a physical sense, yet we call loving Him going to Him. When we love we abandon all inner peace and security

and virtually desert ourselves and enter the object. This incessant process of moving over to another is called love.

III

An act of thought and an act of will are momentary. We can prepare for them in advance but they do not last. The experience is over in the twinkling of an eye. Such acts exist only in a point of time. When I understand a sentence I do so at a single stroke and in an instant. Love, however, endures in time. We do not love in a succession of moments that have no extent, in a succession of points that flame up and vanish like the spark in an induction coil. We love the beloved constantly. Here we discover a new characteristic of love. It is a stream, a flow of spiritual matter, a river that rises from one spring unceasingly. If I wanted to find a metaphor that would make my essential meaning clear, I might say that love is not an explosion but a lasting flow, a spiritual emanation coming from the lover to the beloved.

Pfänder has referred with great acuteness to this character of flow and to the permanence of love and hatred. I have now touched upon three characteristics common to love and hatred: both are centrifugal, both are a process of virtually giving one's self over to the object, and both are enduring or flowing. But now I want to point out the radical distinction between them. They both have the same centrifugal direction, but in spite of this they have a different meaning and their intentions are antithetical. Hatred goes against the object. Its sense is negative. Love goes with the object. It affirms the object.

These two emotional acts, however,

have one characteristic in common that is much more profound than their difference. There is something lacking in thought and will that we might describe as spiritual temperature. Love and hatred have a temperature as compared with a thought expressing, say, some mathematical theory. They are hot and their fire can attain different degrees of heat. Every love goes through periods of changing temperature. It is a commonplace of speech to say that love is cooling off, and the lover complains of the coldness of his beloved. This question of emotional temperatures might lead us off for a time into the rich and varied realm of spiritual observation. It would open up perspectives of world history, morality, and art which, as far as I know, are completely new to us. We could speak of the varying temperatures of the great historic nations, of the coldness of Greece, China, and the eighteenth century, of the mediæval glow of romantic Europe, and so on. We might speak of the influence of varying spiritual temperatures on human relationships, these temperatures being measured in emotional calories. We might also discuss the temperature of famous artistic and literary styles, but it is impossible even to outline such a long theme here.

It is easier to see what the temperature of love and hatred is if we observe it from the point of view of the object. What does love do to its object? Whether the beloved is near or far, whether it is wife, child, art, science, fatherland, or God, love woos it. Desire takes pleasure in what it desires. It receives satisfaction but spends nothing, gives nothing, contributes nothing. Love and hatred, on the other hand, are a form of constant ac-

tion. Whether near or far, love envelops its object in an attractive atmosphere. It fondles, praises, upholds. Hatred clothes its object with no less fire but in an unfavorable atmosphere. It devours it and lays it waste like a burning sirocco. It virtually seizes it and destroys it. To repeat once more, this does not necessarily have to happen. I speak of the intention that lies in hatred, of the inner act that makes hatred hatred.

The opposite intentions of these two emotions express themselves in other forms. When we are in love we feel that we are at one with the object of our affection. What does this identification mean? It does not signify physical union or even physical proximity. Perhaps our friend—for we must not forget friendship when we speak of love—lives far away from us and we see little of him. Nevertheless, we are symbolically at one with him. Our soul seems to have extended itself wonderfully, to have spanned distances, and wherever we are we feel that we have attained essential unity with him. We have that kind of idea in mind when we say to somebody who is in distress: 'Lean on me. I am with you.' This means: 'Your cause is mine. I bind my destiny to yours.'

Hatred, on the other hand, although it pours unceasingly on its object, separates us from that object in the same symbolic sense. It holds us at a radical distance from the thing we hate. It creates an abyss. Love is heart-to-heart unity. Hatred is duality, metaphysical resistance, absolute remoteness from the hated object.

We now begin to discover the real nature of the activity and assiduity that we find in both love and hatred, as contrasted with the passive emo-

tions of joy and sorrow. Not without reason do we speak of being happy or being sad, for both are ways of being and not forms of activity or actions. The sad or happy man, in so far as he is sad or happy, does nothing. Love, on the other hand, expands until it comes in virtual contact with its object and engages in an invisible but divine activity of the most lively kind, an activity that affirms its object. Man transcends himself in loving art or the fatherland. He does not doubt their right to existence for an instant. He understands and asserts at every moment that they are worthy to exist. Nor does he act like a judge who renders his decisions coldly in accordance with some law. Rather does he speak out clearly in behalf of one side or the other and even participates actively. Hatred, on the other hand, is always virtually killing the hated object and trying to deprive it of its right to breathe. To hate somebody means to feel one's self swept away by that other person's mere existence. Only the complete disappearance of the hated person brings satisfaction.

Here, I feel, we come to the essential root of both love and hatred. Anyone who has ever loved something bears responsibility for its existence. He refuses, as far as he can, to tolerate the possibility of a world in which that object does not exist. Which is the same thing as if we constantly tried, as far as we could, to give existence to this beloved object. Love is the eternal dispenser of life and the creator and preserver of the beloved. Hatred is extermination and virtual murder. It is not a murder that is accomplished at one stroke; it means to murder incessantly and to obliterate the hated object from the world.

A friend of Watts-Dunton and Swinburne describes a luncheon he had with the two men in 1902 and then discusses Watts-Dunton's work at greater length.

Swinburne *and* Watts-Dunton

By A. C. BENSON

From *Life and Letters*
London Literary Quarterly

I HAD met Watts-Dunton once or twice previously at luncheon with Gosse, and again at the Cornish's house at Eton. At Gosse's he seems to me, as I search among rather dim recollections of the occasion, to have been a small, dusky man, with an air of demure importance. I fancy it was a literary luncheon party, peopled by not very significant individuals, all horribly afraid of each other, afraid of committing themselves to any commonplace statement, and most afraid of Gosse's hovering and pouncing wit, which had on these occasions a rather strident and excited quality, framed on some strangely devised model of petulance and childish archness, and quite decisively adapted to cause anxiety and discomfort in the guests.

At the Cornish's, Watts-Dunton is a more distinct figure, because I sat next to him, and he was him-

self obviously disconcerted by Mrs. Cornish's ironical appeals to him to settle literary questions and generally to enlighten and guide us in our search for artistic certainties. Mrs. Cornish was in great majesty on that day, and managed to convey to me in some way that she considered the presence of Watts-Dunton, in the character of a literary celebrity, to be an affront and an intrusion; though I suppose she had invited him! But for literature, as represented and interpreted by Watts-Dunton, she certainly contrived to indicate a lofty disdain.

Yet the man was curious and stimulating to me. He had been the chosen friend and guardian of Rossetti in the dark years, and I was just beginning to study Rossetti as a subject for a biography; he had since then taken on the hardly less dreadful charge of Swinburne, whom he

kept, it was supposed, almost under lock and key. Moreover, it was understood that Watts-Dunton, through the *Athenaeum*, wielded a strong and peremptory influence in literary matters, and could make or mar reputations. He seemed to me, I remember, to my great relief, a mild and not unfriendly man, courteous and gentle, with no suggestiveness of fineness of talk, with a weary and jaded air, and wholly without personal distinction. I had prepared, I fancy, some foolish compliment to his greatness, which I must have contrived to impart to him, because he proved suddenly accessible, and even grateful for recognition, and gave me a cordial invitation to come and see him at some unspecified date.

II

When I found myself finally embarked on the Rossetti book, I wrote deferentially to him, and was treated with much epistolary ceremony in return, receiving several courteous letters, written by a secretary, arranging the precise details of my visit. Accordingly, on April 4, 1902, I got off from Eton about noon, on a dark and gloomy day, and reached Putney at 1.15. I knew that he lived near the station, but I was surprised at the common suburban air of the street, full of omnibuses and cabs, and was expecting to find some more quiet and dignified retreat, when I suddenly discovered the house—The Pines, as it was strangely called—a very ordinary yellow-brick, bow-windowed affair, with a few shrubs in a tiny front garden.

The house inside was redolent of cooking, dark, somewhat dusty and

neglected-looking, but with a solid bourgeois sort of comfort, the walls much crowded with pictures, among which I noticed many designs and studies by Rossetti, in pen-and-ink or chalk. I was shown into a little sitting room, looking out on the back. The view was a pleasant surprise, because the adjacent houses opened away on either side, leaving a long prospect of small gardens, with many orchard trees in bloom. In the little villa-garden belonging to the house itself there was a yew hedge and a rather smoke-stained statue of a nymph, and the background was pleasantly screened by some more distant elms.

Mr. Watts-Dunton came in and greeted me with much cordiality: 'What a big fellow you are!' he said playfully. I was equally surprised by his size: I had not remembered he was so very minute a man. He was oddly dressed, in a waistcoat and trousers of some greenish stuff, and with a large, heavy blue frock coat, obviously too big for him, his little fingers only just protruding from its massive cuffs. He was bald, his remaining hair grown thick and long, and with a huge damp-looking moustache concealing a small, secretive chin, in full retreat. He seemed to have lost his teeth since I had seen him, and altogether appeared to me a very old man, though healthily bronzed, his hands firm and small. While we stood talking, the door being open, the front door clicked and was shut again, and some unseen person half-rushed, half-flitted up the stairs, and began (it seemed from the sounds) to jump and dance overhead.

'There is Swinburne!' said Watts-

Dunton. 'He has come in from his walk—we will go and see him.' We went up the thickly carpeted stairs, and found a door with a pair of elastic-sided boots thrown down beside it. Watts-Dunton went quickly in, and I followed. It was a large, comfortable room, crammed with books, the bookcases full, books on the table, a great sofa stacked with books. A fire was burning, by which stood a little man who turned sharply round as we entered.

He was entirely unlike what I had expected. Swinburne looked like a little rather faded don, a large head and domelike forehead, quite bald; small, watery, uncertain eyes; a little, red, aquiline nose; and a ragged, reddish beard grown in irregular wisps. He looked supremely shy, but received me with great courtesy, bowing, drumming impatiently on the ground with his feet, and uttering strange little whistling noises. He seemed very deaf and blinking. He bowed me to a chair: 'Will you sit?' He shook hands with me across the sofa and, for some reason obscure to me, seemed to feel safer if he were entrenched behind it.

On the fender lay a pair of brown rough socks. Watts-Dunton said to me in a low tone: 'He has just come in from one of his long walks,' and then, observing the socks, he took them up with an air of disgust and threw them behind the coal scuttle. Swinburne darted out after them, and I saw that his feet were bare. He picked up the socks, and making a gesture with the other hand, said: 'Hold, they are drying!' and then carefully replaced them. Watts-Dunton said something about their being scorched. Swinburne sat down with

his feet under his chair, and then proceeded, with odd little noises, to draw the socks on to his feet. 'He seems to be changing his things,' said Watts-Dunton. He clearly was. Swinburne said nothing, but continued to whistle and drum. Then he rose and bowed me out of the door, while he opened his window.

III

I went down with Watts-Dunton to a dining room below, a big, comfortable room, but equally overcrowded with books and pictures. Watts-Dunton sat with his back to the window, I on his left, and Swinburne opposite me. We had an excellent meal, a sort of midday dinner, soup, chicken, various sweets, plovers' eggs. Swinburne had a small bottle of beer, which he drank carefully as though husbanding it. He seemed tremulous and clumsy with his hands, and was often in difficulties with his plate. At first Swinburne said nothing, but gazed out of the window with a mild blue eye, or examined me curiously, exhibiting much confusion when he met my gaze, and looking sharply away with many little whistles and finger taps on the table. Watts-Dunton and I talked gravely. He mumbled his food a good deal, his little chin disappearing totally under the heavy fringing moustache, often dripping and clotted with soups and sauces.

When he thought that Swinburne was sufficiently refreshed, he drew him into the talk. I was wholly unable to make Swinburne hear a word, and he often inquired mournfully of Watts-Dunton: 'What does Mr. Benson say?' Watts-Dunton,

speaking clearly and distinctly, had no difficulty in being audible to him. But Swinburne, once launched, was full of talk. He spoke of Hawthorne and said that the *Scarlet Letter* was a great book, but that the development of any book, after such a first chapter, 'must be a bother'! 'I want more catastrophe for my money!' he added, and smiled at me. Then he talked about Elizabethan plays, and said of *Elizabeth Arden* that it was as great as Shakespeare's, but greater than *Romeo and Juliet* or the early plays. 'Here is an extraordinary fact,' he added, 'that, if it is *not* by Shakespeare, we have a dramatist living at the same time who could create and embody a perfectly natural, stainless, and supreme woman!'

He listened to Watts-Dunton with great and serious attention. Swinburne had said that *The Bride of Lammermoor* was a *perfect* story, and Watts-Dunton spoke of the necessity, when Scott became bookish, of translating him into patois. 'Very beautiful and just!' said Swinburne. 'I have never heard that said before, and it is just! You must put that down; it must be said publicly and firmly.'

Watts-Dunton quoted some dictum of Rossetti's about Chatterton. Swinburne smiled, and said to him: 'I have often heard you say that, but' (turning to me) 'there is no truth in it, Mr. Benson! Gabriel had no opinions on Chatterton and many kindred subjects. Our friend here had only to say a thing to him, and it was absolutely adopted and fixed in the firmament.' He looked triumphantly round. Watts-Dunton smiled, and stroked Swinburne's little pink hand, which lay on the

table. Swinburne smiled a pleased schoolboy smile.

Luncheon being over, Watts-Dunton said that he and I had matters to discuss. Swinburne, who was now quite revived and no longer shy, looked concerned, and drawing near said: 'Mr. Benson may come and sit a little in my room first?' So we went up very ceremoniously. He began pulling down books and talking about them quite delightfully; as he became more assured, he began to discourse more rhetorically and in long elaborate sentences of eulogy or disdain. He had a high, thin, resonant voice with a fine thrill in it, but occasionally his voice went off into a curious squeak; once he went into a corner furtively and drank medicine from a glass. There was an odd, fragrant, bookish scent about the room, which clung, I noticed, to his own clothes. He had on an old black morning coat with tails, a light homespun waistcoat and trousers, slippers, a low white collar with a made-up tie, all very shabby, and he was evidently quite unconscious of his appearance. He talked a little about Eton, but when Watts-Dunton endeavored again to lead me away, Swinburne said: 'There is time, surely, just to show Mr. Benson one of these fine scenes?' 'Well, *one* scene,' said Watts-Dunton firmly. 'We have much business to get through—you choose and read it to him.'

Swinburne took the book I was holding—the Arden play—and read very finely and dramatically, his voice rising high and shrill, with a moving tremolo. All the time his little feet drummed under the chair, and he kept up a brisk battery of

taps on the table. At one point he said rather roguishly to Watts-Dunton: 'Do you think Mr. Benson will be shocked if I show him that?' indicating a line with his finger. Watts-Dunton glanced, and said: 'No, of course not!' So he read it—a little bit of schoolboy coarseness—and giggled decorously. Then at last I was led away. Swinburne shook hands very cordially, with a shy, winning smile in his pale eyes. 'You must come again!' he said. 'I suppose you were at Eton about my time?' 'My dear fellow,' said Watts-Dunton, 'Mr. Benson's a *young* man!' 'Of course, of course!' said the bard. As we went down, Watts-Dunton said to me: 'Now Swinburne must be alone—he must get a good siesta; he is such an excitable fellow, like a schoolboy; unfailing animal spirits, always pleased with everything; but he has to take care!'

IV

I gathered that Swinburne was about sixty-six and Watts-Dunton about seventy-two. What was pleasant was to see how they paid each other such fine compliments, and showed such distinguished consideration; nothing bluff or abrupt about them.

I suppose that the secret of Watts-Dunton's influence with both Rossetti and Swinburne is that they were sensitive, lazy, helpless creatures, hating trouble of any kind, and that Watts-Dunton was willing to shelter them in every way and arrange everything for them, and to be at the same time sedulous, gentle, and complimentary. Moreover, he was intelligent, critical, and appreciative, and sensitive enough

himself to require and evoke some sympathy.

Watts-Dunton's egotism came out strongly in our subsequent conversation. I became aware of many little provincialisms. First, he dropped an 'h' occasionally, he said 'proud' for 'proudest,' 'cloud' for 'clouds,' 'roaned' for 'round.' He talked a little about Rossetti, but told me very little I did not know. The difficulty was that he was forever recurring to himself. I became aware that I was in the company of an extremely ambitious, sensitive, anxious, and timid man. He was afraid, I found, of criticism, of enmity, of ridicule; at the same time I gathered that he felt himself in the very front rank—a novelist, a poet, a biographer, a critic. 'Good God,' he suddenly said to me, tremulous with passion and alarm, 'the world's a great whispering gallery; all is known and discussed!' He spoke of his own peculiar strength of character. He said that as a child dogs never bit him, cattle fled before him; that when he was at school—he was careful to add that it was a large and fashionable private school—he dominated all the boys, adding that it was wholly unconscious influence, never deliberately aimed at or exerted, that no boy ever got a hamper without bringing it to him for him to choose what he liked best, how they would have carried him about all day long on their shoulders if he had desired it, and how no edict of any master would have prevailed if he had given contrary orders. He added that he was the only one of Rossetti's circle who had not been dominated by Rossetti.

At one time he sighed heavily and said that he had not done in literature what he felt he was entitled to have

done, but that detraction was both malignant and powerful. He said with a forced air: 'However, I am content. In the friendship of Rossetti and of Swinburne I find my consolation.'

He diverged upon Swinburne again. 'He is a mere boy still and must be treated like one—a mere schoolboy, full of hasty impulses and generous thoughts, like April showers. His mental power grows stronger every year—every intelligent man's does—and he is now a pure and simple improvisatore. The need for thought and toil exists no more for him.' He added, very decisively: 'Swinburne has been censored for the sensuous element in his poetry—not unfairly. But, believe me, he has no animal nature at all: he is a mere bookman and a mere schoolboy. The sensuous element in his poetry was entirely due to Rossetti's dominating influence.'

We sat long together; he sipped whiskey and water and smoked a cigarette, sometimes reclining in a chair, sometimes coming and standing in front of me. I sat in a great carved chair of Rossetti's, facing the light. Finally he loaded me with books of his, writing my name in them, some pictures, and an autograph of Rossetti's. He said: 'Come and see me again—at any time—don't *write* to me; my correspondence is the curse of my life—I have often thirty letters by the post, and keep two secretaries employed. I have a dozen letters a day about *Aylwin* alone!'

V

I went off much touched by the kindness of the two men; but what remained in my mind was a sense of the real genius of Swinburne's mind, the air of intellectual fervor in which

he seemed to live habitually and without effort, and his complete abstraction from all ordinary considerations. He was like a man living in a dream of art, and without any ripple or murmur of the world penetrating his solitary paradise. All his enmities and jealousies and ambitions seemed to have faded, and left him like a dry flame consuming the pure oil of art.

On the other hand, Watts-Dunton seemed to me precisely the opposite. I thought him a man of mediocre power and no inspiration. *Aylwin* is a positively grotesque book, a childish, clumsy, falsetto romance; the poetry purely imitative.

As a critic I expect he is laborious, and well informed; but he lives, not in art or in emotion, but in professional literature; and I doubt if he has any real *enjoyment* of art at all. It is simply a ladder to climb to power. I believe him to be a man who is at the same time afraid of life, and deeply covetous of security and recognition and influence. He seemed to me all the time to be holding a fear at arm's length, a fear of the world, of criticism, a fear, deepest of all, that his own powers were of a second-rate order, and that this might somehow be dreadfully revealed to him. A man of closely calculated and terrified pose, feeding on illusions, dismayed by the truth, with a certain natural kindliness the moment that he feels himself recognized and not menaced. Not exactly an unhappy man, for he is busy and laborious, and his health must be remarkably strong; but essentially a hollow man, morbidly sensitive, and afraid to face the truth.

After writing the above passage, much of which is taken verbatim from my diary, written at the time of my

visit, I had a good many talks with Edmund Gosse about Watts-Dunton. It is clear that Watts-Dunton was a very jealous man, especially with regard to Swinburne, and wished to establish an indefeasible right to the literary and emotional possession of Swinburne. Gosse had for some years been an associate and friend of Swinburne, and I do not doubt that Watts-Dunton resented this. Gosse described to me a visit that his son Philip paid to The Pines on Swinburne's invitation. He said that Philip found Watts-Dunton and Swinburne sitting out together, each furnished with a copy of *Aylwin*, which they were engaged in studying; and before Philip went away Watts-Dunton, with an air of secrecy, took him into a small study and opened a drawer full of MS. tied up in packets, which he said was the original MS. of *Aylwin*, and added that he thought that Philip would be interested in seeing it.

Later on, after Swinburne's death, Gosse told me curious stories of the dispersal, at high prices, to America and elsewhere, of the Swinburne MSS., and further said that he had evidence that Watts-Dunton had torn out of books presented by himself to Swinburne the pages that bore Gosse's autograph inscriptions, with the idea, he thought, of obliterating as far as possible any evidence that Gosse and Swinburne had formerly been friends.

VI

Since then I have read the *Life of Watts-Dunton*, in two volumes, a book that will have done more to destroy the reputation of Watts-Dunton, both as a man and as a writer, than I could have thought possible. It exhibits

Watts-Dunton in the light of a pretentious egotist, bent upon communicating an atmosphere of mystery and romance to a most trumpery and commonplace life. What is most remarkable about the book is that it betrays and emphasizes the fact that Watts-Dunton wrote an almost typically provincial style of English, crammed with cumbrous periphrases, and with an inveterate fondness for commonplace and threadbare phrases. There is not a single fragment quoted from letters, conversations, or public writings that has the least beauty or distinction of expression.

It would appear that Watts-Dunton had a genuine love of literature, that he had read widely and studied carefully the poetry of the nineteenth century; but even here his judgments are curiously amateurish, personal, and partial. Whether he had really thought out any theory of poetry or arrived at any interesting conclusions on the subject, it is difficult to say, because of the heavy and clumsy treatment that he had made his own. The book frankly abandons his claims to be considered a novelist or a poet.

Further, the record of his life shows from end to end an intense ambition to win fame as a writer, coupled with a morbid diffidence, and a terror, amounting to an obsession, for any sort of critical disapproval. He never seems to have brought himself to write anything of a biographical kind about either Rossetti or Swinburne, while he seems to have deliberately hunted all biographers out of the field, and to have sat firmly on the top of his memories and manuscripts. I think that what made him relent in the case of my own monograph about Rossetti was that he felt that such a book was

inevitable, particularly as William Rossetti had published such a mass of letters and biographical material about his brother. He was disarmed, I believe, by my deference, and by my frank recognition of him as the one and supreme arbiter of Rossetti's fortunes.

What is undoubtedly surprising is that Rossetti should have subjected himself so much to Watts-Dunton's domination, and still more that Swinburne should have entertained so lofty a notion of Watts-Dunton's critical powers. What had happened was that Watts-Dunton had made himself necessary to these two men. In the first place his legal knowledge was useful to them; and in the second place he accepted with great loyalty the difficult and disagreeable task of standing between the world and those two men of high genius and confessed frailty. Whatever his motive was, he undoubtedly acquitted himself very conscientiously. He was neither censorious nor peremptory with them. He minimized as far as he could their failings and self-indulgences. He gave them both a sense of security, and he openly declared his appreciation of their genius.

Moreover, though a dreary writer, he was a man of real intelligence; he could discuss literary questions sympathetically and critically, while his own extreme sensitiveness led him to interpret their sensitiveness skillfully, and to avoid occasions of offense. Then, too, he was a man who had a real capacity for affection, in spite of his egotism, or perhaps because of it. He desired to be understood and reassured; and, though it is difficult to feel about Watts-Dunton that his affections and admirations were per-

fectly disinterested, yet he undoubtedly rendered his two great friends sincere and faithful service. What I believe lay behind all his own labor and devotion was a deep and instinctive need to create a romantic atmosphere about his own life, and the care of these two erratic men of genius perhaps ministered to this sense of romance more than anything else could have done.

There is something singularly dreary about the picture of his later years. We see the old man, day after day, rising to breakfast at seven, and employing the services of two secretaries until late in the evening in answering letters of admirers about *Aylwin*, disposing of Swinburne's manuscripts, wrestling with endless real or imaginary legal difficulties. It is the picture of a man going down to the grave in the grip of an immense illusion of influence, fame, detraction, romance, mystery; delaying, procrastinating, beating off the doubts that assailed him, fighting hard for his imagined supremacy, determined to pile up about himself a fortress of honor and glory and self-respect. Whether he knew that it was all a colossal and vulgar failure can hardly be discerned; but, if effort and determination are worthy of reward, then we need not grudge to Watts-Dunton his attainment of a singular literary notoriety. He certainly became a notable fact, as the friend and associate of two men of genius, and as the distributor at one time of literary favors, on a remarkably slender outfit of literary taste, and as the master of a style excelling in prolixity, dilution, conventionality, and general dreariness—the apotheosis, in fact, of the provincial amateur.

An authority on the natives of Africa, just back from the pygmy belt, describes the marriage customs and the position of women in the tribes he visited.

Women of the JUNGLE

By DR. PAUL SCHEBESTA

Translated from the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*
Vienna Conservative Daily

I WAS traveling on foot. My caravan, which consisted of twelve Bahutu bearers and two servants belonging to the Banande tribe, was going downhill when we met another caravan with a sedan chair in the middle of it. To my amazement a well-built, pretty Negro lady—and I use the word 'lady' advisedly—got out, came over to me, bowed elegantly, and greeted me. This unusual experience surprised me so much that I stammered as I shook the hand she offered me. And my astonishment was really excusable, for in all my wanderings back and forth in Africa I had never met such a polite and, in her own way, cultured Negro woman. After greeting me, the bronze beauty climbed back into her sedan chair again and her caravan filed silently out of sight behind the next hill.

This experience occurred in November 1929 in the mountains of Ruanda. Afterward I discovered that the young

woman was a chieftain's daughter who was on her way to make a visit at some distant spot. As a gesture of politeness she had left her sedan chair in order to greet the unknown white man. Subsequently I met women and girls in Ruanda who were just as polite, especially at the court of King Musinga, where they formed the entourage of the queen mother.

I mention this encounter in order to show at the outset what a mistake it is to regard all African wives as slaves of their husbands, deprived of any spirit or will of their own. Nor is it necessary to go to Ruanda to meet Negresses whose personal bearing has won them a dominating position in their family, clan, or tribe. In the town of Majalla, deep in the Ituri jungle, I was introduced to the wife of a chieftain and I was so amazed that I neglected to give any present to the ring-bedecked matron and could only stand gaping

at her. All the people in the village looked askance at me and I had to send back for a present at once to repair my carelessness.

But as a general thing the black wife occupies a subordinate, dependent position in relation to her husband. This is most evident when one meets families traveling to pay a visit in a neighboring village. While the husband, as the master, leads the way, carrying his weapon in his hand, his wife is bowed down under a load that she carries on her back, unless there are women slaves to carry the burden. Nevertheless, it would be presumptuous on the basis of this kind of thing to conclude that women occupy the position of slaves. A free wife is never the slave of her husband, who takes good care not to abuse her or to treat her cruelly, because he knows very well that an injured or maltreated wife can leave him at any time and go back to her own people, who will help her get her rights. Only slaves or such wives as are guilty of some kind of misconduct are comparatively outlawed and therefore subject to harsh treatment. There are so many economic, social, and superstitious considerations to bear in mind in judging the position of the Negro wife that casual observers often come away with a false picture.

II

Marriage is a ceremonious and costly affair among the Negroes. The man does not always seek out his future bride since he is often engaged when he is born. The same thing is true of the girl. The family allows its members to marry only after giving careful thought to the matter. In

Africa it is by no means uncommon for two families who are expecting children to agree that their future offspring shall be man and wife if it so happens that one of the children is a boy and the other a girl. Often parents promise some other family with whom they are on friendly terms that a son of theirs who has not yet come of age shall marry a daughter of the other family who is still a babe in arms and who is regarded as his wife thenceforth.

But in most cases the boy who has come of age selects a suitable girl who is promised to him as the result of an agreement among her kinsfolk, provided he is able to give her and her family the usual presents. For, without some kind of gift or payment, there is no engagement in Negro countries. As soon as the engagement is agreed upon the prospective husband becomes the virtual slave of his prospective wife's kin. He must keep handing out lavish presents to his future wife and her parents and must make betrothal payments at regular intervals, for if he is not generous the engagement will be broken and the girl promised to another man who seems better able to meet the expense.

The pygmies have no betrothal. They get married at once whenever two young people want to do so. Originally all pygmy marriages were exchange marriages, or, as they say, 'head for head.' Marriage by purchase is foreign to them. Whenever the man finds a suitable girl he arranges the matter with his own kin, who put no obstacle in the way. It is the bride's kinsfolk that make the trouble, for they do not like to let the daughter go without some compensation. The man, who is eager for marriage, therefore bends all his efforts to persuade one of

his own kinswomen to marry into the same clan as that to which his intended wife belongs. If one of his sisters or cousins has already begun to cast sheep's eyes at a man belonging to the other clan the marriage is assured within a few hours. Without any singing or clamor, the two couples meet immediately in huts that have been speedily erected by the young women, and the marriages are consummated.

But it is sometimes bound to happen that a poor pygmy boy has no female relation who is not betrothed and therefore has nobody to offer in exchange. I keep remembering how six stalwart young men of the Bafwaguda tribe begged me to help them find wives. I could n't get rid of them. Negroes had kidnapped their sisters and cousins and they had nobody to exchange for wives of their own. The only solution was to yield to their plea and sit in judgment over the Negroes and compel them to hand back the pygmy girls whom they had appropriated, partly by cunning and partly by force. Naturally, the Negroes did not come to terms without vigorous opposition and I needed all my oratorical skill and diplomatic tact to make them hand back the women, and they did so only with many threats against the poor pygmies. Thus the intended marriages could be accomplished, for the pygmies then had feminine relatives to exchange for the women that their own hearts had chosen. If I had not played the rôle of avenging angel the poor men would perhaps have had to pass their whole lives as bachelors.

I say 'perhaps,' for pygmy morals are human and there are exceptions. If a poor pygmy really cannot produce any kinswoman to exchange for the girl he has chosen for himself, presents

will be accepted instead. To judge from the value of these presents, a pygmy wife is not worth very much. A good hunting dog, a spear, and three arrows are enough to get a wife.

All Negro marriages, on the other hand, are based on purchase. The price of a woman differs greatly in different places. In some parts of Africa where European influence is comparatively strong, or in regions where European officials and colonists take the girls for themselves because they are well-built and pretty, the purchase price is so high that the average Negro cannot afford to get married. Here is another of the so-called benefits that our civilization has bequeathed to the Negro. In other places old swords that the tribe has used for marriage payments since time immemorial are employed, or else the so-called *ndundu* is taken in payment. The latter is a brick-shaped iron block weighing a good many pounds which is used only for marriage payments. These blocks cannot be bought from collectors. One *ndundu* is equal in value to a woman, but several *ndundus* may be given in exchange for a specially desirable wife. The clan that is the happy possessor of a *ndundu* keeps it to use in exchange for a future wife. The more girls there are in a clan or family, the more *ndundus* they bring in. But the more *ndundus* a clan has the more wives it can acquire and the better off it will be.

I once came upon a wedding in a Balese village. The bride was sitting on the veranda on a low woman's stool. She was a voluptuous girl dripping with the oil that several women were rubbing on her. She was also weighed down with iron rings and

knives of all sizes and heavy chains so that she could hardly move under the load. This ornamentation represented the price that the bridegroom had paid for the bride.

The Negro wedding party is a celebration of the bride, not of the bridegroom. The latter participates in it only to the extent of paying for it. The Balese women accompany the young bride from their native village to the village of the bridegroom, where the bride's new home awaits her. The procession moves very slowly indeed and often spends days on its journey. After marching a short distance a camp is laid out and everybody rests. A swift runner then hastens to the bridegroom's village with the announcement that they have gotten to such and such a place and can go no farther. There is nothing for the young man to do but to give the messenger a present for the bride's parents, whereupon the procession moves again, only to halt at another spot and win another present.

The Balese Negroes also marry pygmy wives, who are greatly in demand because they bring so many children into the world, whereas the Negro women are often barren. Of course the pygmies must content themselves with far more modest presents from their new husbands. But in conformity with Negro customs they also try to extort further presents during the marriage procession, which looks extraordinarily mean and primitive compared to the Negro procession. They halt from time to time and send a message to the Negro village, but their representative usually comes back empty-handed, sometimes accompanied by the bridegroom, who simply takes the pygmy girl by

the hand and leads her to the village.

Other Negro tribes cover the bride with veils and keep her in their midst while the procession is on its way to the bridegroom so that no one can see her. When it grows dusk they take her to the bridegroom's hut and there the celebrations and dancing begin. But one never sees the bride and groom together, and it is out of the question for them to walk arm in arm. This is true even of ceremonies among Christian Negroes. When the bride, accompanied by her friends, dressed in festive attire, and carrying the inevitable umbrella, reaches the mission church where the ceremony is to occur, the bridegroom is not found waiting for her. He slips in alone at the last minute, as if ashamed, and disappears as quickly as possible after the ceremony.

III

Negro women grow old very quickly. When they marry they are healthy and pretty but a few years after their first child is born they are already old women. Careful as they are of their appearance before marriage, they are completely negligent afterward. Negroes on the Congo consider themselves beautiful if their chocolate-colored or black skin is tattooed with stars and all kinds of decorations. The more deeply the tattooing is engraved and the more it stands out in plastic relief, the greater charm the girl has for the stronger sex. Pygmy women know practically nothing about tattooing. They merely paint themselves with all kinds of colors. Sometimes these tiny painted women look like clowns. Their legs are black, their bodies white, and their faces red. And they regard this as beautiful.

Women, especially along the Congo, attach great importance to hairdressing. The headdress of the Mangbetu women is famous. They wear huge, dish-shaped helmets of false hair that often require days to make. Since they can rarely permit themselves the luxury of visiting a neighboring hairdresser and having their hair put in order, the women make every effort to keep their hair in as good shape as possible. They are even careful while they sleep and submit to the discomfort of laying their heads on head stools in order to preserve their artificial coiffure.

The costumes of the natives are usually very picturesque and often rather inadequate, especially in the case of the women. Pygmy women always wear clothes but the women in some Congo tribes go stark naked. They put on a skirt only when they visit posts where white people live and they take even that off as soon as they are out of sight. The Mbole women give an interesting reason for refusing to wear clothes: 'Why should we cover ourselves? We are not sick.' The Nkundu women cover their bodies with all kinds of metal articles for decoration but their skirt consists merely of a pretty plaited girdle with a thick fringe of string that flaps behind them coquettishly when they walk. The Medje women fasten to their girdles pretty fringed panels made of leaves which conceal their backsides in the most decorous and artistic fashion. The Babali women wear skirts of crushed bark that hang down almost to the ground behind in narrow trains, so that they look as if they had tails. Certain early explorers reported that they had seen human beings with tails in this part of the

world, but the Babali women were probably what they saw. I could continue describing women's costumes indefinitely, for every tribe has its own different styles.

Negro women are models of mother love. For that reason the children feel very tenderly toward them, but the fathers are much less affectionate. When a pygmy boy has been away from his family for any length of time he greets his mother on returning by taking her breast as he did while he was still being suckled. Here is evidence of extraordinary love and affection.

No Negro will allow anybody to criticize or insult his mother. An insult to a man's mother is the greatest offense conceivable and demands revenge. Mothers are equally devoted to their children. To understand this fully one should see with one's own eyes how many tears a Negro mother sheds when she lays a dead child in its grave and how she visits it every day at sunrise and sunset, wailing loud lamentations. I happened to see a boy come back to his family and I heard an old woman singing the following song of thanksgiving over the return of her son: 'My joy is the joy of a puppy when it is wagging its tail.'

The soul of the Negro is as unfathomable as the mother love of the Negro women, who, however, under certain circumstances, sacrifice their children without batting an eyelid. Wherever the superstition exists that twins bring danger or bad luck to the community the mother coolly places them alive on an ant-hill, where the poor little creatures are bitten to death by the ferocious ants, or else the babies are put in a big earthen jug and buried alive.

Here is a humorous essay by one of the most popular modern English authors. You guessed it—the subject is America.

FICTION Made Easy

By J. B. PRIESTLEY

From the *Week-end Review*
London Independent Weekly of the Right

IN SPITE of her slumps and bread lines, there are times even yet when America is her old, happy self. Thus, the Gagnon Company, of Los Angeles, has just produced the Plot Genie. This is—in its own words—‘designed to serve the purpose of giving the writer or author a definite and arbitrary assignment of a number of elements comprising a plot outline which challenges the creative imagination and stimulates it to definite action by charting a course for it to pursue.’

This is how it works. You are given the nine elements that make up ‘The Perfect Story Plot Formula.’ You are also given a gadget that is called, grandly, ‘The Plot Robot,’ but that is nothing more than three pieces of cardboard glued together. The one in the middle is a revolving round piece on which hundreds of numbers are printed, and one of these numbers can be seen through a little opening in the front piece of cardboard. You are also given an Index, which contains long

numbered lists of localities, heroes, heroines, and problems. You revolve the numbers, note the result, then look it up in the Index. When you have done this nine times, you have in your possession all the necessary elements of the Perfect Story Plot Formula, and all you have to do is to make some sense out of them and write your story, play, or film.

Let us have a go. We will make it a short story—if we can. The first element is ‘Background or Locale.’ I revolve the numbers and am presented with No. 35. No. 35 is, it seems, a Canyon. Good! The background of our story is to be a canyon. We will make it the Grand Canyon, and show how we can write rich, descriptive prose. And now for a hero. There are two lists: Usual and Unusual; and naturally we prefer Unusual. We get No. 45, and find ourselves landed with a shipwright. This is bad, but it might be worse, for No. 9 is a gondolier, 34 a fugleman, and 147 a galley

slave. Here, then, we have our shipwright, the only one left in the Grand Canyon, the last of the old breed. Who is to be his lady? And shall we take the Usual or the Unusual list? Better take the Usual this time, or we may find ourselves saddled with a Nautch Girl, a Martian, or a Duenna. The Usual then, and the number is 142. Who is 142, and what is she, that all our swains adore her? She is a Ventriloquist's Daughter. I feel the Usual has played us false.

So far, then, we have a Ventriloquist's Daughter meeting a Shipwright in the Grand Canyon. Already our creative imagination is at work on them, but it need not work very hard yet, for we are to be provided with six more elements for our plot. The next is the Problem, and, for good or ill, the Problem is No. 149. This is not going to be too easy, for 149 is *A religious uprising is threatened by enemies*. Difficult, but not impossible. For example, a fanatical sect has made its headquarters in the Grand Canyon, and its members consider that shipbuilding there is contrary to Biblical instruction. 'Down with the Man of Sin!' I hear them cry, their beards bristling. They could attack him, and then he could be saved at the last minute by the Ventriloquist's Daughter throwing her voice in the beard of the chief prophet. Something like that. Anyhow, a beginning. The creative imagination is at work.

But now, whether we like it or not, we must have a Love Obstacle. These two are not only to be faced with a threatened religious uprising, but there must be an obstacle too. It is 128. Hurry up and turn to the list of Obstacles to Love. Well, it might have been worse: *There is an imaginary dif-*

ference in their ages. I do not propose to worry much about that. The shipwright is pretending to be his own grandfather ('Clipper' Johnson, late of Cape Cod) and wears a wig and a colossal false white beard. The Ventriloquist's Daughter would not have looked at him twice had there not been *something strange* about the old man's eyes, which reminded her, in their boldness, of one of her father's favorite dummies. The shipwright will not pluck off his wig and beard until after she has rescued him from the religious fanatics. A good scene that, and it almost writes itself. The sun will be setting too, and we shall be able to do the Grand Canyon proud.

II

This is a story, however, not a mere anecdote, and there must also be a Complication. (Yes, you could do without one, and so could I, but it is in the formula.) We have given ourselves No. 31. Here are the complications, one hundred and eighty of them. I do not consider No. 31 too bad. It is *Deception threatens loss of reward*. You see the possibilities here? A large prize has been offered for the best 150-ton schooner built this year by any man *under seventy*. (The italics, you will be amused to learn, are mine. I have others, too.) Undoubtedly the best schooner is 'Clipper' Johnson's, from Grand Canyon, but then 'Clipper' is ninety if he's a day. It ought to be possible, too, to work a little more ventriloquism into this schooner-prize complication. This is going to be a corking short story, absolutely corking.

I do think, however, that having jammed us into a Complication, they

might have left out the Predicament. This Story Plot Formula is a shade too perfect for my taste. We do not revolve the numbers with quite our old enthusiasm. We have arrived at 57. (And do not imagine that is the last one; there are more than fifty-seven varieties of predicaments.) No. 57 is *Threatened with banishment by a tyrant ruler*. This is not going to be helpful. It is the girl's turn, and we shall have to make her an Italian. (This may mean moving the Grand Canyon into Italy.) Or, again, she may be an immigrant who has not come into the United States on the quota. The immigration officers are on her track. Five of them may be seen, even now, slowly descending the winding road into the Canyon. Good! Let us leave it at that. She can get out of it all, if necessary, by ventriloquism, or by pulling strings, which is a branch of the ventriloquial art.

Even those of you who are now fainting by the wayside can hardly object to a Crisis. A story must have a crisis. This one has No. 115, and a brute it is too. For the first time I feel tempted to cheat and try another number. *About to permit an unrecognized daughter to commit suicide*. This, you must admit, makes it another story. I had seen our heroine as a mere slip of a girl, our hero a stalwart young man beneath his disguise. We shall have to put about fifteen years on one of them. And then the daughter—poor suicidal creature—will have to be brought in. She could, of course, be one of the religious fanatics, or, for that matter, one of the prize-schooner judges, or a female immigration officer. I think I prefer the last. And she shall

be the shipwright's child, who has been brought up on Ellis Island, a curious, melancholy girl.

That brings us to the very last of our elements, the Climax. I notice that the Index calls its list 'Climaxes or Surprise Twists.' I do not like that Surprise Twist. There have been too many already in this narrative. We must hope for a good number. No, this time I propose to cheat. One number is not enough; I shall take three and then choose between them. My first is 33, and that is *wherein it develops that confusion has been caused by the presence of twins or triplets*. Well, we could use it at a pinch. Indeed, we could fill the Grand Canyon with triplets. The next number is 9: *Wherein a witness proves to be mad or deranged*. But why a mere witness? Let them all be mad. I always suspected that shipwright. But we will have one more throw and then we have done. Here is the last of the numbers. It is 164, and the Index says firmly that 164 is *In which an immortal comes to the rescue of the hero*. That will do. We wanted a surprise twist and we have got it. Has anybody written a story in which Poseidon makes his appearance in the Grand Canyon? I doubt it. And, in any event, I am sure there has never been a story in which Poseidon appears in the Grand Canyon to rescue a shipwright, his child, and his beloved daughter of a ventriloquist from the combined menace of religious fanatics, judges of schooner competitions, and immigration officials. That should be a big finish. If the film rights are not worth a lot of money, then Hollywood has lost all enterprise.

BOOKS ABROAD

NEUE FOLGE DER VORLESUNGEN ZUR
EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE PSYCHOAN-
ALYSE. By Sigmund Freud. Vienna:
*Internationaler Psychoanalytischer
Verlag*. 1932.

(Dr. Alfred Winterstein in the *Neue Freie Presse*,
Vienna)

FIFTEEN years after the publica-
tion of *Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis* [The English transla-
tion is entitled *A General Introduction
to Psychoanalysis*.—EDITOR.] Professor
Freud has now brought out *A New
Series of Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis*. Like the original lec-
tures, the new book is intended less
for the professional analyst than for
'that large number of educated people
to whom may be imputed a friendly,
if reserved, interest in the nature and
achievements of the young science.'
Although these new lectures, unlike
those of the earlier book, were never
delivered, it is most fortunate that
Freud chose this mode of presenta-
tion, of which he is a master, since it
captures the attention of his imagi-
nary audience far more successfully
than a cold scientific treatise would.

The new lectures contain nothing
fundamentally new to the reader who
has followed the development of
psychoanalysis closely, though to the
discerning eye they reveal valuable
details. They are to be considered
rather as a continuation and com-
plement of the previous lectures, since
their purpose is to inform the layman
of the knowledge that has been gained,
and also of the uncertainties that have
appeared, in the field during the last

fifteen years. For depth psychology
has never sought to conceal problems.
The unique ability of Freud, the in-
vestigator, to attack difficulties cour-
ageously in his almost fanatical search
for truth is always a fresh source of
surprise, as is also his talent for
expounding the principal parts of the
psychoanalytic system over and over
again, without repeating himself, in
such clear, readable form that even
laymen can gain access to the subject.
This art of bringing highly involved
material within everybody's range is
an attribute peculiar to the master.

The theory of dreams occupies a
unique position in the history of
psychoanalysis, for it was responsible
for the development of psychoanalysis
from a psychotherapeutic method to a
depth psychology. This circumstance
justifies the devotion of the first lec-
ture to a revision of the theory of
dreams. Freud tries once again to
enlighten 'the educated people among
the belittlers' of psychoanalysis as to
the misunderstandings that have per-
sisted so stubbornly concerning the
theory of dreams. One of these is the
assertion falsely attributed to Freud
that all dreams can be traced to in-
stinctive sexual forces; another is the
persistent confusion between the mani-
fest dream content and the latent
dream thoughts. He describes poeti-
cally as 'a child of the night' that one
impulse which is energetically rejected
by a dreamer whose knowledge of
dream interpretation enables him to
recognize all his other dream thoughts.
This one particular impulse is denied
and rejected precisely because it be-

longs to his unconscious and is the real creator of the dream.

Unfortunately I cannot discuss all the modifications and extensions of the theory of dreams that fifteen years of labor have brought forth and that Freud explains so lucidly, but I shall mention two points. Viennese investigators have succeeded in adducing experimental proof of the much maligned dream symbolism of 'unscientific' psychoanalysis. It should also be mentioned that Freud has modified his statement that a dream is a wish fulfillment. The repetition of painful traumatic experiences in dreams, as, for instance, in the case of a person suffering from traumatic hysteria, serves as a serious objection to this formula, which Freud has now changed to: 'A dream is an *attempt* at wish fulfillment.'

In the following chapter, which should arouse special interest, Freud deals with the relation of dreams to occultism and the application of psychoanalysis in general (not merely the interpretation of dreams) to so-called occult phenomena. However, he limits himself exclusively to the phenomena of telepathy. After conscientious consideration of all the factors involved, Freud comes to the personal conclusion that in telepathy we are very probably dealing with a genuine nucleus of facts not yet known, about which deception and phantasy have woven an almost impenetrable veil. The analysis of a 'telepathic' dream does not permit him to reach any clear decision, although he admits that the hypothesis of telepathy represents by far the simplest explanation. However, he adds that the simplest explanation is not always the correct one, and that truth is very often not

simple. In the light of Freud's experience, the scales tip even more strongly in favor of the reality of thought transference, which is very closely related to telepathy. But his attitude, which he defines by saying that he is not yet fully persuaded but that he is ready to be convinced, is based, as he emphasizes, solely on observations made during analytic treatment. (I can do no more than refer the reader to the particular case that made the strongest impression on him and which he describes in detail.) Freud was unfortunately not sufficiently familiar with the incomparably richer material that lies outside the realm of psychoanalysis.

After having led us into psychic nether regions, Freud proceeds in his third chapter to present the psychology of the ego, in other words, of that higher power in our mental life whose function is to oppose the unreasonable demands of our instinctive life. The division of the psychic personality into ego, id, and super-ego is a schematic representation of inner structural relationships. Of special importance is the affirmation that the ego and super-ego do not coincide with the conscious, nor the repressed with the unconscious. Freud's formula runs: 'Where the id was, the ego shall be. 'It is a work of cultivation, somewhat like the draining of the Zuider Zee.'

The subject of the next lecture is the analytic conception of fear and the problem of instincts. 'We stand here before a steep upward path,' and no final solutions present themselves. The reader who is unfamiliar with the subject will find this lecture even more difficult to understand than the preceding one.

The next chapter, however, on 'The

Characteristics of Woman,' should claim the keenest interest of all educated people. First Freud analyzes 'masculine' and 'feminine' psychic attributes. He then gives a lucid exposition of female psychosexual development up to puberty, stressing the strong attachment of the little girl to her mother and her discovery of the supposed female castration, which has such a disastrous effect upon this attachment. Finally he discusses some of the psychic characteristics of the mature woman.

The next to the last lecture, 'Explanations, Applications, Orientations,' contains a criticism of Adler's individual psychology, a digression on the application of psychoanalysis to pedagogy ('perhaps the most important of all the tasks that analysis undertakes'), and some memorable words on the therapeutic aspect of psychoanalysis. First Freud admits that he has never been a therapeutic enthusiast and does not believe that his cures can compete with those of Lourdes, but then he goes on to state that despite its limitations, of which he is well aware, psychoanalysis is beyond any doubt the most efficient psychotherapeutic method.

Does psychoanalysis lead to any particular philosophic attitude and, if so, which one? is the question with which the last chapter opens. After an analysis of the religious and philosophic attitudes and of intellectual nihilism, Marxism, and Bolshevism, Freud concludes that psychoanalysis is incapable of creating its own philosophic attitude, or *Weltanschauung*. Nor does it need one, for it is a part of science and can make use of the scientific *Weltanschauung*, in so far as this pregnant, untranslatable German

word can be applied to such a young and incomplete science.

The wealth of problems mastered by this seventy-six-year-old thinker is not the only thing to arouse our admiration. Even more impressive, perhaps, are his ever-fresh powers of exposition, the facile ease of his style, his occasional bits of gentle, glancing irony, and the clarity of his diction. What appears simple and clear is in reality most profound, but it takes more than a single reading to perceive this fact.

LE PARI. By Ramon Fernandez. Paris: *La Nouvelle Revue Française*. 1932. [Winner of the Prix Fémina, 1932.]

(Julien Lanoë in the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, Paris)

THE author expects to write a sequel to this novel, which, however, is already complete even to its moral, which is set forth, not without a certain solemnity, in the fine dialogue of the closing pages.

The bet is whether Robert Pourcieux will sleep with Pauline Bordier within three months; such are the terms of defiance hurled at him by the Marquis de la Carouge. The stake is a big eight-cylinder sport car. For the action takes place in the world of the automobile, and the book is a novel of manners that unrolls in the enervating atmosphere of big garages, autodromes, *boîtes de nuit*, and the alcoves of the Faubourg Saint-Germain. For Americans *Le Pari* would belong to that class of novel known as 'hot stuff,' for it is full of the intoxication of speed, the brutality of passion, and the cynicism of automobile dealers and aristocrats swamped with commissions and of young people drunk with leisure. Then, too, there are

many 'bedroom scenes' in the book. Moreover, these enervated weaklings of Jumièges who drink, vomit, curse, and play with death also indulge in the solitary pleasures of introspection. Thus this book seems to unite within itself the heavy attributes of the realistic novel and the sad privileges of the psychological novel.

In reality, its subject is quite different from what it seems. It merely bathes in this *milieu* and presents this external appearance in order to present the trying circumstances in which the love of Robert and Pauline is born and achieves confidence and strength. Robert, animated by a strong inner urge, does not know which way to turn. Idleness now excites, now depresses him. Racing cars are not a derivative of his emotional agitation but a sort of drug, an intoxication, a supplementary disorder of *amour-propre*.

Robert meets Pauline or rather runs into her while traveling in an unfortunate manner that weighs heavily upon both of them for a long time. He comes upon the young girl suddenly out of doors in a pose that happens to be indecent, and through a sort of reflex action photographs her thus as soon as he sees and admires her. After several difficult encounters Robert surmounts this handicap and his first impression of a girl in too short skirts is replaced by that of a fresh young provincial woman who has strayed into a fetid and sneering Paris. Then comes that terrible ordeal—the bet. This is another reflex of Robert's, a reflex of hate and derision at the baseness of a group of which he is all too much a part.

But what gives the book its significance and real beauty is the curve that

now appears, like a providential filigree, in Robert's destiny, which has heretofore seemed quite without direction. At first he has no desire to win his bet, but he finally wins it absent-mindedly and without premeditation. Feeling, however, that the situation is becoming serious he keeps his triumph a secret and lets everyone think that he has lost. Robert and Pauline then take a savage pleasure in each other and each, conscious of living too abnormally, suffers and becomes anxious. Ancient poisons now awake. Robert becomes prey to a frenzy that estranges him from Pauline, throws him into the arms of another woman, and delivers him anew to his passion for dangerous automobiles. Finally, as the result of an accident, Robert sobers up and returns to Pauline, and the two of them sensibly decide to try to love each other again, to risk unhappiness if need be and to try for happiness if possible. Being predestined for one another is not in itself enough to ensure perfect bliss. Love is often more than a difficult conquest; it must be forged in a veritable purgatory. Without the shameful bet Robert would never have found his way. In this sombre book accidents, bad influences, and transgressions alone are the source, or rather the occasion, of good.

M. Fernandez's next book will tell us at what cost his hero and heroine achieve peace. They are already on the threshold of wisdom, both of them humble, docile, and indulgent. Let us await this new novel with the not unreasonable hope that it will lack the subtleties of *amour-propre* and of sincerity toward one's self and the useless reasonings about instinctive acts (which never correspond to the emo-

tions involved) which this book contains.

To sum up, *Le Pari* is the model of the ungrateful novel and Robert Pourcieux the model of the ungrateful hero. I warn the reader that he will have some difficulty in attaching himself to either one or the other. But it is a good thing for him to know beforehand how he will be rewarded. Pauline, on the other hand, attracts our sympathy from the start. M. Fernandez makes her live before our eyes—I was about to say in the palm of our hand—with a truthfulness which makes us all the more sensitive to her sufferings since she is such a noble and loyal woman. By that I mean that she fully accepts her weakness and, beaten and broken by fate, rises again, mad with hope.

LES LOUPS. By Guy Mazeline. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française. 1932. [Winner of the Goncourt Prize, 1932.]

(Ramon Fernandez in *Marianne*, Paris)

LE HAVRE, with its intrigues and passions, in about 1894 . . . The descendants of an industrial magnate, Frédéric Jobourg, are on the downward path. They are no longer making money and are losing what they have. Family ties are disintegrating under the blows of these stubborn and heedless individuals, each of whom lives only for his own dreams or personal ambitions. Maximilien Jobourg, a paterfamilias unworthy of the name, a subtle, lazy dreamer married through caprice to a shallow woman, is responsible for the family downfall. The drama commences when Valérie, an illegitimate daughter of Maximilien, arrives from the Antilles. The city rises against him, and his mother,

the aged Virginie, succeeds in ruining him through the kind of maternal passion that François Mauriac has depicted in *Genitrix*.

But that is only the subject, and the subject is not the essential thing in *Les Loups*. The value of the novel lies above all in its atmosphere and rhythm, which become as concrete as an allegory in the last scene. Valérie, having learned that her life has been built on a lie, commits suicide. The following night Maximilien becomes mentally deranged and, believing himself pursued by his sons and the police, throws himself into the water. His sons try to save him, but soon give up the vain attempt: 'The two brothers headed for the wharf, leaving fan-shaped trails upon the water. They swam silently, as if with reluctance.' The whole book is permeated by water, night, and fog. The word 'atmosphere' must here be taken literally as a kind of vapor in which the characters bathe and in which they meet each other in foggy scenes. The very tempo of the book, its somewhat slow, awkward pace, reminds one of movements in water.

But *Les Loups* has other qualities. This long, heavy novel describes with precision the crowd of people that it bears slowly along. Maximilien Jobourg, his mother, his wife, his children, his hypocritical son-in-law, some sailors, and some more or less shady business men are depicted with loving care. The author seizes them in different lights, in revealing movements, in their spontaneous originality, hardly to be expressed. The portrait of the angry old mother is particularly good, even in its nuances. Only one character completely lacks reality—Valérie, the illegitimate daughter. This is the

first serious defect of the book. It is hard to see how a character who is never clearly perceived can produce such a disturbance. Did M. Mazeline wish to evoke Valérie indirectly, as if in a mirror? If so, he should have carried his intention out completely and not let the young girl appear at all but treated her like the Arlésienne in Daudet's play. He chose a halfway measure that throws his novel out of balance.

Les Loups also suffers from a defect in its setting. By this I mean that certain important and even remarkable scenes fail to stand out from the monotonous thread of the recital and thus escape the attention of the careless reader. If the novelist is not sufficiently talented for the intensity of his vision to bring the chief scenes out in full relief, he should make use of some artifice to that end. It seems as if M. Mazeline had had difficulty in carrying out the excellent dramatic idea that inspired him and as if he had succumbed to the torpor into which he plunged some of his characters.

Les Loups has another, more serious failing. There is no excuse, in a very long novel, for the characters not to be perfectly 'ripe' at the end, and for the reader not to be perfectly convinced of the naturalness of their actions. Yet toward the end of his unusually long novel M. Mazeline introduces in a quite arbitrary manner an important character—a friend of Valérie's mother who is animated with apostolic zeal. It seems as if he had not had time to 'prepare' this character, whom the reader is therefore unable to understand.

This arbitrary method, which is out of keeping with the time and place chosen by the author, is employed

more than once. For example, M. Mazeline, in order to convince us of the important truth that hate is sometimes stronger than self-interest, shows us Maximilien's son-in-law, Georges Peige, trying to ruin his father-in-law, of whom he is an heir—with the complicity, it is true, of the aged Virginie, who is very rich, which confuses the issue somewhat. With the best will in the world I cannot help feeling that this son-in-law is rather overdrawn. We are told that he is a hypocrite so often that when we are finally shown his hypocrisy it seems as if it were merely to justify what has been said about him.

Here is another instance of the same thing. Elisabeth Durban, who is engaged to Didier Jobourg, is attracted to his brother, Benoît. Didier is a timid dreamer; Benoît a rather boorish fellow. Benoît, who is in love with Elisabeth, frequents the low dives of Le Havre in order to 'forget.' In order to produce a certain dramatic effect the author shows us Elisabeth witnessing a nocturnal fight between Benoît and a sailor before a house of ill fame that the young girl wished to see and where her fiancé was about to take her. I should not say that such an escapade was impossible in 1894, because nothing is impossible, but it should at least have been made to seem probable. And such an extravagant scene seems probable only when the reader is able to forget the reasons the author may have had for inserting it in the novel. The longer the novel is, the less indulgent the reader is toward such episodes. The end of *Les Loups* gives the impression that the novel is too long for the incidents that bring it to a close to be acceptable.

These serious faults doubtless keep

Les Loups from being a wholly successful book. Yet it is a book whose charm grips the reader from the start. M. Mazeline has a way of introducing his characters slowly, bit by bit, on the bias, as it were, in a manner reminiscent of the English novel. Their first appearance, that bane of novelists, is handled excellently. They rise from the shadows and let themselves first be seen, not as complete wholes, but in fragmentary fashion, by incomplete yet familiar gestures. M. Mazeline has that endless, loving patience which forms half of the novelist's art. It is evident that he has a passion for the novel, and that in itself is much. He has announced that there is to be a sequel to *Les Loups* entitled *Le Capitaine Durban*, which may perhaps be the heroic counterpart of the present volume. I sincerely hope that M. Mazeline will avoid in it the pitfalls that I have just pointed out, for better or for worse.

LE CHRISTIANISME ET LA LUTTE DES CLASSES. By Nikolai Berdayev. Paris: Editions 'Je Sers.' 1932.

(Raoul Patry in the *Journal de Genève*, Geneva)

WE HAVE heard a great deal about Russians who were driven out of their country by the Revolution, of ladies who keep tea rooms, and of aristocrats who have become taxi drivers. But most of us do not realize that some of these exiles have established a centre of spiritual culture in Paris. Modest quarters have become a rallying point for believers who are not content to count passively on a spiritual revival but who see in their tribulations an appeal from Providence to live out their faith more profoundly, to revive their traditions and,

by coming into contact with the West, to enlarge their horizon, at the same time drawing attention to the shortcomings of Western pragmatism.

This faculty of Greek Orthodox theology does not confine its efforts to preparing priests to serve refugee communities. In conversations with Protestant and Catholic theologians, it is trying to make its faith known and to understand the beliefs of other Christian groups. Those who have taken part in these discussions can testify how far we are away from the day when people excommunicated each other. To-day we do not always understand each other but at least we try to. Under the banner of ecumenicity the forces of reconciliation are marching on and the desire for good understanding reigns supreme.

During these exchanges of opinion, Nikolai Berdayev, a Greek Orthodox theologian and a professor on the Russian Faculty of Theology, has attracted attention with his vigorous ideas. A book of his entitled *A New Middle Age* has been read widely outside the circle of initiates. Since then he has published *The Dignity of Christianity and the Indignity of Christians*, then *Marxism and Religion*, and finally his latest work, *Christianity and the Class Struggle*. As victim of a catastrophe whose consequences he measures, M. Berdayev does not think it is enough to stand passively aside until the storm abates and expect order to return. He sees in the present crisis 'above all a spiritual and moral problem, that of a new Christian attitude toward man and society, that of the religious renaissance of humanity.' As a Christian, our philosopher notes with anxiety that Marxism inspires the masses and

teaches them hatred of religion and the Church.

To make evident the rising power exercised by this new philosophy, M. Berdayev gives an analysis of it which is deserving of praise for its conciseness, clearness, and critical character. The fundamental idea of Marx was the importance he attributed to economics. According to him, spiritual life is conditioned by the method of production. Differentiation of labor has created a class society in which one class exploits the others and religious beliefs, notably Christianity, are simply the reflection of man's servitude to nature and to other men. But, declares Marx, in a better constituted society religious phantoms will vanish. The proletariat will dominate the world and this worldly God will replace the God of Christianity.

This explanation is followed by a refutation executed with a masterly hand. In spite of his apparently scientific rigor, Marx does not mention certain scientific facts but prefers to substitute one religion for another religion, in order that he may preach a new kind of salvation and announce that the proletariat has been called upon to make justice reign. Berdayev detects in this attitude the survival of Jewish Messianism in an atheistic Israelite and he chiefly points out this double contradiction. Marx's philosophy rests on materialism, but matter is merely something that our consciousness constructs. The human being is spirit above all else. Moreover, since Marx has eliminated morality in the name of economic necessity, what right has he to attack social injustice and grow indignant about exploiters?

With severity toward a theory that leads to the death of the spirit, M. Berdayev reveals its sophisms but would consider himself misunderstood if his books created apathy. Convinced that the remedies for our present troubles are of a spiritual nature, he denounces certain Christian practices as obstacles in the path of true Christianity. 'The bourgeois conscience and mentality (the transformation of man into an object and of work into murderous competition), likewise the mentality and conscience of the proletariat, were brought into being by the abandonment of Christianity and the decadence of Christian spirituality.' The indignation of sincere atheists is often justified; and according to our author it would be absurd to expect that a mere return to nineteenth-century capitalist society would rescue our faith in God and the human personality. He does not hesitate to recognize the importance of the political, economic, and social truth contained in socialism, whose error lies in its spiritual character, in its negation of God and man. The task of Christianity is therefore clear. Spiritualize the working class, to which the future belongs. For 'the Church of Christ must always go toward those who perish, toward those who have fallen very low spiritually, even if they seem strong and powerful.'

It is hardly astonishing that a man who looks so boldly toward the future and makes these appeals to Christian heroism has become one of the masters of contemporary thought, not only among his exiled compatriots but in the country in which he has received hospitality.

LETTERS AND THE ARTS

FILMING 'DON QUIXOTE'

'IT'S a lovely little donkey; he runs after me just like a dog. You'll see him later on when we start shooting.' These words were uttered by George Robey, England's most popular music-hall comedian, as he sat under a palm tree in a red and gold nose and the costume of Sancho Panza. They meant that when the shooting started the famous story of Don Quixote was to be immortalized in a moving picture. The impetus for this undertaking came from Charlie Chaplin, who had had ideas for two pictures featuring Chaliapin. One of these, a Russian anti-war film, Chaliapin was unwilling to do; the other, *Don Quixote*, he immediately seized upon. As the result of negotiations in which Chaplin made it plain that he was not to be openly associated with the scheme, two companies, the Nelson Film of England and the French Vandor, decided to share in the production, the one producing an English and the other a French version of the story. At the outset, various complications arose involving several directors, and a million francs were spent without anything's being accomplished. The backers were beginning to get jumpy, so the two companies asked Pabst to take sole direction of the film. His name as a producer is so exalted that money was immediately forthcoming to change a four-million-franc film that was at a standstill to an eight-million-franc film on which real progress began at once.

Paul Morand and Alexandre Arnoux were engaged to write the French continuity; John Farrow, the English. Chaliapin was given the part of Don Quixote in both versions, and the rôle of Sancho Panza was assigned to Robey in the English version and Dorville in the French.

The big scenes, 'Charging the Sheep,' 'The Strolling Players,' and 'Releasing

the Convicts,' were made high up in the rocky country above Grasse, where the company was beset by scorpions and snakes and bad weather and, in spite of these, by a hundred sight-seers who arrived miraculously in automobiles to have a look. Work had been going on there for only four weeks, however, when the unreliable weather forced them down to the Gaumont Studio on the outskirts of Nice, where it was decided to proceed with the street scenes and the interiors.

Here we can get our most intimate glimpse of the actors. On a bench outside Sancho Panza's cottage, with a marvelously painted village behind it, sits Chaliapin in rusty armor, talking French, English, and Russian almost simultaneously. When they start shooting the scene, he will have to mount his nag, who is too fat for Rosinante, he thinks, and too skittish for himself. Nevertheless, he is magnificent on horseback; the point of his lance seems to touch the clouds. He is neither exclusively Don Quixote nor exclusively Chaliapin—he is both. George Robey, on the contrary, is almost solely George Robey and scarcely Sancho Panza at all. Mounted on the 'lovely little donkey' and carrying a blunderbuss, he meets Don Quixote, and the action proceeds. Thus two performers have turned to the cinema from quite different backgrounds, both of them instigated by the greatest movie actor of them all.

CAPONE IN GERMAN

PERHAPS it is too soon for the saga of the gangster to be sung, but now that the Volstead-Capone era is drawing to its close, we certainly can expect it to evoke, if not a Homer, at least its own Lope de Vega or Bret Harte. At any rate, we have a right to expect a little more than the adventure-story magazines have so far

produced. Some distance in time is probably necessary for the creation of an indigenous racketeer literature, but, three thousand miles away, a good many European writers have been turning to Chicago for subject matter.

Having made his reputation some years ago with *L'Or*, the story of General Sutter of California, Blaise Cendrars chose another American hero for his latest book, published last year, *Al Capone le Balafre* (Scarface to us). Edgar Wallace's play, *On the Spot*, in which the central character was drawn, in the main, from Capone, was written, if rumor speaks true, during a four-day visit to Chicago. It was received with enthusiasm in Paris as well as in London and New York.

And now in Germany *Alkoholkrieg in U. S. A.*, by Peter Omm, has had enough success to warrant its translation into other languages. This book purports to be a true account of the 'alcohol war' compiled from the journal of Al Capone's private secretary, court records, and other sources. It is the narrative of a Chicago youth by the name of Lemon Scoots who returns from the World War with an heroic record and soon afterward finds his livelihood as a saloon keeper outlawed by the Eighteenth Amendment. By degrees he becomes deeply involved in bootlegging activities until he lands in a penitentiary. A fellow prisoner advises him to apply to the leader of a Chicago racket, an ex-lieutenant of police. The countersign by which he is to introduce himself is 'Lemon Scoots, black ale, all right.'

From then on his adventures become increasingly precarious. He is employed in almost all the departments of the liquor traffic successively until at length he finds himself a trusted lieutenant of Scarface Al himself, who appears in a highly idealized form combining the picturesque features of Harun-el-Rashid, Mussolini, and Robin Hood. Anything glaringly improbable in the account is easily explained by the unfathomable gullibility

of the Americans. Herr Omm goes so far as to say: 'If he feels like hearing *Tosca*, he orders it for the next night at the opera. In Chicago his popularity is unbelievable. When in 1927 the Italian aviator, Pinedo, came to Chicago, Capone was the first to invite him to his home. But when he himself receives an invitation his secretary asks for a list of the guests before answering. If the names that do not please him are not struck out, he will not go. And usually fifty guests will be sacrificed rather than give up having Capone, even in the highest circles.'

In one respect, however, Scoots makes the same mistake as President Hoover—in overestimating the public's appetite for statistics. One would prefer a little more of Edgar Allan Poe, and considerably less of the Wickersham Report. In any case we must hail this engaging narrative of the dark ages of Chicago that comes to us from the land of the Rhine barons.

TRANSLATIONS INTO FRENCH

FRANCE is no longer the most provincial nation in the world if we are to judge by some figures released by the International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation. According to a new publication issued by that organization entitled *Index Translationum*, 408 books translated from foreign languages were published in France during the first half of 1932 as compared with 347 in Italy, 305 in Spain, 217 in Germany, 210 in the United States, and 181 in England. Dominique Braga, writing in *Le Crapouillot* of Paris, takes these figures as a point of departure for an essay on some of the foreign authors who have lately been introduced to France. He says that if 1929 was Remarque year and 1931 Sinclair Lewis year, 1932 was D. H. Lawrence year. He then continues as follows:—

'This Englishman of the new school is the victim in France of a vogue due unhappily to reasons of a nonliterary order. It can't be denied that *Lady Chatterley's*

Lover has had the greatest success here of any translation in the last twelve months. Poor Lawrence! He was certainly not a pornographic writer, and there is a certain cruelty in the fact that, when works of his like *The Fox* appeared some years ago in translation, they passed almost unnoticed. His success came when people discovered that he also described the gallant adventure of a gamekeeper and of an English noblewoman, and that he was the author of *Sons and Lovers*, and of *St. Maur*, which was entitled *The Woman and the Beast* in French.

'Among English translations two deserve particularly to hold the attention: *Tobias Transplanted* by Stella Benson and *The Good Companions* by J. B. Priestley. Stella Benson is undeniably an artist to her finger tips and possesses passion, directness, sincerity, and impetuosity. How trivial Priestley appears compared with her charm, yet *The Good Companions* had a tremendous sale in England. This is easily understood, for it is a joyous, unrestrained book that is a welcome contrast to recent psychological literature. Its humor and satire recall Dickens (with reservations).

'During 1932 a fat volume by Alfred Döblin and another by Israël Querido were added to the "Foreign Writers of Modern Prose" series. Why had a writer like Döblin, whom Germans consider one of their masters, never been translated into French? No doubt because of the difficulties offered by his style as well as because *Wang-lun* has 600 pages and *Berlin Alexanderplatz* still more. Both these difficulties have been surmounted in M. Pierre's masterly translation. Israël Querido, the greatest contemporary Dutch writer, died last year without seeing his chief work, *The Jordan*, translated into French. I do not hesitate to say that this book corresponds in literature to a kirmess of Rubens in painting. By its force, its richness, it attains a height unequalled, I believe, in the literature of any other nation.

'It could not have been difficulty of translation that hindered the publishers from bringing out sooner *An American Tragedy* by Theodore Dreiser. This North American writer is neither truculent nor labored. His style is indeed almost neutral, just sober and patient. But the mass of the work was overwhelming. Thanks should be returned to the publisher who was not dismayed by the mammoth task of bringing out a translation of 1,300 pages.

'Theodore Dreiser means, no doubt, to attribute symbolic value to his work, since he calls it *An American Tragedy*. But it must be observed that the hero does not represent the conquering, energetic type of man. Clyde Griffiths is buffeted by events and by his own desires. If picture of an American there be, it is the picture of a very surprising American.

'But at least it is a picture of American surroundings. The fidelity of the book is unbelievable. It has become a cliché to contrast photography, which reproduces all details, with art, which gives only the striking features. Well, Dreiser's work is a sort of "photography in time." It leaves nothing out, and this enumeration does not come from inability to select. It is deliberate. The repetition of the theme of the first chapter at the end of *An American Tragedy* shows that Dreiser is in control of his novel, that he constructed it.

'But is it not known that Dreiser is of German origin, the son of an immigrant to the United States? Here perhaps is the explanation. *An American Tragedy* applies faithfully the method of German university theses, where everything is in its place, nothing is forgotten. To this he adds that strength of concrete representation which seems to be specifically American (one sees it in the cinema).

'Does this mixture produce art? For my part, I believe it does. *An American Tragedy* deserves to be considered as one of the most marked literary expressions of present-day American genius. It belongs to the skyscraper school.'

FEUCHTWANGER ON HUMAN NATURE

BEFORE coming to the United States for his recent lecture tour, Lion Feuchtwanger, author of *Power*, *Success*, and *Josephus*, paid a visit to England, where he delivered himself of these opinions on the unchanging quality of human nature:—

'My new book, *Josephus*, although the scene takes place many centuries ago, presents the two problems that I have already spoken about—the problem of the one and the many, and the problem of the conscious and the unconscious. Josephus himself was intellectually an internationalist, but emotionally a nationalist. And what can be more modern than this story of the Jewish war (the book should have been called this and not *Josephus*), the story of the clash between the Jews, who were firm nationalists, and the Romans, whose attitude was an international one? Is it not the story of Europe to-day and a picture of its warring elements? It has as much to say to us as the Great War.

'Because I believe human nature has not changed during the last 2,000 years, I do not mean that it will not change in the next 2,000 years. I do. It will change enormously, and I think in the right direction. Machinery will create a different world. If I were to be asked why I think progress has been sidetracked in the last 2,000 years, I should say that it was due to the peasant. The peasant is invariably a nationalist. This soil that he tills—this is his, and his pride in it makes him believe that it is better than any other soil.

'Now what the machine does is to release the peasant from the soil and to put him into towns. It may seem at first that this is an unnatural movement, a process that will turn men into machines. But

consider it from another angle. The man in the factory is not such a violent nationalist as the peasant; he wishes to trade with his neighbor, not to go to war with him. That is why I am convinced we are moving toward a new, I hope a better, world, where the bitter nationalism of modern Europe will not have a place.'

AN INTERNATIONAL DANCE COMPETITION

OF THE two important influences on the dance at the present time, the Russian ballet since Diaghilev's death has been comparatively stagnant, whereas the Central Europeans have made continuous headway. The Germans think in terms of a small number of dancers (a great asset in times like these), and beyond this the personal success of Mary Wigman has given a big boost to all German dancing.

At the first international choreographic competition this year in Paris, the honors were carried off by Kurt Joos, ballet master of the Essen Theatre. The suite performed in the competition, 'Der Grüne Tisch,' constitutes practically a propaganda dance. War is depicted at its most horrible and, above all, at its most futile, and the prologue and epilogue, in which the statesmen sit around the green table trading in human misery, complete the thesis of the work. This is far from the kind of an evening's entertainment we used to expect in the days when Diaghilev, Bakst, Picasso, and Nijinski were contributing to the Russian ballet, but 1933 is in many respects more than nineteen years away from 1914. So on with the Central European dance, and let us hope that we of the audience can develop some of the endurance the performers have in such generous measure.

AS OTHERS SEE US

JAPAN LOOKS AT ROOSEVELT

ONLY one brief comment from Japan arrived in time to be included in our Roosevelt symposium of last month. We are therefore appending some characteristic statements from various newspapers and individuals on the subject of the Democratic victory. In almost every case Roosevelt's election is attributed to the depression, although a former conservative cabinet member, Kumaichi Horaguchi, attributes Mr. Hoover's defeat to the Stimson doctrine in the Far East. He writes as follows in the *Nippon Shimbun* of Tokyo:—

The Republican Party may have several reasons for its miserable defeat this time, but there is no doubt that its diplomatic failure constitutes one of the most important causes. Colonel Stimson's enthusiastic adherence to his strong Far Eastern policy must have invited the nation's antipathy. Stimson's policy is based upon pure theory in disregard of facts, perhaps for the reason that he is of jurist origin. In reading the so-called Stimson doctrine we understand how he founds reason upon vaporlike theory in utter disregard of facts. The officious diplomatic policy of Secretary Stimson is the traditional tactics of the Republican Party, and this roused national ill feeling.

Besides its misdirected diplomatic policy the Republican Party, as is evidenced by the unreserved attack of the press against it before the election, has accumulated a number of maladministrations during its twelve years of government, so that it has nearly completely lost the trust of the nation.

In thus tracing the causes of the defeat

of the Republican Party and studying the traditional administrative policy of the Democratic Party, it is not at all hard to imagine what the latter's policy ought to be. The most important change expected is that the new Administration will concentrate all of its energy upon reconstruction work at home. What concerns us most, however, is its foreign policy.

Since Stimson's foreign policy invited the ill feeling of the nation and partly contributed to his party's ill luck at the election, we may safely presume that a change will be effected in America's Far Eastern policy with the Manchurian question as its centre. In this respect we hope we shall find a more favorable situation than at present. By this, however, I do not mean that we may expect a change in the fixed national policy of America. If the United States decides to hold up the Nine-Power Treaty and Anti-War Pact as her state policy, we must be prepared to find her sticking hard to them under one pretext or another. Yet, it is not unthinkable that the new Administration will refrain from repeating the Stimson policy in regard to the Manchurian and League questions.

Cbugai Shogyo, the leading commercial paper in Japan, owned by the powerful Mitsui interests, says:—

We are informed that our Foreign Office, taking advantage of the change in American foreign policy consequent upon the late presidential election, designs to effect a sweeping renovation of Japanese-American relations, which have grown dangerous since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, and that it thus hopes to place our diplomatic policy on a sounder basis. In our Foreign Office they maintain in this connection that it is quite obvious that as long as the Ameri-

can Government adheres to Stimson's intimidatory anti-Japanese policy there can be no hope of any betterment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and it is most advisable to utilize the new Administration's liberal and conciliatory principles to rebuild Japanese-American relations. Since the improvement of international friendship depends upon mutual understanding, we expect much of Ambassador Debuchi, who is returning to his Washington post. Inasmuch, however, as the Ambassador has lost no small credit with the American public consequent upon the Chinchow incident, we understand that a wholesale shift is expected among the higher officials of the Foreign Office about the time when the new Administration comes into power.

Tokyo Nichi Nichi, a more popular daily paper, says:—

From the viewpoint of our national economy, which is extremely sensitive to the American economic condition, and of our diplomatic standpoint, it will not be wide of the mark to anticipate a more favorable situation with the Democratic Party in power. It is true that Mr. Baker, who is a member of the party, at the time of the Shanghai incident fanned the boycott against Japan, but it is also true that he disapproved of Hoover's Japan policy as being too deeply involved. The fact that the Hearst papers, while strongly supporting Mr. Roosevelt's candidacy, advocated a noninterference Far Eastern policy suggests that the Roosevelt Administration will not adopt such a strong policy as has been followed by Stimson.

In the light of the foregoing we trust that the delicate Japanese-American relations will be restored to their status before the Manchurian incident with the Roosevelt Administration in power.

The most amusing comment comes from a former New York representative of the Mitsui interests, Ryukichi Takagi:—

Secretary Stimson has repeatedly stimulated the enmity of the Japanese by assuming a strong attitude and making pronouncements unfavorable to Japan, thereby spreading his own unpopularity among the Japanese. I had a talk with him for hours, and I found him quite a good-natured man. It seems that this very nature of him makes him unrestrainable once he is vexed.

He well digests the special nature of the relations between Japan and Manchuria. The Japanese army attacked Tsitsihar and Shanghai after making it known that its action was to safeguard the South Manchuria Railway lines. This fact displeased Stimson and applied a match to the controversy. At the time when the Shanghai incident broke out the excitement of the Americans was at its zenith, even such an extreme attempt as boycotting Japanese goods being threatened. This clamorous anti-Japanese agitation was incited partly by the murderous depression against which the whole of America stood up to fight.

When the Manchurian incident broke out Japan ought to have notified the League of Nations of her own strong attitude to be taken thereafter and of the special interest she had in Manchuria. Britain prevented herself from being involved in a troublesome aftermath by reporting to the League the detailed account of her standpoint at the time of the Shanghai anti-British trouble.

There are those Japanese who hold pessimistic views on the Democratic Administration on the ground that its diplomatic policy shows little friendliness toward Japan. But when we turn back and see what a disadvantageous position we have been placed in through Stimson's Japan policy we cannot imagine worse developments of the situation under the Democratic Administration. And, what is better still, we understand it is a Democratic traditional policy not to interfere with foreign affairs. Therefore, it seems to me things will rather improve than remain

stationary with the Roosevelt Administration in power.

The national traits of Americans, unlike those of old countries such as Britain and France, are simple and lovable, though not without a tinge of *nouveau riche* and haughtiness to match. Japan's American policy should in future be to sell as much as possible under the cover of condescension, taking advantage of this very lovable haughtiness of the people of America. (Mr. Takagi stayed long in New York as the branch manager of the Mitsui Bussan Kabushiki Kaisha.)

AMERICA'S SUBSIDIZED SHIPPING

SIR ALAN G. ANDERSON, chairman of the Orient Steam Navigation Company, Limited, of London, devoted a considerable portion of his annual report to the competition British ships are encountering from those of America in the Far East:—

I will not give you a list of the subsidies paid to the foreign lines that directly compete with us, but as the whole world is being pressed to pay debts to one nation and as in my judgment the world market and world prices have been broken more by the refusal of that creditor nation to receive payment in goods and services than by any other human error, it may interest you to know to what length the United States of America goes in subsidizing her mercantile marine, in dumping shipping services on the world's market below cost, and in this way refusing to be paid her debts in the form of shipping services, that is, in the form in which the world, and in particular Great Britain, can pay.

From the official reports of the United States Shipping Board it appears that during the five years ending June 1928 the United States taxpayer paid in operating losses and in laying-up expenses of merchant ships on the average about £5,000,-

000 at par in each year: the total loss for the last twelve years, including the operating loss named above, but excluding interest, has been about £600,000,000 at par. Such immense figures by themselves mean nothing, but it may concern you to know that to this one gesture of refusal to accept the services of foreign ships in payment of past debts and current exports the United States taxpayer has devoted a sum of money that is approximately ten times the value of goods bought by the United States from the United Kingdom in 1929, a fairly normal year, or eight times the cost of the Panama Canal, or five times the face value of the preferred and common stock and funded debt of Bethlehem Steel, or twice the value, based on building cost less normal depreciation, of the 17,500,000 tons of British merchant ships engaged in foreign trade. Moreover, this sum exceeds by some £50,000,000 at par the total payments for war debts made to the United States by all her debtors up to last year.

It is difficult to exaggerate the injury the United States does to world trade and incidentally to herself by devoting such a mass of wealth to rejecting payment by her debtors in the form of shipping services. It almost seems that the more the world in its anxiety to be honest pours its much-needed spending power into the United States, the more resolutely the United States applies that wealth to preventing the debtor from repaying or recovering his prosperity, which is as necessary for the prosperity of the farmer and industrialist and investor of the United States as for anyone else. Perhaps the taxpayer of the United States does not grasp what is happening, and he is not enlightened by the shipowner, who naturally speaks as if he were engaged in normal enterprise at his own risk and deserved praise for his courage.

The Matson Line, for instance, is placing on the San Francisco-Honolulu-New Zealand-Australia run three new vessels whose capital cost and running expense

are much greater than the trade will repay, judged by past experience. The competing British line, which cannot dip into the public purse, is unable to offer the public such costly vessels. Moreover, the British line is excluded from the voyage between Honolulu and San Francisco, whereas the Matson Line competes freely between New Zealand and Australia. Listen now to the United States journalist and shipowner on this curious piece of commercial enterprise. First the journalist:—

'Usually adventures begin when ships sail, but the colorful arrival in the bay of this monarch of tropic travel was the occasion for officials of the Matson Line to announce they had invested \$25,000,000 in a gesture of challenge to British Empire trade.'

And listen to the shipowner:—

'I know that people have wondered how we could afford to invest \$25,000,000 as a gamble in futures when the Sydney-San Francisco trade has been unable to make the run of our three old-timers, *Sierra*, *Ventura*, and *Sonoma*, very profitable. We are going on the principle that service makes travel and travel makes trade. We are out to compete with the P. & O. and Orient Line and, with speed, comfort, and perfect efficiency, divert trade to this route.'

We must give a man credit for knowing

just how little his fellow countrymen know about the way their money is spent, but it is really hard to believe that anyone should be surprised at the courage of the Matson Line. If the Matson Line had found \$25,000,000 themselves, or even were being charged interest upon it at normal rates, or were in any serious risk of having to pay the eventual loss, we might indeed blame them for 'gambling'—ship-owners should not gamble—but as a grateful nation is taking the risk we must congratulate these American shipowners on being safe men and not gamblers.

As to the 'gesture of challenge' to Great Britain's trade and the intention to compete with the Orient Line, we shall not claim 'perfect efficiency,' nor can we play beggar-my-neighbor against the richest nation on earth; but we shall try to maintain a service on which British citizens can travel with comfort and dispatch at their own cost; and as to maintain that service nothing is more necessary than good men at sea and ashore, keeping their courage and their wits and their manners in these trying times; you will, I am sure, wish to send your compliments and thanks to our captains, officers, and men at sea. In my long voyages this year on *Orford* and *Orama* and on short trips in several other of our ships I was impressed not only by the discipline and smartness but by the evident wish to please shown by all hands.

THE GUIDE POST

(Continued)

politics to love and his latest book is devoted chiefly to the tender emotion. We present an excerpt from it, preceded by an English exposition of his philosophy.

A. C. Benson's essay on Swinburne and Watts-Dunton was entitled 'Theodore Watts-Dunton' in *Life and Letters*. But there was so much about Swinburne and Swinburne amounted to so much more than Watts-Dunton that we felt his name should be included in the title and we put it there. Anyone who has read Max Beerbohm's little masterpiece, 'No. 2, The Pines,' will enjoy Mr. Benson's description of an experience that closely paralleled Mr. Beerbohm's.

Only last month we translated a review of Dr. Paul Schebesta's new book on the Congo pygmies entitled *Bambuti, die Zwerge vom Kongo*. We are following this up with one of his own descriptions of the Negro women of Africa. Dr. Schebesta has traveled widely in the African jungles and knows them as well as any white man living.

We live in a sad world and America often seems the saddest part of it. But J. B. Priestley has found amusement in a contraption made in Los Angeles to help novelists and short-story writers develop their plots. His essay on this theme provides the most welcome antidote to such subjects as war, war debts, and Technocracy, which are supposed to occupy all the waking hours of every thinking American.

Special timeliness is attached to the interview with Premier Azaña of Spain in 'Persons and Personages.' In spite of the

hopes that the Third International entertains of Communist revolution, the present rulers of the country are stronger, abler men than Kerenski ever was and they have already avoided his fate for nearly two years instead of collapsing in eight months.

We are glad to report that the publishing house of Simon and Schuster will bring out in April an English translation by Eric Sutton of Hans Fallada's *Kleiner Mann—was nun?* Our September issue contained a highly laudatory review of this novel and last month we translated a chapter entitled 'A Child Falls Ill.' We commend the book to our readers as an accurate description of the plight of the white-collar worker, not only in Germany but in every industrialized country.

On the front inside cover of this issue appears a statement about THE LIVING AGE and Technocracy pointing out why we have devoted considerable space to the subject. The enormous public interest in Technocracy that followed the publication of Howard Scott's first signed article more than justifies our original belief that the problems Technocracy raises are the most important of our time and should therefore be given ample space and authoritative treatment here. The fact that Technocracy is an American organization caused us to turn to Mr. Scott for a statement, but it is significant that the first serious editorial comment on the subject, which caused him to issue that statement, appeared in England, not in the United States. We could ask for no more striking justification of our policy of translating and reprinting material from the foreign press. That policy will be departed from only when we cannot find in some European source a better treatment of world problems than we can find in the United States.

WAR AND PEACE

TRUE it is that the cannon has ceased to roar, the airplane to drop its deadly missile on great cities, and the favoring winds to carry the lethal gases since November 11, 1918. Yet man carries on war not only with deadly physical weapons but with other methods that may be just as detrimental to the development of peace and of prosperity.—*Frederic R. Coudert, international lawyer.*

It is only when all states maintain relations with one another that we shall be able to speak seriously of international coöperation in the cause of peace, and of international observation of peace pacts and agreements and the creation of universally recognized and authoritative international organizations.—*From the identical notes restoring normal relations between China and Soviet Russia.*

What I liked best about him [Lord Kitchener] was that, in spite of welcoming popularity, he was not vain; and he detested war. He told me that he had fought with the French in the Franco-Prussian War and had spent most of his life in soldiering, but that he had never seen a war out of which any permanent peace had come; and that, while fighting brought out great individual heroism, it was futile in settling great international disputes.—*Lady Oxford and Asquith.*

The weight of inter-governmental indebtedness left by the War has certainly been one of the chief causes of the whole financial crisis.—*Sir Arthur Salter, British economist.*

The people who are the most admired are the people who kill the most. If Gandhi killed 6,000,000 people he would instantly become an important person. All this talk of disarmament is nonsense, for if people disarm they will fight with their fists.—*George Bernard Shaw.*

At the stage of evolution the world has now reached, principles, unhappily, do not always accord with realities, which are controlled for certain distant races by imperative political and economic necessities. Japan is facing such necessities at present. She knows China can

do nothing alone, that Soviet Russia is reduced, for a long time ahead, to complete military impotence, that lack of directive force paralyzes the United States, and that the European powers are struggling with their own difficulties and cannot undertake a distant adventure. The temptation is strong for her to take advantage of circumstances to achieve her aspirations.—*'Le Temps,' Paris semi-official daily.*

Whether the United States is growing more or less militaristic must also be judged in the dubious light of conflicting theories and conduct. Traditionally insisting upon the supremacy of the civil over the military power, we have held to that doctrine and have played an important part in all movements for the curbing or abolition of war, including participation in a 'war to end war.' On the other hand, our interest in foreign markets and loans has greatly increased, and the need of a strong hand in economic diplomacy has been emphasized. Our military and naval establishments have grown, and systems of military training have been expanded. Our soldiers have fought in Asia, Europe, and Latin America.—*From the report of President Hoover's Research Committee on Foreign Trends.*

May, in the love for Bolivia, our mother, all love be merged and may your youth be the flash of joy that lights the encampment and increases the faith and perseverance of your brothers in sacrifice and glory.—*The rector of the University of San Xavier, La Paz, Bolivia, in a message to students fighting Paraguay.*

The god of nations will bring justice to our brave Paraguayan army.—*President Guggiari of Paraguay.*

'No more one-sided naval reduction.' This pledge given by the First Lord of the Admiralty will give heart to every Englishman who still remembers that the British Navy is the soul of our existence. The Navy, as Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell [chief Conservative whip in the House of Commons] rightly pointed out, is 'the helper and protector of mankind in trouble all over the world.'—*'The Saturday Review,' London Conservative Weekly.*

